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Abstract
A Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN) is an overlay on top of a number of diverse 
networks such as mobile ad hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, satellite networks, vehicular 
networks and the Internet. In terrestrial DTNs, the effectiveness of data dissemination is greatly 
affected by node mobility and end-to-end disconnections. The inherent mobility of nodes is 
exploited to forward data opportunistically when a contact arises through the store-carry-and- 
forward technique. Thus a DTN is characterized by limited bandwidth, long queuing delays, low 
data rate, low power and intermittent connectivity. The real challenge is how to make DTN 
resilient against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
In this thesis, we have investigated several DoS mitigating schemes for wired and wireless 
networks and found most of them to be highly interactive requiring several protocol rounds, 
resource-consuming, complex, assume persistent connectivity and hence not suitable for DTN. 
This thesis proposes three variants of DTN-Cookies of which any is selected as the light-weight 
authenticator based on the perceived Network Threat Level. For the intra-region scenario, it 
proposes a DoS-Resilient Authentication Mechanism to mitigate the effect of resource exhaustion 
DoS attacks. For the inter-region scenario, it proposes an enhanced version of the DoS-Resilient 
Authentication Mechanism. The proposed mechanism exploits the loose time-synchronization 
property of DTN, dividing communication contact time into timeslots. The mechanism uses 
variable seed values in different time slots for the computation and verification of DTN-Cookies, 
incorporates an ingress filter at the region gateways and uses the HMAC variant of DTN-Cookie.
This work also proposes a comprehensive defence mechanism against flooding DoS attacks. 
The aim of the proposed mechanism is to restrict the volume of malicious traffic during an attack. 
The rate limiting component monitors the number of bundles per traffic flow and different nodes 
are assigned different threshold values based on their capability and role in the network. The 
results show that the proposed DTN-Cookies accurately detect DoS attacks and outperform RSA- 
1024 digital signatures in terms of energy and bandwidth efficiency. The proposed mechanisms 
have been verified through simulations and their superior performance is established over 
solutions which are based purely on Public-Key Cryptography.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1
1 Introduction
In today’s world there are a variety of network deployments of which some are in remote regions 
of the world with extreme conditions which makes communications difficult. These networks are 
referred to as “Challenged” networks because they do not conform to the existing Internet 
protocol semantics. The success of the Internet is largely due to its ability to interconnect 
communication devices globally using a homogeneous set of protocols, called the Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite. Connectivity on the Internet relies on wired 
links which guarantees a continuously connected end-to-end paths between sources and 
destinations. The present Internet architecture is built on the assumption that there is a continuous 
bi-directional link between a communicating source and destination. The delay in sending and 
receiving packets is relatively small, data rates between two communicating entities are 
symmetric, and the rate of packet loss and error is low [1], [2]. Security is an end-to-end problem 
and not the concern of intermediate nodes.
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) is defined as an overlay architecture on top of a 
number of diverse regional networks such as Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSNs), the Interplanetary Internet, Satellite Networks and the Internet. The 
DTN overlay provides interoperability using gateway functionality across these varying network 
characteristics to provide a service that works regardless of the underlying networks technologies. 
DTN falls into the category of networks that do not conform to the assumptions of the Internet 
architecture and is characterised by limited bandwidth, long queuing delays, low data rates, 
delivery latency, intermittent connectivity due to frequent disruptions, and scarcity of resources 
such as battery power. Central Processing Unit (CPU) processing cycles, bandwidth and memory. 
DTN introduces a new protocol layer, the Bundle Layer, which sits on top of the transport layer. 
A bundle layer stores and forwards entire bundles (or bundle fragments) between DTN nodes [3]. 
The bundle layer bounds together the lower layers specific to individual regions so that 
application programs can communicate across multiple regions. It uses the carry-store-and- 
forward message forwarding technique, replication, parallel forwarding, error correction 
techniques and the inherent mobility of nodes to overcome these constraints and deliver bundles 
to a destination [4], [5], [6]. DTN as a networking concept has gained popularity over the years 
with a number of researches in application areas such as the Interplanetary Networks (IPNs) [7]
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for space and satellite communication, Airborne Networks (ANs) [8], Delay-Tolerant Sensor 
Networks [9], Vehicular Ad hoc Networks [10], UnderWater Networks (UWNs) [11] and Pocket- 
Switched Networks (PSNs) [12]. A number of research works have been carried out and are still 
on-going in DTN routing [13], congestion control/buffer management [4], convergence layer 
design [14], application layer design [15], and flow control [16] but very little on DTN security.
Providing security to challenged networks like DTN requires new techniques and a fresh 
approach. This is due to the wireless multi-hop communication which makes the channel open to 
attacks, lack of infrastructure, changing network topology due to mobility, intermittent 
connectivity and hmited power budget of participating nodes. Due to its unique characteristics, 
DTN is vulnerable to bundle injection and modification attacks, eavesdropping, unauthorised 
access and use of its scarce resources. Standard security protocols like Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) [17] and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [18] require more than one protocol round to 
exchange cryptographic materials and agree on the cryptographic cipher suites (algorithms). The 
round-trip delay of these traditional protocols to establish secure connections make them not 
suitable for DTNs since message transfer is opportunistic in DTN. In designing protocols to 
secure a DTN, such designs have to be very efficient and light-weight to guarantee and prolong 
the life of the network. To encourage large-scale deployment and use, DTN must guarantee secure 
and reliable communications.
In this thesis, we look into the aspect of service availability which is a critical requirement for 
computer and communication networks. This thesis investigates Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
in DTNs. The aim of DoS attacks is to prevent a network from fulfilling its functions by disabling, 
degrading and making network services unavailable to legitimate network users. In 
communication networks, there are key components that provide critical services such as 
monitoring or query access points, routers, gateways, cryptographic key managers, and network 
uplinks. However, this infrastructure can come under serious DoS attacks when an attacker sends 
a large number of requests which engage any of these key components in computationally 
intensive authentication protocol. Therefore, the protection of the DTN infrastructure and 
controlling access to the network is critically important.
DTN security emphasizes the common security goals of ensuring end-to-end data integrity and 
confidentiality. Also the DTN security architecture includes a hop-by-hop security feature to 
protect the network from unwanted traffic because network capacity is scarce and connectivity is 
infrequent. A DTN router in this case is at liberty to drop incoming traffic that cannot be 
authenticated as coming from a node’s trusted peers. Currently, it is not possible to stop DoS 
attacks from occurring since most the attacks are based on the use of protocols and services in an 
enormous scale, solutions can only mitigate the effects of these attacks. We performed an in-depth
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study of DoS attacks in different networks and investigate how they are mitigated. This thesis 
presents mechanisms for protecting a DTN against resource exhaustion and flooding DoS attacks.
1.1 Terminology
In this section important terms used throughout this thesis are defined for clarity and readability of 
the work.
Security: A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures 
that ensures the inviolability from hostile acts or influences [19]
Network Security: A continuous process towards meeting reasonable objectives of providing 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and access for legitimate users of network resources [20].
Vulnerability: A  flaw in security procedures, software, internal system controls, or 
implementation of an (information) system that may affect the confidentiality, integrity, and/or 
availability of data or services. Vulnerabihties include flaws that may be deliberately exploited 
and those that may cause failure due to inadvertent human interactions or natural disasters [21].
Threat: A potential violation of security, which exists where there is a circumstance, capability, 
action, or event that could breach security and cause harm. A threat is a possible danger that might 
exploit a vulnerability [21], [22].
Attack: an assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat. An intelligent act that 
is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services 
and violate the security policy of the system [23].
Security Attack: Any action that compromises the security of information owed by an 
organization [22]. Security attacks are classified as either passive or active attacks. Passive attacks 
include unauthorized reading of a message, file and traffic analysis. Active attacks include 
modification of messages or files and denial of service.
Security Mechanism: A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that is designed to 
detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack [22]. Examples of security mechanisms include 
encryption algorithms, digital signatures and authentication protocols.
Security Service: A  processing or communication service that enhances the security of the data 
processing systems and information transfers of an organization. The services are intended to 
counter security attacks and make use of one or more security mechanisms to provide the service 
[22]. Examples of security services include authentication, access control, data confidentiality, 
data integrity, non-repudiation and availability.
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Exploit: A program, script, or technique that makes it possible to take advantage of a vulnerability 
in a system [24].
Denial o f service: The prevention of authorized access to resources or the delaying of time- 
critical operations [25].
Denial o f service attack: An intentional attempt to prevent or degrade availability of any 
resources [25]. Denial of service attack is the prevention of authorized access to resources or 
delaying of time-critical operations [26].
Availability: the property of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity 
[26].
Channel: an information transfer path [26].
Security policy: the set of criteria for the provision of security services [26].
To Mitigate: To lessen in force or intensity, or to make less severe [27].
1.2 Problem Statement
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are three major information security requirements of any 
system or network. The open wireless channel used in DTN communications exposes it to 
numerous threats and attacks from adversaries. DoS attacks are a major threat to availabihty faced 
by all types of networks including DTN. The main goal of a DoS attack is to prevent the 
availability of network services such as control and data message delivery to authorised users. The 
effect of DoS attacks in DTN is even more aggravated due to the scarcity of resources, long 
periods of disconnectivity and the attacker’s objective is not only to render a target node 
inoperable but to cause a network-wide degradation of resources, service and performance. The 
attacker can achieve this by injecting packets into the network in order to exhaust node or link 
resources and partition the network. The major challenges in this area are:
Resource Exhaustion: Most access control schemes use strong authentication which is resource 
consuming and incurs a lot of traffic overhead. Although strong security translates to a more 
secure system, the performance of network devices with limited resources deteriorates, creating 
an avenue for new security threats like resource exhaustion. Bundle authentication is an important 
security service in DTN. The current requirement in the Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) 
specification [28] by the Delay Tolerant Network Research Group (DTNRG) makes it mandatory 
for bundles to be checked for authenticity and integrity hop-by-hop and end-to-end in multi-hop 
routing. Public key digital signatures are computationally-expensive operations requiring modular 
exponentiation which an attacker can exploit to his advantage. Energy consumption for Ron
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Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman (RSA) digital signatures [29] is asymmetric with 
different energy cost at the transmitter and receiver. The attacker can inject bundles with bogus 
signatures in order to keep legitimate DTN nodes busy. It is therefore important to consider the 
computational energy cost in the design of a security mechanism for DTN taking into cognizance 
the fact that a DTN comprises of nodes with different capabiUties and constraints. The application 
of light-weight mechanisms to detect and prevent attack bundles from entering and using the DTN 
infrastructure is desirable.
Flooding: In DTN, network-wide flooding may not be possible because there is no direct link 
from source to destination due to intermittent connectivity. An attacker can flood a victim node by 
remaining in close communication range and sending a large volume of useless bundles more than 
what the victim can handle or process. Flood-based DoS attacks consume both host resources and 
network bandwidth; the target (victim) node has limited resource to process incoming packets, 
becomes unresponsive to legitimate requests or becomes a congestion point. If attack traffic is 
able to congest the communication links that leads to the victim, legitimate traffic will be 
dropped. Apart from the victim of the attack, other network entities that rely on the 
communication links on the attack path will be disabled. Existing mechanisms to alleviate 
flooding attacks in DTN [30] are designed to support a particular routing protocol. A good flood 
defence mechanism for DTN should be distributed, scalable, energy-efficient and not tailored 
towards a specific routing protocol since the DTN architecture supports different routing 
protocols.
Unsuitability of Existing Schemes: Existing DoS mitigation schemes have been proposed for the 
Internet such as client puzzles and the Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP) cookies which are designed for well-connected, fixed networks with minimal delay. 
Several schemes have also been proposed to defend against DoS attacks in wireless sensor 
networks. These schemes are not suitable for DTN because they are highly interactive requiring 
several protocol rounds for connection establishment, resource-consuming and assume persistent 
connectivity.
1.3 Research Motivation
The main motivation for this research is to propose and develop scalable light-weight mechanisms 
that can detect and react quickly and accurately to DoS attacks. The proposed mechanisms should 
make the DTN authentication security service resilient against resource exhaustion DoS attacks 
by protecting scarce resources such as memory, bandwidth, communication contact time, battery 
power and CPU processing cycles from exhaustion and unauthorised use.
The objectives of this thesis are as follows:
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• Study DTNs, understand the features and characteristics that make them different from 
other networks, and obtain a sound background on how nodes communicate with each 
other.
• Understand the different types of attacks that a DTN can be subject to, appreciate how 
these attacks can disrupt communications between DTN nodes and waste resources. Study 
available techniques used to mitigate DoS attacks in other networks. Particular attention 
will be focused on techniques that detect nodes that engage in resource exhaustion and 
flooding DoS attacks.
• Design and implement security mechanisms which provide DoS-resilience in both intra­
region and inter-region DTN scenarios. The proposed security mechanisms should have 
the ability to operate in heterogeneous networks, support mobility and should be scalable.
• The proposed security mechanisms should be light-weight and not be targets of new 
attacks. Also the mechanisms should not increase the load during attack periods by 
generating additional traffic.
• The proposed DoS-resilient mechanisms should have a high probability to identify and 
discard attack traffic promptly while keeping false positives to a minimum.
• The proposed mechanisms should improve network performance in terms of delivery 
ratio, average latency, buffer time average, and overhead ratio and minimize 
computational and communication costs.
1.4 Research Methodology
The research methodology used in this thesis is based on simulating various attack scenarios using 
varying attack intensities. The first step is the formulation of the research problem and based on 
the problem definition, a review of the existing related literature for different networks was 
carried out. From the literature review into existing solutions/works in different networks, it was 
clear that the proposed solutions are unsuitable for DTN environments due to its unique features 
and network characteristics. Developed the objectives of the research and identified the 
requirements and the challenges in the design of security in delay/disruption tolerant networks. 
Based on this, we proposed three variants of light-weight DTN-Cookies and schemes to mitigate 
resource exhaustion attacks in the intra-region and inter-region scenarios and flooding attacks in 
the inter-region scenario. Detailed application scenarios have been described and simulation and 
analysis of results show that our proposed mechanisms give better performance over schemes 
which use Public-Key Cryptography. Directions for future work and research are identified and 
discussed in chapter 7.
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1.5 Thesis Contributions
The unique features and characteristics of DTNs such as long variable round trip communication 
time, intermittent connectivity, and low power budget of nodes make the design of a suitable DoS 
resilience scheme more challenging than in most conventional networks. We have thoroughly 
investigated the topics listed in the objectives section and the following are the major 
contributions of this thesis.
• We investigate the DTN architecture, its characteristics, environment of deployment, 
applications and what makes security design in DTN different from conventional wired 
and wireless networks.
• We investigate the existing DoS mechanisms which provide defence in challenged 
networks such as MANETs, WSNs, Wireless Terrestrial Networks, Satellite Networks 
and the Internet.
• We extended some in-built packages such as Core.java, Routing.java and Report.java in 
the ONE simulator to suit the mechanisms proposed in this thesis. A new package 
Security.java is defined because the ONE simulator has no in-built security functionality.
• We propose three variants of DTN-Cookies for hop-by-hop bundle authentication. The 
DTN-Cookies are energy-efficient, light-weight, hard to forge and protect the bundle 
blocks against modification attacks.
• We propose a DoS-Resilient Authentication Mechanism (DoSRAM) which uses the 
proposed DTN-Cookies to protect DTN nodes against resource exhaustion attacks in the 
intra-region scenario.
• We propose an enhanced version of DoSRAM which uses the proposed DTN-Cookies 
and ingress filtering. A DTN-Cookie is generated using variable nonce values in different 
timeslots to provide resilience against resource exhaustion and source address spoofing 
attacks in the inter-region scenario.
• We propose a comprehensive mechanism which combines Enhanced-DoSRAM, ingress 
filtering and rate-limiting techniques to detect source address spoofing and flood-based 
DoS attacks by an attacker.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized into 7 chapters and 3 appendices. In addition to this chapter, the 
remaining chapters are as follows:
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Chapter 2 gives a detailed description of DTN, its evolution, type of contacts, architectures, 
application scenarios and the component devices which make up a DTN. Finally we conclude the 
chapter with a list of causes of delay and disruption in challenged networks.
Chapter 3 discusses DTN security, types of security blocks and the concept of security zones. 
Security threats to the DTN architecture are enumerated and the general security requirements for 
DTN are listed and discussed. A detailed survey on DoS attacks and different mitigation schemes 
in heterogeneous networks such as WSNs, MANETs, terrestrial networks, satellite networks and 
DTN is presented.
Chapter 4 describes DoSRAM and its implementation which is based on the use of light-weight 
and hard to forge DTN-Cookies. Bundle authentication is a very important security service used 
to protect the DTN infrastructure from misuse. DTN security protocols should be designed to be 
highly robust against DoS attacks. The protocols should not introduce new DoS threats such as 
resource exhaustion. DoSRAM is resistant to resource exhaustion attacks as shown in the results 
in this thesis.
Chapter 5 describes an enhanced version of DoSRAM which uses variable nonce values in 
different timeslots to authenticate regional gateways. This version exploits the time- 
synchronization capability of DTN nodes and is resilient against an attacker that spoofs source 
addresses by incorporating an ingress filtering mechanism.
Chapter 6 describes a comprehensive mechanism which mitigates the effects of flood-based DoS 
attacks in DTN. The proposed mechanism is dynamic and distributed and incorporates ingress 
filtering techniques and rate limiting filters at DTN gateways. The aim of the proposed 
mechanism is to protect the DTN architecture against the misuse of its scarce resources by 
authorized and unauthorized entities.
Chapter 7 draws conclusions on the thesis and outlines directions for future work.
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2 DTN Overview
In the Internet, communication is based on packet-switching in which packets can travel 
independently from source to destination through a network of links connected by routers. The 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a time-tested transport layer protocol for the Internet 
which ensures reliability, flow control and congestion control [31]. TCP is an interactive protocol 
which does not often work in challenged networking scenarios. This is as a result of excessive 
latency which limits its throughput performance and inference in connection establishment [32]. 
A three-way handshake is required before a network node can send any application data using 
TCP and this requires 1.5 round trips (RTTs). Also, there is a generic two-minute timeout 
implemented on most TCP stacks: a connection breaks when no data is sent or received for two 
minutes [33]. TCP also uses positive and negative acknowledgement to control retransmission of 
lost or corrupt segments using Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) [3]. A number of emerging 
networks are evolving which support power-constrained mobile, satellite and interplanetary 
communications. Each of these networks is adapted to a particular communication region where 
communication characteristics are completely homogenous (i.e. same technology) [3]. Therefore 
there is a need for a new set of delay/disruption tolerant protocols to support communications in 
these scenarios [33].
“DTN is an overlay architecture intended to operate above the protocol stacks of distinct 
Intermittently Connected Networks (ICNs), and enable gateway functionality between them 
through the use of storage capacity, a variety of protocol techniques, replication and parallel 
forwarding, forward error correction and many other techniques for overcoming communication 
impairments” [6]. The target of the DTN architecture is to interconnect isolated and sometimes 
disconnected heterogeneous regional networks [34]. Gateways act as interconnection points to 
provide interoperability between disjoint and dissimilar regions [32] as shown in Figure 2-4 of 
section 2.6. Interoperability Gateways (IG) are situated at these points and used to enforce policy 
and control. Nodes within each region can exchange data through their respective interoperability 
gateways. DTN is concerned with highly challenged networks with no end-to-end connectivity 
between source and destination [35] and the overlay allows a DTN node to handle delays and 
disruptions. Intermediate nodes on that path provide storage for application data and can handle
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retransmissions in an ARQ scheme without end-to-end connectivity [7]. This chapter lists and 
describes a number of challenged networks and provides a chronological account into the 
evolution of DTNs. It also discusses the types of contacts, routing, architectures, application 
scenarios and major causes of delay and disruption in DTN.
2.1 Challenged Networks
The author in [4] categorizes these emerging networks as “Challenged” networks which may 
violate some of the assumptions of the Internet or may not be compatible with the current TCP/IP 
model. He listed some examples of challenged networks to include:
• Satellite/Space Networks: Satellite/Space Networks include near-earth satellite 
communications, very long-distance radio or optical links (e.g. in deep space 
conununications with light trip propagation delays in seconds and minutes), free-space 
optical communications, acoustic links in air and water. These systems are prone to high 
delays and predictable disruption, and may be disconnected due to environmental factors 
such as weather. Networks such as these provide predictably-available store-and-forward 
network service that is occasionally available for example, during the periodic “pass” of 
Low-Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites each day.
• Sensor/Actuator Networks: These are networks whose end nodes are limited in terms 
of power, memory and CPU capability. Each sensor network is made up of thousands or 
possibly millions of nodes whose communication is scheduled in order to save on battery 
power. Sets of nodes are addressed in aggregate and they rely on “proxy” nodes to 
translate Internet protocols to the sensor network native protocols.
• Terrestrial Mobile Networks: Due to mobility or variations in signal strength, these 
networks may become unexpectedly partitioned in a periodic, predictable fashion. An 
example is a bus which acts as a store-and-forward message switch having limited Radio 
Frequency (RF) communication capability and providing a message-switch service to its 
nearby clients as it travels. Nearby clients can conununicate to distant entities which the 
bus will visit in the future.
• Military Ad hoc Networks: These are devices which operate in very harsh and hostile 
environments where disconnection is a constant feature due to mobility, intentional 
jamming or environmental factors. In this scenario, voice traffic is accorded higher- 
priority over data-traffic which has to contend for available bandwidth and suffers several
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seconds of delay in the process. Strong infrastructure protection requirements are also 
needed in such systems.
2.2 Evolution of DTN
Initial research in DTNs dates back to the 1980’s when the Consultative Committee for Space 
Data Systems (CCSDS) was created [36]. The CCSDS is made up of a number of renowned and 
world-class space agencies whose objective was to create standards for deep space 
communications which are published in the Blue Books. A number of protocols were developed 
by the CCSDS which could withstand delay and disruption over multiple network layers and one 
of such outstanding protocols is the CCSDS File Delivery Protocol (CFDP) [37]. The CFDP is a 
link layer protocol which guarantees data transfers between DTN nodes and remote networks. The 
US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) provided funding to the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for 
research in Interplanetary Internet. The principal objective of the project was to make it easy for 
applications on earth to conununicate with applications on-board a spacecraft. The aim was for 
applications to use a protocol stack which fulfils the need of a particular scenario and this was 
made possible with an intermediate Network Protocol between the optimized lower layers and the 
application layer [38].
The Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) inaugurated the Delay Tolerant Network Research 
Group (DTNRG) in 2002 to extend work on the Interplanetary Networks (IPN) concept to include 
terrestrial wireless networks. An outstanding design difference between IPN and terrestrial 
wireless networks is how connectivity is modelled and handled. In IPN, connectivity is scheduled 
since delay and disruption are predictable. However in terrestrial environments, connectivity is 
opportunistic due to the inherent mobility of nodes as in MANETs and data mules. A DTN is an 
overlay on top of regional networks including the Internet [3]. The DTN network model is a time 
varying graph as opposed to being a simple graph which most networking systems adopt [39]. 
The DTN architecture consists of a network of independent internets each characterised by 
Intemet-like connectivity in within, but having occasional communication opportunities among 
them [40]. Connectivity can be scheduled while sometimes it can be random. The independent 
internets which are located apart form the DTN regions and are connected through a system of 
DTN gateways. Each DTN region (internet) relies on its own protocol stack that best suits its 
conununication means, infrastructure and technologies. At the DTN nodes, a new overlay layer 
(bundle layer) is added on top of the traditional transport layers to provide end-to-end data 
transfers among the DTN regions.
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The DTN overlay architecture operates above the existing protocol stacks found in other 
network architectures [32]. For example in the Internet, the overlay may operate over TCP, in the 
Interplanetary Internet it might operate over CFDP/CCSDS, and in sensor/actuator networks it 
may operate over a yet-to-be-standardized sensor transport protocol. The purpose of the DTN 
architecture is to support interoperability among underlying challenged regional networks. The 
wireless DTN technologies may be diverse and may include other technologies such as Ultra- 
Wide Band (UWB), free space optical, and acoustic (sonar or ultrasonic) technologies other than 
radio frequency (RF) [3]. Factors such as link delays, link connectivity, data-rate asymmetry, 
addressing and reliability mechanisms, trust boundaries, error rates, and quality of service 
provisions define the boundaries between these regions. These highly heterogeneous networks 
unlike the Internet are prone to long and variable delays, high error rates, arbitrarily long periods 
of link disconnection and large bi-directional data-rate asymmetries.
To overcome these challenges, a DTN uses store-and-forward message-switching technique. 
The routers are equipped with persistent storage for their queues because a communication link to 
the next hop may not be readily available for a long time. A node from the communicating pair 
may send or receive data much faster than the other node and in a more reliable manner. Message 
switching technique provides the abstraction which allows a network node to have prior 
knowledge of message size and performance requirements thereby making it easy to determine 
intermediate storage space and transmission bandwidth which helps in scheduling decisions.
Node A
Store
NodeB
Store
NodeC
Store
NodeD
Store
Figure 2-1 Store-and-Forward-Message-Switching
Figure 2-1 shows four DTN nodes (A, B, C, D) which are equipped with persistent storage. Node 
A is the bundle sender while node D is depicted as the bundle receiver. Nodes B and C are the 
DTN routers or bundle forwarders. As a result of intermittent connectivity (caused by mobility 
and power conservation by nodes), persistent storage is used to queue bundles until outbound 
links to destination become available. Today, there are a growing number of devices which are 
mobile but power-constrained especially mobile wireless communication devices. For these nodes 
to conserve their battery power or maintain privacy, links must shut down. This leads to 
intermittent connectivity where a network is partitioned due to non-existent route from a source to
12
Chapter 2. DTN Overview
a destination. Packet loss on the Internet is as a result of intermittent connectivity and packets 
which cannot be forwarded immediately are discarded. Lost packets may be retransmitted using 
slower retransmission timing. In the event of severe packet losses, TCP simply terminates the 
session and this is what causes applications to fail. Communication between intermittently 
connected nodes is supported in DTNs by adopting a method that isolates delay using a carry- 
store-and-forward technique.
B.R3 [{0, Sa t e l l i t e}  I
DTN G
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( B . R 4 }
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Figure 2-2 Regional Networks with Dissimilar Protocol Stacks Forming a DTN [4]
Four regions representing the Internet (A), vehicular network (B), intranet (C) and satellite 
network (D) respectively are shown in Figure 2-2 to illustrate the DTN architecture concepts of 
regions and gateways. In region B, a mobile DTN gateway is mounted on a bus which visits DTN 
gateways 3 and 5. A low-earth orbiting satellite link (LEO) in region D provides periodic 
connectivity which can be more regular than the bus due to vehicular congestion and other delays. 
Region boundaries represent interconnection points between different network protocol and 
addressing families. Translation between region-specific encodings and the enforcement of policy 
and control take place at these interconnection points [4].
A bundle is a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) of the DTN bundle protocol which is made up of a 
sequence of two or more blocks of data which are used for different purposes and passed between 
entities participating in Bundle Protocol communications [41]. Multiple instances of the same 
bundle can exist in different parts of the network at the same time in different parts of the network 
(i.e. in memory of bundles nodes or in transit between nodes). Agents are nodes that bear unique 
names within a DTN region and can be any of three types: source, destination or forwarding 
agents [42].
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Figure 2-3 DTN Architecture and Protocols [42]
Figure 2-3 shows the protocol stack of two regions (Region 1 and Region 2) in a DTN. DTN- 
aware nodes (source-node, router, gateway and destination-node) have an additional layer called 
the bundle layer above their native transport layers. A single bundle layer protocol is used across 
all networks (regions) that make up a DTN [41]. The DTN-aware nodes in Region 1 have IP as 
the network layer protocol and TCP as the local transport protocol. The DTN gateway runs both 
IP and TCP at the network and transport layers respectively on one side of its protocol stack, and 
a set of dissimilar native protocols peculiar to Region 2 on the other side of the protocol stack. 
This allows the gateway to provide interoperability between the two regions despite the 
dissimilarity in their protocol stacks. The gateway is responsible for message storage and also 
functions as a DTN forwarder [32].
The physical layer can be optical fibre, coaxial cable or radio link and examples of data link 
layer protocols include Ethernet, High-level Data Link Control (HDLC) and CCSDS Space 
Packet Protocol. Network layer protocols include IPv4, IPv6 and EPsec. Transport layer protocols 
include Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and Licklider Transport Protocol (LTP). The Bundle Protocol (BP) 
is used for bundle layer communications and an example of application layer protocol is the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
2.3 Causes of Delay and Disruption in DTN
We will now explain the causes of delay and disruption in DTN. Delay is the end-to-end latency 
of the data transmission which maybe as a result of bundles being buffered at intermediate nodes, 
the inherent delay in the transmission medium and the overall configuration of the system. 
Disruption is influenced by factors that cause connections to break or not to be established.
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transient or fast changes in some components of the system or environment. The author in [35] 
provides a summary of the causes of delay and disruption in DTN environments.
Finite speed of radio signal and the scale of the solar system 
Over-subscribed communications system 
Power conservation (on/off/sleep modes)
Stealth requirements
Malware/Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
Network interface selection decisions 
Long period of outages (e.g. snow on solar panels)
Visibility restriction in line of sight communications 
Node movement in and out of coverage area 
Radio range restrictions due to power conservation 
Lack of application activity 
Beacon-based node wake-up
2.4 DTN Architectures
In order to adapt these dissimilar networks to have links similar to the Internet’s TCP/IP, a 
number of approaches has been attempted [4].
• Link Repair Approach: These methods try to make the Internet protocols believe they
are operating over a well-connected infrastructure by maintaining the end-to-end
reliability and fate-sharing model of the Internet. This however requires the use of IP in
all nodes in the networks.
• Use of Proxy: Using a special proxy agent, challenged networks can be attached to the 
edge of the Internet. Through this method, access is provided to and from the challenged 
networks to the Internet. It does not however provide a means whereby these networks
can be used for data transit. Without the support for data transit, the full capability of
these networks will never be realized.
• Message-Oriented Overlay Approach: In order to achieve interoperability between 
these diverse challenged networks, a general-purpose message-oriented and reliable 
overlay architecture is recommended. This approach supports asynchronous delivery 
which may be combined with TCP/IP where necessary. The architecture is inspired by the 
interoperability properties of the classical Internet design, the robust non-interactive 
delivery semantics of electronic mail which can be liken to a subset of classes of service
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provided by the US postal system. This is the approach used widely in DTN and in this 
thesis.
2.5 DTN Application Scenarios
DTN has a wide range of application areas of which a few are presented and discussed below.
• Deep Space Communications: For DTN purposes, we consider distances beyond the 
geosynchronous orbit as being in deep space. It is possible to use TCP proxies to improve 
the performance of TCP for geosynchronous satellites; this is not possible at lunar 
distances. There are three phases to deep space missions: prelaunch, cruise and approach. 
The DTN approach is required in the last two phases. DTN is needed due to the long 
delays experienced by communication signals from deep space to devices on the earth. At 
times data can be transmitted through orbiters when the robot is not in direct line of sight 
with ground station.
• Application in Developing Countries (Rural Kiosks): Rural kiosks can provide a 
wide range of valuable services to developing regions. Useful services such as birth, 
marriage and death certificates, land and medical records, and agricultural consulting to 
the most remote parts of the world. KioskNet uses low-cost computing devices as kiosks 
and buses as mechanical backbone to move data to Internet gateways [43]. The Haggle 
project is a Pocket-Switched variant of a DTN network where people carry devices in 
their pockets and can communicate with other devices within range or with a 
communication infrastructure. Haggle is built on the original DTN architecture and 
provides a data-centric architecture which is less infrastructure-dependent as applications 
do not have to worry on how data is transported. Applications simply take advantage of 
every contact opportunity both within their local neighbourhoods and with Internet 
servers to propagate data [43].
• ZebraNet: ZebraNet is a project designed to track zebra movements where each zebra 
has a power-conserving, global positioning aware tracking collar strapped to the neck. 
The collar come ON every two hours and exchange Global Positioning System (GPS) 
information with any collar which is in range. Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) base stations provide the required coverage and data mules can be used to collect 
all data from Zebra collars. ZebraNet is a power-aware wireless ad hoc sensor network 
prototype which requires large bandwidth and computational power than other sensor 
networks [6]. ZebraNet is concerned with the development, evaluation, testing and
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implementation of systems that combine computing, wireless communication and 
persistent storage with Global Positioning System (GPS) and other sensors [44]. Using 
the DTN approach, this project can be made cheaper and have more scale.
• Undersea Acoustic Networks: Undersea Acoustic Networks are known for then- 
inherent delays and data is transferred through “Sonar” a technology for sound transfers 
in deep water. End-to-end latencies are measured in minutes due to the high rate of packet 
loss. Signals in these networks experience delays, multipath, reflections, as do RF signals. 
DTN is a good choice for such high delay communication environment.
• Military Tactical Networks: The application of military Tactical networks is due to 
disruption rather than delay. Disruption can be due to several reasons such as jamming of 
signals, breaking of troops for a very long time, mobile nodes, and geographical 
environment. These networks are called C2 “Command and Control networks” and are ad 
hoc in nature, slow and repetitive. Military tactical networks are typically DTN networks 
because DTN supports the push and pull mode of information which is typical of military 
networks. In the Push mode, a sender takes the initiative to send information to the 
receiver. An example situation is in battlefield broadcasting and in Operations during the 
dissemination of orders by a commander [45].
• Telemedicine in Underdeveloped Regions: DTN can be the best choice in 
facihtating general practitioners who are based in developed regions to make contact with 
specialists in urban centres [46]. Telemedicine might require the transmission of large 
files representing medical images, or medical records of patients relating to a particular 
diagnosis. Technologies such as interactive video, high resolution monitors, high speed 
computer and switching systems, fibre optic, satellite and cellular phones have been used 
over the years to support telemedicine. With the absence of Internet access in most remote 
regions of the world, such general practitioner-specialist consultation is made possible 
through telemedicine. It will be very difficult to make such transfers on long and 
disruptive channels without DTNs.
• Environmental Monitoring: A network of data sensors with acoustic, seismic, video 
and some data processing capabilities can be deployed for environmental monitoring. 
Mobile data mules such as buses, cars, boats can be made to travel among the sensors to 
collect data and transfer them to the data servers. As an alternative, sensors can 
communicate directly with base stations in a scheduled or event-report basis. Two
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applications are presented in [47] for monitoring lake water quality in rural lakes and 
noise level logging in urban areas and along motorways. Other examples include forest 
fires support, earth quake monitoring and glacial sensor networks.
2.6 DTN Nodes
A DTN node is an entity with a bundle layer and maybe a host, router, or gateway which act as 
source, forwarder or destination of bundles and are defined below [3]:
• Hosts: Sends and/or receives bundles, but does not forward them. A host can be a source 
or a destination of a bundle transfer. The bundle layers of hosts that operate over long- 
delay links require persistent storage to queue bundles until outbound links become 
available. Hosts may optionally support custody transfers [3]. A DTN node is an entity 
that runs an instance of the Bundle protocol and can be used by applications to send or 
receive messages in bundles [33]. Often times, some nodes act as report-to-destinations 
for diagnostic information carried in bundles. Applications also use nodes to bind to End­
point Identifiers (EIDs).
• Router: Forwards bundles within a single DTN region and may optionally be a host. The 
bundle layers of routers that operate over long-delay links require persistent storage to 
queue bundles until outbound links become available. Routers may optionally support 
custody transfers [3].
• Forwarder: A DTN forwarder is primarily responsible for the forwarding of DTN 
bundles between DTN nodes using the underlying transport protocol specific to that 
region [32]. Forwarding may involve storage and scheduling of bundles, aggregation of 
bundles, generation of status reports, enforcement of security policy and participation in 
network time synchronization.
• Gateway: Forwards bundles between two or more DTN regions and may optionally be a 
host. The bundle layers of gateways require persistent storage and support custody 
transfers [3]. Gateways provide conversions between the lower-layer protocols of the 
regions they span. Nodes within a region can only exchange data with nodes in other 
regions with the help of interoperability gateways (IG) [32]. For more details on DTN 
gateways see [4].
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Figure 2-4 DTN Nodes
Figure 2-4 illustrates the protocol stack of a DTN host, router and gateway. DTN routers and 
gateways optionally implement the application layer. Each entity has an additional layer (Bundle 
layer) operating above the native transport protocols. Each entity is equipped with persistent 
storage and the capacity to accept custody transfer. Nodes accepting custody transfer requests act 
as points of retransmission of bundles.
2.7 Region and Custody Transfer
Region and custody transfers are two important concepts in DTN which assist in the proper 
propagation of bundles within one or more administrative domains.
• Region; DTN as defined in the literature is network of networks and each network is 
called a DTN region. Communications within a region is homogenous (i.e. same 
technology) [3] and two nodes are in the same region can communicate without a gateway 
[4]. Placing a DTN node in a particular region is an administrative decision which is 
greatly influenced by connection dynamics, differences in protocol families or 
administrative policies [2]. Regions are delimited by criteria such as trust boundaries or 
global/local address partitions where every region in a DTN has a unique name. The 
concept of regions is very important to the DTN architecture as it provides a separation of 
namespaces, helps in the partitioning of routing information or applying specific policies. 
A sensor network, an intelligent highway. Wireless personal digital assistant (PDA) 
network and the Internet are examples of regions in DTN [3].
• Custody Transfers: Custody transfer is a hop-by-hop reliability framework used by the 
Bundle protocol. The responsibility for delivery of a bundle can be transferred between
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nodes (custodians) in the network. Once a node accepts custody for a bundle; it takes 
responsibility to use its resources to reliably store a bundle and forward it towards its 
destination which might require multiple transmissions until the bundle is delivered or 
some other node takes custody [48], [49]. This is in contrast to the Internet architecture 
where reliable delivery is the responsibility of the end-points due to the assumption of 
minimal end-to-end delays and the fact that nodes are well-connected most of the time.
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Figure 2-5 Custody Transfer in DTN
Figure 2-5 illustrates the concept of custody transfers and shows how bundles are transmitted 
from the bundle source to the bundle destination. A bundle is sent from source application down 
the protocol stack of the host device. The custodian can be a DTN gateway which accepts custody 
of the bundle and stores it in persistent storage with some potential delays (in minutes, hours, days 
or months). Custody transfer is used to provide node-to-node retransmission through the support 
of the bundle layer by allowing the source to delegate retransmission responsibility. It is an 
optional service which is most suitable for disruptive and discontinuous channels. No single 
transport layer protocol, the primary means of reliable transfers operates end-to-end across the 
DTN [3].
• DTN Delivery Options: The delay tolerant networking architecture [34] defines eight 
(8) delivery options which include: custody transfer requested, source node custody 
acceptance accepted, report when bundle delivered, report when bundle acknowledged by 
application, report when bundle received, report when bundle custody accepted, report 
when bundle forwarded and report when bundle deleted. The first four delivery options 
are designed for ordinary use by applications while the last four are designed primarily 
for diagnostic purposes and can only be used in networks where there is congestion or
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attack. Other delivery options when security is enabled as defined in [50] include: 
confidentiality required, authentication required and error detection required.
2.8 Types of Contacts
There are three types of contacts which nodes in DTN can use based on the application, 
networking scenario and node type.
• Opportunistic Contacts: A sender and receiver make contact at an unscheduled time
for example a satellite, vehicle or aircraft may make contact and want to exchange
information when they are in line-of-sight or close enough to communicate using their 
available power. A likely example can be an unscheduled aircraft flying overhead and 
beaconing, and making public its readiness to communicate. This may represent an 
opportunistic contact [34].
• Scheduled Contacts: An agreement can be made to estabhsh contact at a particular
time and for a given duration [34]. Scheduled contacts may involve sending messages
between nodes that are in direct contact. This might involve storing information until it 
can be forwarded or the receive application can catch up with the sender’s data rate. 
Scheduled contacts need a lot of time-synchronization across the DTN [3].
• Predicted Contacts: Predicted contacts are not based on any fixed schedule. They are 
predictions of likely contact times and durations based on history of previously observed 
contacts or some other information. Routes may be chosen based on the confidence in the 
information for a predicted contact [34].
2.9 Time Synchronization in DTN
The DTN architecture needs well-defined time synchronization for identifying message fragments 
and discarding messages that have exceeded their time-to-live (TTL) [34]. Based on observation, 
many distributed applications in challenged environments require stringent time synchronization. 
This is especially so in the DTN approach where scheduling and path selection might require 
accurate contact start and end times in advance. DTN congestion management techniques require 
time synchronization to predict when the network might be less congested. Time synchronization 
is needed in DTN based on several features that are common to many challenged networks. The 
DTN architecture does not try to provide real-time control loops instead it aims to deliver pre­
programmed control instructions for execution in precise time in the future. De facto data analysis
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and pre-programmed control instructions can be very difficult without any form of reasonable 
time synchronization [4].
Time synchronization is required in DTN security to guard against replay attacks while in 
DTN routing, time synchronization is used to rid the DTN routing infrastructure of expired 
bundles [32]. Timestamps are typically used for logging events and the Bundle Protocol uses 
timestamps for three reasons to guarantee network efficiency and resource protection [51]. The 
useful life indicator of bundles prevents the network from storing and forwarding bundles whose 
useful lifespan have expired. The lifetime helps prevent bundles from looping continuously in the 
network as a result of routing loops. Finally the originating timestamp helps in the unique 
identification of bundles and the re-assembly of bundle fragments. The original purpose of 
timestamps in DTN is to help intermediate nodes or destination nodes to determine when it is 
appropriate to drop a bundle or determine the age of a bundle.
Timestamps provide a more efficient way to test for freshness without introducing too much 
traffic into the network. This replaces the idea of the gateway broadcasting or sending a nonce as 
a freshness identifier at certain time intervals. Based on RFC 5050 [41], the creation timestamp is 
a concatenation of the bundle creation time and a monotonically increasing sequence number. The 
sequence number is incremented continuously (say every second) in order to make the 
concatenation of source BID and creation timestamp the unique bundle identifier. With this, 
bundles created at the same time interval by different nodes can be differentiated. The Bundle 
Protocol has an in-built assumption that DTN nodes have a basic time synchronization capability 
with a common, synchronized view of the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) [34], [51]. This is 
based on the initial design of DTN for deep space environments where the space-based agents are 
synchronized and highly scheduled with bandwidth and delays known in advance. The use of 
classical time protocols like the Network Time Protocol (NTP) is limited because it is not resilient 
to disruption and a very good source for UTC is the Global Positioning System (GPS) which is 
one non-DTN time solution. DTN nodes have the in-built capability to read the local system clock 
values and determine the correct time. This is the reason why it possible for DTN nodes to set the 
creation time when bundles are created and sent into the network and checked for expiry on 
reception.
At present, there is on-going debate in the DTN research community on the justification for 
DTN rehance on time synchronization to perform store-and-forward networking as specified in 
RFC 5050. The use of absolute timestamps and coordinated clocks in DTN to meet the 
requirements stated earlier has been criticized or supported by many. There are suggestions to 
either strengthen or replace the lifetime mechanism with a countdown counter such as a “hops-to- 
live”. Hops-to-live explicitly discards bundles that have traversed more than a set number of hops.
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This will allow bundles to expire when their lifetime is decremented to zero without any 
requirement for loose synchronization.
2.10 Routing in DTN
In a DTN where an end-to-end path may never exist, routing is therefore achieved over time by 
employing persistent-storage at the intermediate nodes [34]. The “DTN routing problem amounts 
to a constrained optimization problem where edges may be unavailable for extended periods of 
time and a storage constraint exists at each node”. Traditional routing schemes adopt the shortest 
path techniques without considering intermediate buffering and bandwidth availability while in 
DTN, the routing objective is yet to be defined [2]. Proactive routing requires routes to be 
computed automatically irrespective of traffic arrivals as in the case of Destination-Sequenced 
Distance Vector (DSDV) [52] and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [53] routing protocols. 
Reactive routing requires routes to be discovered on-demand when packets have to be delivered to 
an unknown destination. Traditional reactive routing protocols include Ad hoc On Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) [54] and Direct Source Routing (DSR) [55].
These protocols fail in a DTN environment when they try to calculate paths to nodes that are 
currently unreachable and fail to return a successful route due to a lack of response. A DTN is 
assumed to experience frequent and long periods of disconnection or partitioning without the 
existence of any end-to-end path. In contrast however, routing in conventional networks is based 
on a “shortest policy-compliant” path in a connected graph with no consideration for intermediate 
storage and bandwidth capacity availability [56]. The DTN routing problem is different and more 
challenging than the standard dynamic routing problem. In standard dynamic routing, the network 
is assumed to be connected or suffer disconnection over very short intervals. In this case, the aim 
of the routing algorithm is to discover the best route to move/deliver packets to their destination. 
In [56], DTN routing is described as a constrained optimization problem with storage limitation at 
each node and edges (links) are unavailable for long periods of time. Routing in DTN can be 
categorised broadly into four classes namely: Single-copy, N-copy, unlimited-copy and 
Estimation-based. Based on the work in [57], the ONE simulator includes a framework for 
defining the algorithms and rules for routing. Six ready implementations of DTN routing 
protocols include:
• Direct Delivery and First Contact: Direct Delivery is a single copy routing protocol 
where a single copy of a message exist in the network at any point in time. In Direct 
Delivery routing, a node carries the message until it encounters the final destination node. 
First Contact is a single copy routing protocol where a single copy of a message exist in 
the network. Nodes forward messages to the first node they encounter in a “random walk”
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search of the final destination [57], [58].
Spray-and-Wait: Spray-and-Wait is an n-copy routing protocol. It limits the number of 
message copies that can be created based on a set (configured) maximum. The scheme 
“sprays” a number of message copies into the network and “waits” till the number of 
copies are exhausted or one of the receiving nodes meets the destination. Spray-and-Wait 
comes in two variants: Normal mode, where a node gives one copy of a message to a 
contact. In the Binary mode, half of the number of message copies is forwarded and when 
the number of copies reduces to a single copy, it is only forwarded if the node encounters 
the final destination [59] . Spray-and-Wait is a highly scalable DTN routing scheme used 
in different scenarios with good message delivery, low delivery delays and few 
transmissions per message delivered.
PRoPHET: PRoPHET stands for Probabilistic Routing Protocol using History of 
Encounters and Transitivity. It is a flooding-based routing protocol which estimates the 
“likelihood” of a node’s ability to deliver a message to the final destination based on 
encounter history [60]. PRoPHET is based on the assumption that the mobility of nodes is 
non-random in order to improve message delivery, keep buffer utilization and 
communication overhead low. PRoPHET uses a probabilistic metric called delivery 
predictability, P(x, y> e [0, 1], at every node x for each known destination y. The delivery 
predictability is a measure of a node’s ability to deliver a message to destination. 
PRoPHET works in a similar manner to Epidemic Routing [61] because nodes use a 
sunnnary vector (an index of all buffered messages) during the exchange of messages. 
The summary vectors contain predictability information which helps a node to decide 
which messages to request from the other peer based on the forwarding strategy used. 
PRoPHET was developed to make routing more efficient in intermittently connected 
networks.
Epidemic: Epidemic Routing is a flooding-based routing scheme where a node floods 
multiple copies of a message to every node it encounters with the intention that at least 
one of them will reach the destination. This routing protocol is best suited when network 
bandwidth is high, storage capacity is large and nodes interact randomly. Epidemic 
routing is not suitable for static nodes and with data mules, has a high probability of 
delivery, but causes energy waste and severe contention which degrades network 
performance [59]. The authors in [61] state that the goals of epidemic routing is to 
maximize message delivery rate, minimize latency and minimize the total resources
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consumed in message delivery.
• MaxProp: MaxProp is a flooding-based routing protocol which by design is a greedy 
protocol. In MaxProp routing, messages are sent in a specified order which takes 
cognizance of message hop counts in bundles. This feature is a measure of network 
resource fairness and message delivery probabilities based on node encounters. The 
protocol keeps a list of encountered nodes and assigns a higher rank to new bundles to 
prevent reception of duplicate messages at intermediate nodes [62]. MaxProp has the 
capability to prioritize the schedule of transmitted messages and the messages that are 
schedule/earmarked for dropping. MaxProp deletes message copies once they are 
delivered to the destination node. To achieve this, MaxProp uses acknowledgements that 
are propagated network-wide and not just to the source. The acknowledgments are 
cryptographic hashes of the contents of each packet.
2.11 Summary
This chapter briefly discusses the Internet and its success in connecting devices across the world. 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is one of the transport layer protocols for the Internet. 
TCP is not suitable for use in “challenged” networking environments because it is an interactive 
protocol requiring multiple signalling and round-trip between a source and destination. Examples 
of emerging/“challenged” networks such as satellite/space networks, sensor/actuator networks, 
terrestrial mobile networks and military ad hoc networks were identified and discussed. Also the 
origin and evolution of the DTN concept, the causes of delay/disruption and three DTN 
architectures such as link repair approach, use of proxy and message-oriented overlay approaches 
have been discussed. The message-oriented overlay approach is widely used in DTN and in this 
thesis.
A number of DTN application scenarios such as deep space communications, rural kiosks for 
developing countries, zebranet, undersea acoustic networks, military tactical networks, 
telemedicine for underdeveloped regions and environmental monitoring have been presented. 
Opportunistic, scheduled and predicted contacts are three major contact types defined in DTN 
literature have been discussed. Also the use of timestamps and time synchronization is an 
important aspect in DTN security and routing for replay attack prevention and elimination of 
expired bundles has been discussed in this chapter. Routing in DTN is seen as a constrained 
optimization problem with nodes having limited storage and links are unavailable for long periods 
of time. The features and characteristics of the different DTN routing protocols such as Direct 
Delivery, First Contact, Spray-and-Wait, ProPHET, Epidemic and MaxProp are analysed and
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discussed. In chapter three, we will focus on issues relating to security and DoS attacks in 
different networks in general and DTN in particular.
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Chapter 3
3 Security and DoS Attacks
Wireless ad hoc networking has experienced rapid advances from the well-researched areas of 
mobile ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks to vehicular networks, wireless mesh 
networks, pocket switched networks, urban sensing networks and delay tolerant networks. These 
emerging networks though vital in promoting and encouraging social interactions and ubiquitous 
network access are vulnerable to a number of security and privacy threats [63]. Security in these 
emerging networks must be given serious consideration based on the problems being encountered 
today by the current Internet. To satisfy the security requirements of a DTN, the DTN architecture 
adopts a standard yet optional security architecture which uses a hop-by-hop and an end-to-end 
authentication and integrity mechanisms. This allows access control for data forwarding and 
storage to be handled separately from application-layer data integrity. The end-to-end mechanism 
provides authentication for the user while the hop-by-hop mechanism is designed to authenticate 
DTN nodes as legitimate senders and receivers of bundles to each other [34].
A DoS attack is defined in [64] as “an action that prevents or impairs the authorized use of 
networks, systems, or applications by exhausting resources such as central processing units 
(CPU), memory, bandwidth, and disk space”. The primary goal of a DoS attack is to prevent 
access to a shared resource or service [65]. DoS attacks aim at preventing legitimate users from 
accessing a service they are authorized to access in normal circumstances. DoS attacks have 
become a frequent occurrence which poses a serious network security threat with significant 
financial loss, threat to life and compromise to national security. In most of these attacks, the 
adversary attempts to compromise a large number of hosts, and then orders these hosts to attack 
another node or group of nodes. The primary goal of a DoS attack is to deny service to legitimate 
users of the target node by overwhelming its network and processing resources [66]. In this 
chapter we will define terminologies relating to DTN security and explain the types and functions 
of DTN security blocks. We will also discuss security threats to the DTN architecture and related 
works in DoS attacks and mitigation techniques in different networks. Finally we will identify the 
types of DoS attacks in delay/disruption tolerant networks and current work in this area.
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3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques which relates to information security such 
as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication and data origin authentication [67]. 
Alternatively, cryptography is defined as the discipline which encompasses principles, means and 
methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, prevent its 
undetected modification and/or prevent its unauthorized use [26]. It is not the only means of 
providing information security but one set of techniques. The aim of cryptography is the 
prevention and detection of cheating and other malicious actions. Examples of cryptographic tools 
or primitives include encryption schemes, hash functions and digital signatures schemes.
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Figure 3-1 A Taxonomy of Cryptographic Primitives [67]
Cryptographic primitives are evaluated based on some criteria which include [67]:
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Level of security: is difficult to quantify but is considered as the upper bound of the 
number of operations or work required to defeat an intended objective. This is sometimes 
referred as the work factor.
Functionality: various information security objectives are met by combining 
cryptographic primitives. The basic properties of the primitives, helps to determine its 
suitability for a given objective.
Methods of operation: Primitives exhibit different characteristics based on the various 
ways they are applied and with various inputs. The type of functionality provided by a 
primitive is dependent on its mode of operation and usage.
Performance: is the efficiency of a primitive based on a particular mode of operation. 
Ease of implementation: refers to difficulty of implementing the primitive in a hardware 
or software environment.
The application and available resources determine the relative importance of these criteria. In an 
environment where the nodes are constrained in battery power for example, we can trade-off 
strong resource demanding security for better performance of the system. Figure 3.1 is a 
schematic that lists the cryptographic primitives of interest and how they relate. We give a brief 
summary of the cryptographic primitives used throughout the thesis.
3.1.1 Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs)
A number of cryptographic algorithms in network security use random numbers. Some of these 
algorithms include reciprocal authentication schemes where nonces are used for handshaking to 
prevent replay attacks. In this case the random numbers frustrate the attacker’s effort by making it 
hard to guess the nonces. Random numbers are also used to generate session keys and keys for 
RSA public encryption algorithm. A sequence of random numbers must meet the requirement of 
randomness and unpredictability. A pseudo-random number generator is a deterministic algorithm 
which produces sequences of numbers that are not statistically random but pass many reasonable 
test of randomness [22].
3.1.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
The cryptographic hash function sometimes called one-way hash function is one of the 
fundamental primitives in modem cryptography. A hash function is a computationally efficient 
function which maps binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some fixed length 
called hash-values. The hash-value is a compact representative of an input string. For a hash 
function which outputs an n-bit hash-value (where n = 120 or 160), the probability that a
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randomly chosen string maps to a particular n-bit hash-value is 2'” provided it has the following 
desirable properties:
• It is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs that hash to a common value. 
That is two colliding inputs x  and y such that h(x) = h(y).
• For a specific hash-value y, it is computationally infeasible to find an input % such that 
h(x) = y.
Hash functions are used commonly with digital signatures and for data integrity. Another 
application of hash functions is in their use in protocols involving a priori commitments including 
digital signature schemes and identification protocols. Hash functions used to detect whether a 
message has been altered are called Modification Detection Codes (MDGs) [67].
3.1.3 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a keyed hash function whose specification requires 
two distinct inputs, a message and a secret key. The purpose of a MAC is to provide assurance of 
the source and the integrity of the message [67]. A MAC is also called a cryptographic checksum 
and is generated by the function C as follows:
MAC = C(K,M)
where M  denotes a variable-length message, Æ is a secret key shared only by the sender and 
receiver, and C(K,M)\s?i fixed-length authenticator. The MAC is appended to the message at the 
source when the message is assumed to be correct. The MAC is recomputed by the receiver in 
order to authenticate the message [22]. There is a distinction between a MAC algorithm and the 
use of MDC with a secret key as part of its message input. The algorithmic specification of a hash 
function is assumed to be public. For MDCs, anyone can compute the hash-value given a message 
input. For MACs, anyone with knowledge of the key can compute the hash-value given a message 
as input [67]. MACs can be constructed from cryptographic hash functions such as HMAC [68] , 
[69] or from block cipher algorithms such as Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication 
Code (CBC-MAC) [70].
3.1.4 Digital Signatures
A digital signature of a message is dependent on the content of the message being signed and a 
secret known only to the signer. Signatures must be verifiable and have many applications in 
information security such as authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. In large networks, 
certification of public keys is one application area where digital signatures are used. In 
certification, a trusted third party (TTP) binds a user’s identity to a public key. This allows other
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entities to authenticate a public key in the future without verifying from a TTP. Digital signatures 
can be classified into two categories: digital signature schemes with appendix and digital 
signature schemes with message recovery. The former requires the original message as input to 
the verification algorithm while the later recovers the original message from the signature itself 
[67], [71]. Two popular signature schemes are the Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman 
(RSA) algorithm [29] and ElGamel [72]. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is based on the 
difficulty of computing discrete logarithms and is based on the ElGamel signature scheme. 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [73] is a variant of DSA and is based on 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
3.2 Classîfîcatîon of Security Attacks
Security attacks can be classified into passive attacks and active attacks.
3.2.1 Passive Attacks
A passive attack attempts to learn or utilize information from the system without affecting 
systems resources [23]. Passive attacks are in the form of eavesdropping and monitoring of 
transmissions (traffic analysis). The release of message content can be prevented by means of 
encryption but traffic analysis is a more difficult problem to tackle. The attacker can still perform 
traffic analysis on the communication between two parties to obtain the frequency and length of 
the communication, determine their location and identities in order to guess the nature of 
conununication taking place even with encryption in place. A passive attack is difficult to detect 
because it does not alter data. The conununication is sent and received by the sender without any 
indication that a third party has read or observed the traffic pattern [22].
3.2.2 Active Attacks
Active attacks involve alteration of information contained in a system, or changes to the state or 
operation of a system [23]. Active attacks can be sub-divided into four categories: masquerade, 
replay, modification and denial of service [26]. Masquerade is a type of attack in which one entity 
illegitimately assumes the identity of another entity. Masquerade is used to launch the other types 
of active attacks such as capturing of an authentication sequence and replaying it. An authorized 
entity with less system privileges can be granted extra privileges by impersonating an entity with 
those privileges. Replay attacks are a form of passive data capture in which a message is 
maliciously and fraudulently re-transmitted or delayed to produce an authorized effect. 
Modification is the altering, insertion, deletion of a portion of a legitimate message in an
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unauthorized manner that appears genuine to the user. Denial of service prevents legitimate users 
access to use resources of the system [22], [23], [26].
3.3 DTN Security Source, Destination, Path and Zones
The following terminologies as defined in [28] are specific to DTN security. A security-source is 
a bundle node that adds a security block to a bundle. The security-destination is a bundle node 
that processes a security block on a bundle. A security-path is the ordered sequence of security- 
aware nodes through which the bundle passes on its way from the security-source to the security- 
destination. A security-zone is that part of the network from security-source to security- 
destination.
Node A Node B Node C Node D Node E
Security zone 1
Security zone 2
Security zon e 3
Security zone 4
Security zone 5
Figure 3-2 Security Zones in DTN
To illustrate the concept of security zones. Figure 3-2 shows a DTN with 5 security-aware nodes 
A, B, C, D and E. Security zone 1 has nodes A and B as security-source and security-destination. 
For zone 2, the security source and security-destination are nodes B and E while nodes B and D 
are security-source and security-destination for zone 3. Similarly, nodes A and C are security- 
source and security-destination for zone 4 and finally the security-source and security-destination 
for zone 5 is nodes A and E. Within each zone there may exist non-security-aware nodes which 
act solely as relay points in forwarding bundles towards destination.
Each security block in a bundle has a security path which is often different. This means that the 
security paths of two blocks in a. bundle which do not overlap completely can cause problems. 
The path for BABs is a single hop and does not cause any conflicts. Also the paths for PIBs and
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PCBs are from bundle-source to bundle-destination to provide end-to-end protection. Therefore a 
bundle-source and bundle-destination path never causes conflicts. To prevent overlaps in security 
paths, the security policy for a node should avoid specifying a security-destination for a bundle 
for which a security-destination already exists. An intermediate security-aware node should not 
specify a security-destination that is further distant than an existing security-destination in the 
bundle since neither of each path is a subset of the other [50].
3.4 Components of a DTN Bundle
Figure 3-3 shows the format of a generic bundle which is made up of the primary block and the 
payload block. The primary block comprises the timestamp (TS), the bundle lifespan/expiry (LS), 
the source-endpoint identifier (Src_EID), the destination-endpoint identifier (Dst_EID) and the 
Class-of Service (CoS) fields. The actual application data is contained in the payload block and is 
the purpose of the transmission of any given bundle to a bundle destination.
Primary Block Payload  Block
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Figure 3-3 Generic Bundle Diagram
The bundle diagram in Figure 3-4 shows that additional blocks can be added to the generic bundle 
shown in Figure 3-3 to provide security to DTN traffic. A security block can be added after the 
primary block or before the payload block and the security result for each security block is added 
to the right of the payload block. RSAwithSHA256 is a security block which specifies the type of 
cipher suite in use.
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Figure 3-4 DTN Bundle with Security Blocks
The Bundle Security Protocol (BSP) defines four types of security blocks which may be included 
in a bundle as follows:
• Bundle Authentication Block (BAB): The Bundle Authentication Block (BAB)
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provides authenticity and integrity of the bundle along a single hop from forwarder to 
intermediate receiver. Security blocks are only processed by nodes that implement the 
Bundle Security Protocol (BSP). These set of nodes are known as “security-aware” nodes. 
A single hop from a security-aware forwarder to the next security-aware intermediate 
receiver might be more than one actual hop. The BAB protects a bundle on a hop-by-hop 
basis and must form the outer layer of a bundle if other security blocks such as Payload 
Integrity block (PIB) and Payload Confidentiality Block (PGB) are present [28]. A share- 
key Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC-SHAl) is defined for the BAB. This 
cipher suite could be used to support group keying where the key is shared between the 
nodes that need it. There is no requirement that the key should be one-to-one unique [74] 
and an asymmetric BAB cipher suite can also be used. BAB is used to protect DTN 
against DoS attacks and ensure that routing information exchanged between adjacent 
“neighbouring” nodes are authenticated [50].
Payload Integrity Block (PIB): The Payload Integrity Block (PIB) provides assurance 
for the authenticity and integrity of the payload from the PIB security-source which creates 
the PIB to the PIB security-destination which verifies the PIB authenticator. Any node 
between the PIB security-source and the PIB security-destination can verify the PIB 
authenticator if it has access to the cryptographic keys or the revocation status information. 
The PIB protects a bundle in an “end-to-end” manner. The PIB protects the payload and is 
regarded as “part o f’ the payload [28]. The Payload Integrity Block can be more useful in 
space-based networks where host does not need to bother to know the unique source 
identity of the previous hop. In such networks, policy-based routing is based on 
determining if a bundle originates from a trusted community or region [74].
Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB): The Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) 
provides confidentiality by encrypting the bundle payload totally or partly in an “end-to- 
end” manner. The encryption is performed at the PCB security-source and provides 
protection to the bundle content while on transit to the PCB security-destination. The PCB 
protects the payload and is regarded as “part o f’ the payload [28]. A strong 
recommendation is to use a data integrity mechanism in conjunction with confidentiality, 
but encryption-only cipher suites are discouraged [74].
Extension Security Block (ESB): The Extension Security Block (ESB) provides 
security for non-payload blocks in the bundle such as metadata. The ESB must not be used 
for the primary block, payload or payload related blocks such as PIB and PCB. Each
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security block contains the security-source and security-destination information and a 
cipher suite. The cipher suite defines the algorithms that should be used to process the 
received security blocks [75]. The security-sender and the cipher suite determine the keys 
to be used. All the security blocks can be present simultaneously in a bundle using 
different combinations. “The ESB is placed in the bundle in the same position as the block 
being protected. That is, the entire original block is processed (encrypted) and 
encapsulated in a "replacing" ESB-type block, and this appears in the bundle at the same 
sequential position as the original block. The processed data is placed in the security-result 
field”. ESB is used to protect Meta-data blocks [76]. The Meta-data Extension Block is 
primarily designed to carry application-level information used in DTN-level decisions 
regarding bundles, such as deciding whether to store a bundle or determining which nodes 
to forward a bundle to [74].
3.5 General Security Threats in Overlay Netw o^rks
An overlay network is vulnerable to all the threats (such as DoS attack, man-in-the-middle attack, 
masquerade etc.) of the underlying network which makes overlay networks difficult to secure. For 
secure communications over an overlay network, the underlying networks have to be properly 
secured in addition to securing the network overlay. If the overlay network runs on top of an 
underlying network that is secure, then the overlay network will benefit from the security of the 
underlying network. In [74], the author identifies six basic areas in which security can be bridged 
in a DTN network:
• Physical Access: involves the highly controlled access to key network facilities and 
components.
• Physical Media: is the wire, fibre or radio link over which data is transmitted. For
example in a space-based network, communication between Mission Operations Centres
and ground stations could be bulk encrypted over wire or fibre hnes.
• Radio Links: radio links can be subject to jamming in a bid to disrupt communication. To
prevent this some type of anti-jamming system is required. Also the radio links may be
encrypted.
• Data Link Layer: is responsible for node-to-node (hop-to-hop) frame delivery on the 
same link. The data link layer is made up of the Media Access Control (MAC) and the 
Logical Link Control (LLC). The data link layer ensures that an initial connection is set 
up, divides output data into data frames, handles acknowledgement of receipt of data from 
receiver and ensures that incoming data a successfully received by analysing bit patterns 
in special places in the frames.
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Network Layer: the network layer is responsible for packet delivery from source to 
destination, where addressing and routing are performed. Addressing in IP networks is 
hierarchical and occurs in the network layer. IP security (IPsec) is used to secure IP 
networks. IPsec is tightly coupled to the interface address and since it is address-based 
and the address in IP networks is hierarchical, this helps in the aggregation of addresses 
into sets where security pohcies can be applied.
Transport Layer: the transport layer is responsible for the delivery of data between 
appropriate application processes on two or more end systems via the underlying network 
or data link where no network exist. In IP networks, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol is used to secure the transport layer. TLS provides security and data integrity and 
allows client/server applications to communicate across a network and prevent threats 
such as eavesdropping, tampering, man-in-the-middle attacks, DoS attacks, TCP SYN- 
flood attacks, UDP flooding attacks and message forgery. TLS requires low delay control 
loops and continuous connectivity which makes it impractical for use in most DTN. The 
Licklider Transport Protocol (LTP) is designed to serve as a reliable convergence layer 
over single-hop deep-space RF links. LTP supports Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) of 
data transmissions by soliciting selective acknowledgment reception reports. It is stateful 
and has no initial negotiation or handshakes and is the transport protocol of choice for 
deep space communications. A security specification for LTP [77] defines security 
extensions for LTP and specifically to combat DoS attacks.
Bundle Layer: is an end-to-end message-oriented overlay that exists above the transport 
layers of networks on which it is hosted and below the applications layers. The bundle 
layer uses persistent storage to overcome network interruptions, supports hop-by-hop 
transfer of delivery responsibility and an optional end-to-end acknowledgement [34]. The 
DTN overlay can bridge between dissimilar lower-layer networks and can operate 
simultaneously over heterogeneous networks such as CCSDS, IPv4, IPv4 and Bluetooth. 
The bundle layer supports the Bundle Protocol for DTN communications however, the 
DTN architecture is vulnerable to a number of threats which are listed and discussed in 
section 3.6. Also, a basic security model which is optional enabled is defined to protect 
the DTN infrastructure from unauthorized use.
Application Layer: the application layer is where all protocol and methods that support 
process-to-process communications are found. The application layer sits on top of the 
bundle layer and above the transport layer. With the Internet, the application layer is the 
layer where a large number of system exploit are carried out as evidenced in the large 
number of anti-virus and anti-spyware software in the market today. The application layer 
is the easiest layer to attack due to the large number of application it supports and the ease
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in exploiting human behaviour.
3.6 Security Threats to the DTN Architecture
In this section we present security threats that are specific to the DTN architecture which include 
the following:
• Non-DTN Node Threats: There are threats that come from nodes that are not part of 
the DTN. Since bundles travel through multiple underlying elements on each DTN hop, 
the DTN as an overlay network is open to attack if any vulnerability is found in the 
bundle protocol. Threats include masquerade, bit flips et cetera and a DTN node should 
have the ability to counter bundle insertions and discard such bundles as quickly as 
possible [78].
• Resource Consumption: Unauthorised use and access to DTN resources is viewed 
very seriously because a DTN is a highly resource-constrained network. The following 
are resource-consumption threats to the DTN architecture: Access by unauthorized 
entities, unauthorized applications controlling the DTN infrastructure, authorized 
applications sending bundles at a rate or Class of Service for which they lack permission, 
unauthorized bundle content modification, compromised network elements, generating 
reports not originally requested, forwarding bundles not sent by authorized DTN nodes, 
and the non-detection of unplanned replays and other misbehaviours [78].
• Confidentiality and Integrity: DTN applications can also be vulnerable to threats 
against confidentiality and integrity such as falsifying a bundle source, changing the 
intended destination, changing a bundle’s control fields, changing other block or payload 
fields, replay of bundles, and copying or disclosure of bundle content [78].
• Traffic Storms: Traffic storms can be generated through administrative records 
contained in the Bundle protocol. Such records which are produced in response to original 
bundles include bundle status reports and custody signals. The status report request flags 
and bundle processing flags must be set to zero at all times on all bundles carrying 
administrative records in order to stem the tide of traffic storms. In the DTN security 
model architecture, carriage of unauthorised traffic is not encouraged or allowed. Every 
message includes an immutable capability containing verifiable identity of the sender, an 
approving authority of the requested service (CoS) associated with each message and
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other conventional cryptographic material to verify the accuracy of the message content. 
Credentials are checked at every DTN hop by routers and traffic dropped if the 
authentication process fails [78].
• Denial of Service: The Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), classifies DoS 
attacks into three broad categories [79]: the consumption of scarce, limited, or non­
renewable resources; the destruction or alteration of configuration information; and the 
physical destruction or alteration of network components. DoS involves three 
components: authorized users, a shared resource, and a maximum waiting time. It is a 
breach of the security characteristic of availability and is analysed as having the following 
properties [80].
• Malicious: the act is performed intentionally while accidental failures fall into the 
domain of fault tolerance and reliability engineering.
• Disruptive: a successful DoS attack degrades and disrupts some capacity or service.
• Asymmetric: the effect of an attack is much greater than the effort required to mount 
it.
• Remote: mostly in distributed systems, where an attacker can launch an attack over 
the network, common with unauthenticated or lightly authenticated users. However, 
these attacks must take the form of an attempted exploitation of vulnerability in some 
service provided by a node.
DoS attacks can be mounted on any layer from physical to application. For this reason, new 
protocols should be designed to withstand DoS attacks by making it hard to launch “off-path” 
DoS attacks. This can be achieved by making it hard to “guess” valid values of messages through 
the use of random numbers instead of counters for identifying messages. Secondly such protocol 
design should make it easier to withstand “on-path” DoS attacks by providing a way to block DoS 
traffic. For example, changing to a mode of operation where only fresh, authenticated messages 
are accepted and others are dropped. An attacker is said to cause an “off-path” DoS attack when it 
is not on the forwarding path from source to destination otherwise, the attacker is said to be “on- 
path”. A DoS attack can be single-source originating from only one host or multi-source where a 
number of hosts are coordinated to overwhelm a victim with malicious traffic as in Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. We will be focusing on single-source DoS attacks. DoS attacks 
can be either application-based or protocol-based. The former is simple to launch by using e-mail 
and different attack methods under this category include “chain bombs” and message 
amplification. Attacks that are protocol-based subvert the normal networking or cryptographic 
protocols in order to cause availability problems. More details on the impact of DoS attacks in 
different networks are presented in section 3.8.
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3.7 Security Requirements for DTN
DTN protocols should provide the following security services to guarantee secure 
communications.
3.7.1 Authentication
Authentication is a security service concerned with assuring that a communication is authentic 
[22]. It provides a guarantee that entities are who they claim to be [67]. Authentication is specific 
to the security objectives which one sets to achieve. Examples of such security objectives include 
access control, entity authentication, message authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation and 
key authentication. The advent of hash functions and digital signatures provides an insight which 
proves that secrecy and authentication are two separate and independent objectives. 
Authentication can be categorised into two: entity authentication/identification and data origin 
authentication or message authentication [67].
Identification or Entity Authentication: Assures one party or both that the identity of a second 
party involved is active at the time the evidence is created or acquired. The entities are both active 
in the communication giving a timeliness guarantee.
Data Origin Authentication or Message Authentication: This security service provides a party 
which receives a message an assurance of the identity of the party which originated the message. 
Message authentication is suitable in situations when one of the communicating parties is not 
active. It does not provide any timeliness guarantees but implicitly provides data integrity. In 
DTN, intermediate nodes have the capacity to verify that a message was sent by an authorised 
node. Authentication in DTN can be hop-by-hop or end-to-end and is a vital security service to 
support access control.
3.7.2 Integrity
The integrity service relates to active attacks where detection rather than prevention is of priority. 
Integrity can be applied to a single message, a stream of messages or selected fields in a message. 
An integrity service can be connection-oriented or connection-less. The connection-oriented 
integrity service applies to stream of messages and assures that messages are received as sent 
without duplication, insertion, modification, reordering or replays. This service also covers data 
destruction. Connection-oriented integrity service addresses message stream modification and 
DoS. The connection-less integrity service provides protection to individual messages and 
protects against message modification [22]. The integrity service is concerned more on active 
attacks with focus on detection rather than prevention. The service simply reports any detected
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violation of integrity and some other portion of software or human intervention is needed to 
recover from such violations [22]. Integrity can be compromised either through malicious altering 
or accidental altering [81]. In DTN, the wireless channel is prone to active attacks like message 
modification, duplication, replays and re-ordering attacks. The attacker’s goal is malicious and 
regarded as malicious altering. Accidental altering can be as a result of the content of a message 
changing due to benign failures such as hard disk failures or errors introduced due to the 
communication channel.
3.7.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality protects transmitted data from passive attacks which may include protection of a 
single message or specific fields of the message [22]. The confidentiality security service helps to 
keep content of information from unauthorised entities. Secrecy is a term which is closely related 
to confidentiality and privacy. Encryption algorithms can be used to render data unintelligible to 
an unauthorised entity [67]. The wireless communication channel is open to passive attacks like 
eavesdropping. In DTN end-to-end encryption can protect message from unwanted disclosures.
3.7.4 Privacy/Anonymity
Privacy protection is a crucial issue in pervasive computing environments and opportunistic 
DTNs [82]. In these environments, without proper privacy protection guarantees built into any 
technology, such solutions are bound to fail. As stated earlier, traffic analysis is a subtle security 
threat in most wireless networks. It is a kind of passive attack which is difficult to detect where an 
adversary can observe network traffic patterns and deduce sensitive information about the 
applications or the underlying system [83]. The identities of the communicating parties, the 
pattern of network traffic and their changing pattern and frequency are some of the sensitive 
information an adversary looks out for. The shared wireless communication medium makes it 
possible for adversaries to eavesdrop on communication without physically compromising the 
nodes. An example scenario where anonymity is important is a military network where an 
unexpected change in traffic patterns may signify a chain of commands or imminent action or 
change of network alertness. It might also reveal the location of mobile priority nodes and 
command centres which are prime targets for the adversary. In DTN, user anonymity in 
applications can be achieved when a sender and receiver know each other’s identity. Other 
network entities and observers should not be able to deduce the identity of the communicating 
parties [84]. Pseudonyms and protocols provide anonymity which allows DTN nodes to know a 
node’s pseudonym without knowing its identity. Anonymity helps to ensure that a user can use a 
resource or service without disclosing its identity [83].
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3.7.5 Availability
Availability is a system property or system resource being accessible and usable by an authorized 
user or entity upon request in accordance with the system’s performance specifications [23]. A 
system is said to be available if it provides services in accordance to its design when users make 
requests [22]. One common property of availability is finite time properties which guarantees that 
under a set time frame requests are processed and responded to. Another important time-based 
property is wait time which when added to response time ensures fairness and streamlining of 
resource allocation. The term Availability deals with aspects which define the locking for use and 
the release of a resource [85]. A loss or degradation in availability may be as a result of a variety 
of attacks and some countermeasures such as authentication and encryption can help protect a 
system. Security goals such as authentication, confidentiality and integrity may conflict with 
service availability [86]. In [26] availability is viewed as a property to be associated with various 
security services and addresses the security concerns associated with DoS attacks. It depends on 
access control service and a number of other security services for the proper management and 
control of system resources. In a distributed system, physical action may be needed to recover 
from loss of availability. In DTN, resources are scarce and any form of misuse can lead to loss or 
degradation of service. Such misuse include unauthorised use of the DTN infrastructure, 
malicious injection of bundles, a malicious node sending bundles at a rate or Class of Service for 
which they are not permitted by security policy. When an entity deliberately denies access to 
others, such denial of service is a security issue which involves malicious behaviour and harms 
honest nodes [82]. A detailed survey on DoS in heterogeneous networks is presented in section 
3.8.
3.8 DoS Attacks
Service guarantee and availability is an important aspect of network security which may conflict 
with other security goals like confidentiality and integrity [86], [87]. Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks is a problem that is widespread affecting different types of networks and prevents the 
authorized access to resources and delay of time-critical operations. A DoS attack denies or 
degrades access to some network services [88], [89] and is a major threat to availability because it 
prevents a user or network from fulfilling its functions by disabling or degrading the services it 
provides [66]. There are two types of DoS attacks that have minimal cost to the attacker: flooding 
attacks and logic or vulnerability attacks [65], [87]. In flooding attacks, the victim node 
experiences a large and continuous volume of network traffic. This large volume of traffic 
overwhelms the victim causing congestion and a bottleneck in the affected node. The aim of 
flooding attacks is to saturate network queues, processors and links [90]. Flooding attacks do not
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need to exploit any vulnerability in the target node. Hooding attacks can be categorised into non­
destructive and destructive attacks. Non-destructive attacks simply degrade system performance 
by consuming resources such as network bandwidth, processing power, or disk space. On the 
other hand, destructive flooding attacks causes permanent DoS condition such as crashing target 
nodes and filling up disk spaces. Flooding-based DoS attacks prevent legitimate traffic from 
reaching the victim and are most prevalent in wired networks.
In [91] flooding attacks can be divided into direct and reflector attacks. A direct attack is when 
spoof attack packets are sent directly to the victim/target node. In the terrestrial Internet, direct 
attacks use a few mechanisms such as TCP SYN flooding, Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP) Echo flood or UDP data flood [92]. In reflector attacks, the attacker uses the victim’s 
address as the source address of the attack packets which it sends to an innocent third party node. 
The third party node in response will send a reply back to the victim. In reflector attacks there are 
at least two victims involved and can use a technique known as bandwidth or packet 
amplification. A logic attack on the other hand cleverly exploits vulnerabilities in the target such 
as hosts, routers, gateways or a protocol. Logic attacks can be as a result of mal-formed packets 
interacting with the protocol which might lead to high CPU usage, resource consumption, system 
reboots or general degradation of system performance.
Millen [93] divides DoS attacks into two categories: resource allocation and resource 
destruction. In the former an attacker deliberately exhausts resources from a shared pool of 
limited capacity thereby denying others the opportunity to function. Resource destruction on the 
other hand is as a result of design and implementation errors. The first models of denial of service 
focused on multi-user Operating Systems (OS). Gligor [94] defines DoS as a failure of the system 
to meet a Maximum Waiting Time (MWT) policy. Users should be granted access to a shared 
service within a fixed period of time from a request. The MWT policy is seen as a fairness 
requirement in real-time OS, the model is based on some implicit assumptions that there exists a 
reference monitor to control all access requests. Users and processes are assigned priorities, and 
resources are given first to users with the highest privileges. The above DoS model fails when 
there is no reference monitor to control all user actions or when the available resources is not 
enough to satisfy users with high-privileges within a specified MWT.
A classical approach by Yu and Gligor [95] and Millen [93] is to define a resource allocation 
policy that guarantees that services are available to users who agree to use the resources according 
to some restrictive rules. These classical DoS models do not apply to open distributed networks 
like the Internet. The reason being that there is no central trusted authority to set a global policy, 
there are no mechanisms to enforce the policies and all network users are equal with nobody to 
assign priorities. The Dolev and Yao model of network protocol security cannot be applied either, 
this model cannot deal with network DoS because it assumes that the attacker is in control of the
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communication channel and can stop all traffic. New models are required to understand network 
DoS attacks. In the following sections we present some DoS attacks in heterogeneous networks 
such as wireless sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, terrestrial networks, and satellite 
networks and proposed solutions against them.
3.8.1 DoS Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks
Sensor nodes are resource-constrained and this makes them more vulnerable to DoS attacks. 
These attacks include jamming, exhaustion and interrogation, elective forwarding, misdirection, 
sinkholes, Sybil attacks, and flooding. An attack can be targeted at any service or layer of the 
sensor node. Jamming which is a deliberate interference uses radio signals to target the victim’s 
communication channel. It can be defended against through the use of spread-spectrum and 
frequency-hopping. Flooding attacks are targeted at the transport layer, with the sole aim of 
overwhelming and draining the sensor node of resources (CPU cycles, bandwidth or memory). A 
typical sensor network is made up of one or more base stations that serve as data sinks and 
commanders [80]. They broadcast commands to sensor nodes which act on the commands. 
Broadcast authentication is therefore used to prevent malicious nodes masquerading as base 
stations. There are two broadcast authentication schemes used in sensor networks: [iTelsa and the 
public-key based signature scheme. Both methods are vulnerable to DoS since an attacker can 
inject bogus traffic and cause the sensor node to perform packet forwarding (jrTelsa) or expensive 
signature verifications (public-key based signature) thus exhausting the node’s battery power. 
A new technique called message specific puzzle is proposed by [96]. This approach adds a light 
authenticator to each broadcast packet which is easily verified by any sensor node but will take a 
strong attacker with enough computational resources a long time to forge. Each node first verifies 
the weak authenticator for validity before embarking on the expensive packet forwarding (piTelsa) 
or signature verification (public-key based signature). This technique requires a powerful sender 
and introduces sender-side delay.
3.8.2 DoS Attacks in Terrestrial Networks
Network level DoS counter-measures can be classified into proactive or reactive defences. 
Reactive counter-measures are based on detection and a good example is the trace back technique 
which involves making comparison among traffic patterns or packet marking. The search for 
attacks only begins when there is a sharp degradation in service or the target node has been totally 
shut down [97]. On the contrary however, the proactive defence requires that access to resources 
is only granted after proper authentication. Other proactive techniques attempt to detect attacks 
before the victim is severely damaged or when there is a serious degradation in the service that it 
provides. In this case, ingress and egress filtering (firewalls) is used. Recently proposed solutions
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in this category are mainly based on monitoring changes in the internal characteristics of the 
network such as traffic volume, loss ratio, and queuing delays.
Attacks may want to exploit the protocols which are used for the establishment and 
authentication of communication in order to waste resources and disable servers. In this 
circumstance, it is not wise to rely on access control mechanisms for protection as proposed in the 
classic work of Gligor and Millen [93], [94]. Instead, appropriate defences should be built into the 
protocols to make them DoS-resistant since these attacks are launched before the parties in the 
conununication are authenticated. A vivid example is in the case of the TCP SYN attack in which 
an attacker sends SYN messages with fake source addresses to its victim, which now sends back 
SYN ACK messages which are never acknowledged. The aim of this attack is to fill up the 
connection queue of the victim and deny legitimate users TCP services. The trick the attacker 
employs is to stop participating in the protocol at some stage thereby leaving the victim with an 
unmanageable number of uncompleted connection requests which forces it to shut down 
operations at some point.
Attacks such as this can be prevented by providing authentication from the very beginning. 
However, it should be noted that stronger requirements are needed to protect against DoS than 
requirements for usual authentication. Strong authentication in itself can trigger off a DoS attack 
since it employs mechanisms which are computationally expensive (e.g. digital signatures). If an 
attacker in the TCP SYN attack scenario is able to send a number of fake SYN messages with 
incorrect signatures, the victim will spend all of its time trying to verify the signatures instead of 
storing the SYN messages in the connection queue. To avoid this ugly scenario, an approach 
where light authentication is employed when the protocol initiates but as the protocol completes, 
the authentication requirements become stronger. This provides the protocol protection against a 
weak attacker at the initial stages of the protocol and also helps avoid exposure to DoS which 
exploits the use of strong authentication. It also provides protection against spoofing by a strong 
attacker. This is not a guarantee that the protocol is totally immune to DoS attacks instead a strong 
attacker must work harder in order to break the weak authentication mechanisms. The effects of 
flooding attacks in these networks are mitigated when a server forces the client to commit more of 
its resources upfront [86]. This technique uses client puzzles and is effective when the malicious 
client has computational power that is equivalent to that of the server. In order to prevent the 
consumption of memory resources at the servers, Leiwo et al. [98] proposed the concept of 
stateless connection management where the server state is stored in all messages sent to clients 
and clients are required to return it in all future response within the protocol with the server. This 
principle is especially useful when connections are not strongly authenticated.
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3.8.3 DoS Attacks in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
In [99] the authors define a MANET as “a network which consists of a group of devices that 
relies solely on the wireless communication medium and themselves for data transmission”. 
Nodes cooperate to forward packets on behalf of each other when destinations are out of their 
direct wireless transmission range. The wireless nature and basic features of mobile ad hoc 
networks exposes them to a wide variety of vulnerabilities. Applications in MANETs include 
emergency and rescue operations, battlefield as well as civilian applications such as ad hoc 
classroom or outdoor meeting [100]. It is a challenging task to provide security in an ad hoc 
network because the wireless channel is susceptible to passive and active attacks, and the lack of a 
trusted third party for example an online Certificate Authority (CA). Devices are constrained in 
battery power, bandwidth, storage and computational capabilities which make them targets for 
DoS. The nodes do not possess enough capability to execute computationally-intensive 
cryptographic schemes based on public-key algorithms which are used to provide security 
services such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, and availability. Lastly, 
mobility enforces reconfiguration of the network topology and the borderless nature of MANETs 
where nodes are free to join and leave the network at will throws up the challenge of using novel 
methods to provide security.
Nodes in MANETs act as both hosts and routers since there are no central infrastructures to 
provide coordination. In [101], three DoS attack scenarios are described: attack on the memory, 
storage space, and CPU of a service provider by continuously flooding its neighbourhood with 
executable packets thereby depleting storage. This type of attack can be prevented through 
neighbourhood watch and monitoring. Another attack scenario targets battery power, a malicious 
node can continuously send bogus packets to a node to wear down its battery power. This attack 
can be thwarted using localized monitoring for detection and prevention. The third scenario 
targets network bandwidth and aims at disrupting communication between two parties. This attack 
can be launched by an attacker which uses spoof IP addresses to send overwhelming traffic to 
consume bandwidth and overload the network. This attack can be prevented using reputation 
information exchanged among nodes or the cluster head. Encouraging and enforcing cooperation 
among the nodes is one of the strategies of improving security and network throughput [101].
The author in [101] proposes a distributed reputation-based incentive mechanism in order to 
reduce the effectiveness of DoS attacks and improve overall network throughput. Due to the lack 
of a trusted third party such as a key management system, centralized monitoring is therefore 
impossible in MANETs. However, there has been increase in the development of protocols which 
gather, store and distribute reputations. The work in [101] centres on packet drop (selfish) and 
wormhole (malicious) attacks and uses clustering architecture to provide localized monitoring to 
detect malicious behaviour and improve scalability. It is difficult to define boundaries that
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separate the inside of the network from the outside and this makes traffic monitoring and the 
deployment of access control mechanisms cumbersome [102]. There is an underlying assumption 
that nodes in a MANET will cooperate in sharing the available resources and provide services and 
preserve the network functionalities. However, nodes especially in civilian applications tend to be 
selfish in a bid to conserve their resources (battery power). Mahcious nodes on the other hand 
attack the network in order to cause disruptions to its operations.
The authors in [102] propose a multifence network-layer approach to securing MANETs using 
proactive and reactive mechanisms. The proactive approach tries to prevent attacks using various 
cryptographic techniques while the reactive approach tries to detect attacks based on known attack 
signatures and react as the need arises. The proactive approach is adopted widely in securing 
routing protocols while the reactive approach is used to protect the packet forwarding service. 
Security solutions which integrate proactive and reactive schemes and having the following 
components (prevention, detection and reaction) are proposed as being appropriate for MANETs. 
The prevention component serves to secure ad hoc routing protocols which prevent an attacker 
from advertising incorrect routing information. Protocols such as Direct Source Routing (DSR) 
[55], Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODY) [54], and Destination-Sequenced Distance 
Vector (DSDV) [52] use cryptographic primitives such as HMAC, digital signatures and hash 
chains to authenticate routing messages. Malicious nodes which exhibit abnormal behaviour are 
identified either end-to-end or through neighbourhood monitoring. Once a node is detected as 
misbehaving, the reaction component is triggered in order to either exclude the node from the 
route selection process or total isolation from the network through collective consensus.
3.8.4 DoS Attacks in Satellite Networks
Satellite systems such as Digital Video Broadcasting System/Return Channel over Satellite 
(DVB-S/RCS) or the Unidirectional Link Broadcasting (UDLR) which allow shared-access are 
very prone to the unauthorised access to satellite services. Access control is one of the measures 
that are taken to prevent this unauthorised access. The satellite access control system makes use of 
strong authentication which makes the system vulnerable to DoS when an attacker sends large 
number of bogus request messages to the server. Every legitimate client has a specified data rate 
threshold that is acceptable for the server. To justify an increase in packet sending rate, a DoS 
attacker deliberately emulates different source addresses to hide its identity and fool the server. 
The authentication of each request is computationally expensive in terms of CPU cycles and 
memory utilization and there is likelihood that the request from legitimate users are unduly 
delayed or discarded by the server.
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The DoS countermeasure for terrestrial networks which is based on the cookie and client 
puzzle techniques will not be suitable for the satellite environment for two reasons [79]. The 
satellite network uses a broadcast channel which allows every terminal under its coverage 
including attackers to receive all traffic from servers. The attacker will then be able to respond to 
the weak authentication messages successfully masquerading as a number of different sources. 
Secondly satellite systems experience very long delays between two satellite terminals which are 
in the region of 30ms for Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites and 300ms for Geostationary 
(GEO) satellites. An additional delay will be introduced if we add three new messages for the 
cookie technique in the satellites’ protocol. What is ideal is an authentication protocol which 
protects the satellite networks against DoS attacks and is resilient to masquerade, and is efficient 
in terms of resource consumption and number of flows.
The authors in [79] propose a basic identification protocol which assumes tight clock 
synchronization between the Network Control Centre (NCC) and the Satellite Terminals (ST). 
The basic protocol involves a two-step verification process where control messages with 
inconsistencies are discarded promptly. The NCC only allocates resources if these two steps are 
successful. The basic protocol is based on the assumption that the intruder cannot replay an 
eavesdropped message. An improved version of the basic protocol by the authors [79] relaxes the 
condition for tight clock synchronization between the NCC and the ST by introducing a stateful 
verification mechanism. The NCC can store the state of every successful authentication attempt 
during each time interval using sequence numbers which change with each request.
3.8.5 DoS Attacks in Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks
Research in DTN security has been minimal and one of such pioneering works is the Bundle 
Security Protocol (BSP) specification [28]. The specification identifies “on-path” and “off-path” 
DoS attacks as threats which must be considered during the design of any DoS defence 
mechanism for DTN. BSP proposes the dropping of bundles that fail the authentication process 
which in itself provides minimal protection against DoS attacks. Packet dropping and address 
spoofing are two types of DoS attacks identified in [103] which an attacker can use to degrade 
network performance or prevent a resource-constrained DTN from functioning. Results show that 
these attacks impact significantly on packet delivery rate with spoofing attacks having a more 
devastating effect. The authors propose three protection mechanisms (Opportunistic Protection, 
Token Protection, Collision Count Protection) as countermeasures to these attacks. Lee et al. [30] 
propose a distributed queuing mechanism using buffer management techniques and the PRoPHET 
protocol [60] to mitigate flooding attacks.
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In [104] the authors make a comparison to analyse the performance between single-copy and 
multi-copy packet replication in the presence of both strong and weak attackers and the effects on 
packet delivery ratio. The weak attacker has no knowledge of network topology, future network 
events and chooses its target at random. On the contrary, the strong attacker has prior knowledge 
of future network events and full knowledge of the network topology. They use different routing 
schemes to model packet drop attacks, packet flooding and counterfeiting of acknowledgements. 
They conclude that the performance of a DTN without authentication degrades gracefully even 
when a sizeable number of attackers are present in the network. The authors in [104] identified the 
following as conunon DoS attacks in DTN:
• Packet Dropping Attacks: Network performance is adversely affected when a packet 
dropping node is situated along a commonly used path. Packet dropping is the simplest attack 
a node can mount on packet delivery where the malicious node simply drops all bundles that 
it receives creating a black-hole along the propagation path. In DTN, the best countermeasure 
against this attack is to use multiple paths and packet replication. Another form of defence 
against this attack is to detect an outage along a path and try to avoid that path in the future. 
Packet dropping attack has characteristics that are similar to standard network outages which 
make it difficult to differentiate or prove that a node is malicious, malfunctioning or part of a 
route with faulty links.
• Flooding Attacks: Flooding attacks are the basis of most DoS attacks in wired networks. 
The aim of the attacker is to prevent legitimate traffic from reaching its victim while 
overwhelming the victim with a large volume of bogus bundles. In DTN an attacker can flood 
its victim whenever there is a connection opportunity. The attacker on the other hand never 
forwards any bundles it receives from other nodes. Since there is no direct path from source to 
destination in DTN, an attacker can resort to localised flooding where it sends these bogus 
bundles only to nodes within its communication range.
• Routing Table Falsification/Corruption: The injection of erroneous routing information 
causes delay and loss of bundles and is common place in traditional networks. DTN routing 
protocols such as MaxProp [62] support the replicate distribution of a table of node contact 
frequencies from each node to all peer nodes. DTN routing protocols such as MaxProp [62] 
and PRoPHET [60] do not support authentication so an attacker is at liberty to falsify the 
routing table information of any node.
• Address Spoofing: An attacker can pretend to be another node when it comes in contact 
with a legitimate or malicious node in the network. A legitimate node sends a packet destined
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to this spoof address to its intermediate peers and deletes the packet from its buffer. In a 
situation where such bundles are not replicated by the sender, then they are lost and cannot be 
delivered to destination. Address spoofing attacks have a more adverse effect on packet 
delivery than packet dropping attacks.
• Acknowledgment Counterfeiting: Replicative routing protocols use acknowledgments 
(acks) as an effective mechanism to enhance packet delivery. As effective as they are in 
guaranteeing packet delivery, acks can be sabotaged to mount a DoS attack. Acks are small­
sized bundles with little overhead. In routing protocols such as MaxProp, the cryptographic 
hash of a packet is used as its ack. An attacker can send false acks to intermediate nodes that 
have no seen the original packet. The first line of defence is to delete the ack and not 
propagate it. However there is a penalty if the ack belongs to a legitimate packet which the 
intermediate node is yet to see. Based on the evaluation of the authors [104], this 
countermeasure reduces the effectiveness of an attack by half and has a negligible impact on 
routing performance.
• Resource Exhaustion: Resource exhaustion attacks are a major concern in DTN which 
suffers from resource scarcity. One of the security objectives of DTN is to prevent 
unauthorised use and access of its infrastructure. An attacker can engage legitimate nodes in 
resource consuming tasks which are computationally-intensive with the aim to deplete a 
node’s battery, memory and link resources. Most resource exhaustion attacks are “Protocol- 
based” DoS attacks which exploits vulnerabilities inherent in the design of network and 
security protocols.
3.9 Protocol-Based Denial of Service Attacks
The DTN architecture lays a strong emphasis on protecting the infrastructure from misuse and this 
can be achieved through authentication and access control. The very protocols used to provide 
these services can also be used as a hook for DoS attacks by a clever attacker. The survivability of 
systems is greatly threatened by DoS attacks that are protocol-based. These attacks may be 
through resource allocation, resource destruction or through failures that are random in nature 
[105]. Any protocol where the server commits to expensive computations especially using public 
key cryptography or to memory allocation by storing protocol state information before or as part 
of client authentication is susceptible to network DoS. Gligor demonstrated that DoS in operating 
systems should be tackled through resource allocation and not through access control. His 
assumption is based on the resource allocation model where there are appropriate resources to 
cater for each request. Needham suggests that protocol design methods are most appropriate to
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prevent network DoS [98]. Strong support for stateless protocols is a trade-off between state 
storage space and increase in protocol message size and cryptographic computations. Instead of 
storing state, the server simply sends an authenticated protocol state to the client and expects that 
the client returns the state in subsequent messages. The cost of this operation is minimal using fast 
MAC algorithms. The server never commits to storage until the authenticity of the client is 
established.
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) derived from the 
PHOTURIS protocol by Kam and Simpson [106], requires the client to return a server generated 
cookie which can be used to prove the identity of the client and can be verified by the server 
before triggering any costly authentication protocol. “A cookie is a unique nonce computed from 
the names of sending and receiving parties and local secret information available only to the 
sender” [79]. The PHOTURIS protocol gives a specification of the cookie approach [79], [106]:
• the cookie must depend on the addresses of the communicating parties
• the cookie is generated based on a local secret known only by its generator
• nobody must be able to forge the cookie that will be accepted by the server
• the cookie generation and verification must be efficient in CPU and memory consumption
• the server must not keep per-client state until IP address has been verified.
PHOTURIS uses a keyed one-way hash function using both IP addresses, both UDP ports, and 
some locally-generated secret value. This value is the same for all clients but must be changed 
periodically. The cookie exchange technique is illustrated in Figure 3-5 below.
S E R V E R
A , B , C o o k ie A
N o n c e  =  k e
B , A . C o o k ie B
Nonce = Ra
A . B . C o o k ie A ,  C o o k ie B
G r a n t  r e q u e s t
C o o k i e A  =  H  (A . B . t. R a  ) 
C o o k i e B  -  H  (B , A . t,  k a  )
Figure 3-5 The Cookie Exchange Technique
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Juels and Brainard [107] introduced client puzzles to tackle the problem of connection depletion 
attacks. This method commits the client to the protocol by ensuring that the cost of engaging in 
the protocol is higher for the client than for the server. Hirose and Matsuura [108] propose a 
hybrid of cryptographic measure together with stateless protocols to prevent DoS attacks. The 
assurance of the server is increased when it establishes that the intention of the client is good 
which is achieved gradually through a series of weak authentication prior to signature verification. 
A good client puzzle should have the following [109].
• Creating a puzzle and verifying the solution is inexpensive for the server
• The cost of solving the puzzle is easy to adjust from zero to impossible
• The puzzle can be solved on most types of client hardware (although it might be slower
on some hardware).
• It is not possible to recompute solutions to the puzzles
• While the client is solving the puzzle, the server does not need to store the solution or
other client-specific data.
The robustness of authentication protocols against DoS attacks can be improved by asking clients 
to commit its computational resources to the protocol run before the server allocates its memory 
and processing time. The solution to the puzzle requires a brute-force search for some bits of 
inverse of a one-way hash function. The difficulty of the puzzle is adjusted based on server load. 
The client puzzle technique is illustrated in Figure 3-6 below.
request
Solution to Puzzle
Com pute Solution to the Puzzle
G enera te  a  random  nonce N
C hoose  a  difficulty level (k)
based  on server load
If Solution Is correct
Verify Solution
Grant request
Puzzle = (N,k)
Figure 3-6 Client Puzzle Technique
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3.10 How to Defend Against DoS Attacks
Protecting a system against DoS attacks involves the three cycles of preparation, detection and 
reaction [110]. In the preparation phase actions such as over provisioning of capacity, security 
policy creation, selection of good security protocols, the monitoring of on-going operations 
(packet rates, CPU and memory utilization) to distinguish between normal and abnormal 
behaviour. The detection phase is quite critical and important because the ability to detect attacks 
directly affects how the system reacts to such attacks and minimizes the possibility of damage 
[110]. The detection phase should be automatic and the response to DoS attack swift. Late 
detection of a DoS attack leads to the degradation of availability of critical services. The reaction 
phase involves the characterization and mitigation of attacks. During the characterization phase, 
the victim classifies the incoming traffic in order to determine if an attack is on-going. The 
classification helps the victim to distinguish between normal traffic (sent by legitimate nodes) and 
attack traffic (sent by malicious nodes) [111]. A good characterization will lead to a proper 
understanding of the nature of attack. In the mitigation phase, the victim uses the knowledge in 
the attack characterization sub-phase to deploy appropriate defences to defuse the attack.
Filtering and rate limiting are two effective mechanisms that can be applied to mitigate the 
effects of flooding DoS attacks [110]. Filtering requires that all incoming packets of a flow are 
discarded. Rate limiting is a process where traffic is allowed to pass through a node up to a 
maximum limit. In rate limiting, a certain probability of incoming packets of a flow is dropped if 
it exceeds a set limit to avoid congestion [111]. Filtering (Blocking) has a more damaging effect if 
legitimate flows cannot be differentiated from attack traffic. Blocking prevents users whose traffic 
matches the attack traffic from accessing services. On the other hand, rate limiting in itself is not a 
total effective mechanism to mitigate DoS attacks. As an automatic reaction mechanism, it offers 
a trade-off between mitigating the effect of a DoS attack and causing damage to legitimate traffic. 
Rate limiting is applicable to non-destructive flooding DoS attacks where a victim/target is 
overwhelmed with too many packets. Rate limiting is ineffective against logic attacks which 
targets a single victim where a single packet can infect, compromise, or crash a host. Another 
class of DoS attack in which rate limiting is ineffective is very high-bandwidth flooding attacks. It 
will require total blocking to stop attack traffic which will in turn harm legitimate traffic. The 
proposed mechanism to mitigate flooding DoS attacks in chapter 6 uses rate limiting in 
combination with other mechanisms.
Egress filtering is enforced at border gateways to help ensure that no malicious or attack traffic 
leaves the region. The purpose is to prevent an attacker within the network from spoofing a source 
address to launch a DoS attack. In RFC 2267 [112], Ferguson presents ingress packet filtering 
which reduces the effectiveness of source address spoofing DoS attack. Ingress filtering prevents
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an attacker from using forged source addresses to mount a DoS attack. Ingress filtering is a “good 
neighbour” policy based on mutual cooperation among gateways to thwart source address 
spoofing DoS attacks. Egress and ingress filtering are router-based solutions and are effective in 
stopping spoofed packets from reaching end-hosts. An attacker may decide to spoof the source 
address of a legitimate gateway in order to mount a DoS attack. Such attacks will be thwarted 
during the verification of the DTN-cookie proposed in chapter 4 since the attacker does not know 
the secret of the network. The egress filtering policy at security gateways requires that all out­
bound bundles must have legitimate source addresses within the region and must be authenticated. 
To achieve this, the source address must belong to a valid node within the region [113]. The 
mechanisms proposed in chapters 5 and 6 use ingress filtering techniques to thwart source address 
spoofing at DTN gateways. Ingress filtering is enforced at the security gateways to ensure that 
before a packet is processed, it must originate from a legitimate and known gateway in the DTN.
3.11 Summary
This chapter focuses on two aspects: security in general and DoS attacks in heterogeneous 
networks. The different solutions proposed in the related literature to mitigate DoS attacks in 
these networks are discussed. DTN security concepts such as security-source, security-destination 
and security-zones are defined and explained. This chapter also gives a brief description of 
security blocks and their use in securing DTN traffic. Examples of security blocks include Bundle 
Authentication Block (BAB), Payload Integrity Block (PIB), Payload Confidentiality Block 
(PCB) and Extension Security Block (ESB). Also we have discussed security threats to the DTN 
architecture such as resource consumption, traffic storms, bundle content modification/disclosure 
and DoS attacks. Authentication, integrity, confidentiality, privacy/anonymity and availability are 
five security requirements for DTN listed and discussed in this chapter. We have defined and 
classified DoS attacks and discussed its effects in wireless sensor networks, terrestrial networks, 
satellite networks, mobile ad hoc networks and delay/disruption tolerant networks. We have 
identified packet dropping, flooding, address spoofing, acknowledgement counterfeiting, resource 
exhaustion and routing table corruption/falsification as common DoS attacks in DTN. Table 3-1 
provides a summary of DoS attacks and the mitigation techniques proposed in the different 
networks mentioned in section 3.8.
The damaging effect of protocol-based based DoS attacks have been highlighted and 
discussed. A protocol-based DoS attack exploits vulnerabilities in security protocols to make them 
target of new threats. Solutions proposed for the terrestrial Internet such as the Internet Security 
Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) which is based on the use of cookies have 
been analysed and considered not suitable for DTN. The ISAKMP cookie technique is suitable for
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static and well-connected networks and requires more than one message exchange during client 
authentication. In chapter 4 we will discuss in detail the three variants of the proposed DTN- 
Cookies and how they are applied. Also, the proposed DoS-Resilient Authentication Mechanism 
(DoSRAM) for mitigating resource exhaustion attacks in the intra-region scenario will be 
discussed and evaluated in detail.
Table 3-1 Summary of DoS Attacks and Mitigation Techniques in Different Networks
Network Type Examples of DoS Attack Mitigation Techniques
Wireless Sensor
Networks
(WSNs)
Jamming, exhaustion, interrogation, 
elective forwarding, misdirection, 
sinkholes, Sybil attacks, flooding
Spread spectrum, frequency hopping, 
broadcast authentication (pTelsa and 
public-key based signature scheme), 
client puzzles
Terrestrial
Networks
(Internet)
TCP-SYN attack, IP spoofing, 
flooding
Cookies, client puzzles, traffic 
monitoring (volume, loss ratio, 
queuing delays), stateless protocols.
Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks
(MANETs)
Flooding, battery depletion attack, 
bandwidth attack, packet dropping, 
incorrect routing information 
advertisement
Neighbourhood watch/monitoring, 
localised monitoring, exchange of 
reputation information/cluster head, 
cooperation enforcement, digital 
cryptography (Hmac, digital 
signatures, hash chains)
Satellite
Networks
Flooding, resource exhaustion, 
address spoofing
Weak authentication
Delay/Disruption
Tolerant
Networks (DTNs)
Packet dropping, flooding, routing 
table falsification/corruption, 
address spoofing, acknowledgement 
counterfeiting, resource exhaustion
Distributed queuing mechanism, 
collision count protection, token 
protection, opportunistic protection
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Chapter 4
4 Intra-Region DoS Mitigation Mechanism 
for DTNs
Many systems especially most mobile, sensor and hand-held devices are constrained by the need 
to conserve power. Most of these systems are totally destroyed due to a complete drain in their 
battery power. Such systems will be unable to provide service if a large proportion of nodes suffer 
from total battery depletion which can lead to network partitions. The cost of recovery can be very 
significant [35]. In these systems and in many applications, power is a critical and limited 
resource and its conservation is a priority [114]. Providing security in a DTN may impose 
additional costs in terms of bandwidth utilization and computational costs on the nodes. In 
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [18], bogus traffic injected into the network is carried all the 
way to the security destination and this consumes a lot of resources [115].
In this chapter, we will focus on how to make security services like authentication efficient and 
robust against DoS attacks. In a multi-hop DTN routing scenario, bundles are checked for 
authenticity and integrity at intermediate nodes. An attacker can exploit the message forwarding 
mechanism and the authentication/access control checks by injecting bogus bundles into the 
network. The aim is to deplete the scarce resources of the DTN which include battery power, 
bandwidth, CPU cycles, communication contact time and memory. Without authentication, 
unsuspecting honest nodes will replicate and forward fake bundles from the attacker. If allowed to 
go unchecked, the network will become congested and network resources and services will be 
denied to legitimate users. Extra traffic from rogue nodes may pose serious threats to the 
operation and survivability of the DTN due to its resource constraints. In DTN, unauthorized 
access and use of resources is viewed seriously and highly discouraged.
Most access control methods use strong security and resource intensive authentication. Strong 
security implies a more secure system but degrades the performance of devices with limited 
resources and introduces new threats such as resource exhaustion. Public Key Cryptography 
(PKC) involves computationally-expensive operations such as modular exponentiation. Verifying 
digital signatures which are based on PKC hop-by-hop at intermediate nodes takes time and 
consumes resource leading to an increase in bundle propagation time and network congestion.
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The situation becomes worse when multi copy routing/forwarding is adopted to boast bundle 
delivery ratio. The per-bundle addition in terms of size of the digital signatures and their 
corresponding certificates is large. For instance 1024-bit RSA is in the order of hundreds of bytes 
(128 bytes) in extra transmission cost per packet per hop. The DTNRG has adopted the Bundle 
Security Protocol (BSP) [28] specification to address two important security challenges in DTN 
communications. The absence of authenticity of transmitted bundles and a lack of authorization 
for nodes to access and utilize DTN resources. The BSP specification uses the BAB or the PIB to 
achieve bundle authentication and node authorization by adding a digital signature to each bundle. 
The security source node signs the bundle with its private key to produce a bundle-specific digital 
signature. Intermediate nodes and the destination node can verify the authenticity of the sender, 
the integrity of the message and the Class of Service (CoS) rights of the sender using their public 
keys [116].
Packet, sigA
D estina tion  N od eS o u rce  N od e in te rm e d ia te  N od e In term ed ia te  N ode
.......................................  ^ Intermittent Connectivity
Figure 4-1 DTN Hop-by-Hop Authentication
A generic DTN bundle is made up of the primary block and the payload block as shown in Figure 
3-3 of section 3.4. The BSP specification [28] provides additional blocks which can be added to a 
bundle to provide a security service. For more details on the BAB, PIB, PCB and ESB security 
blocks, see section 3.4 and [28]. The BAB and the PIB are security blocks related to bundle 
authentication. The BAB provides protection for the bundle on a hop-by-hop basis, while the PIB 
protects the bundle end-to-end. In Figure 4-1, a source node A signs a bundle (packet) and 
appends its signature sigA (PIB) to the bundle and sends it to an intermediate node B. Node B 
checks the sender’s identity and Class of Service (CoS) rights for authenticity by verifying the 
signature. Node B generates its own signature sigg (BAB) and appends it to the bundle and 
forwards to intermediate node C. Node C verifies Node B’s signature sigg and replaces it with its 
own signatuie. This continues until the bundle arrives at the destination. Implementing strong and 
resource-intensive security like digital signatures means more than having a very secure system or 
network. For resource-constrained DTN environments, such strong security will lead to a decline 
in device performance and resource exhaustion. Our objective is to achieve great efficiency during
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bundle authentication, by minimizing the computational and communication cost associated with 
security by using very light-weight mechanisms. In this chapter, we propose a DoS-Resilient 
Authentication Mechanism (DoSRAM). The scheme uses three variants of light-weight DTN- 
Cookies to detect and react quickly to illegitimate traffic that can lead to resource exhaustion DoS 
attacks. Our aim is to minimize the impact of security processing on energy constrained DTN 
nodes, keep computational and communication costs low, reduce latency, improve packet delivery 
ratio and prolong the life of the network.
4.1 System M odel, Attacker M odel and Design Assum ptions
In this section we describe the system model, the attacker model, design assumptions, design 
goals and the networking and security requirements.
4.1.1 System Model/Application Scenario
S eo u rityS ecurity
Security
Security
Gateway
S ecu rity
S ecu rity
Figure 4-2 A DTN Region
Figure 4-2 shows a DTN region with a gateway which provides interoperability and connectivity 
to other DTN regions with similar or dissimilar protocol stacks. Messages are propagated hop-by- 
hop through fixed sinks to the gateway or through mobile sinks whose routes and time are 
scheduled. All legitimate nodes are security-aware (SA_Node) with predefined security policies 
which are updated regulaiiy. Bundles must be authenticated before storage or forwarding and all 
the nodes are mobile except the fixed sinks and gateway. A good example of such DTNs is in 
sensor network applications which range from wild life and environmental monitoring, waiehouse 
inventory, object tracking to military surveillance [117], [118]. Sensor nodes communicate their
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readings hop-by-hop to fixed sink nodes within their respective domains. The fixed sinks act as 
Group Head (GH) to a number of sensors and can perform data aggregation and fusion to reduce 
duplication. Fixed sinks are more powerful computationally and storage-wise than ordinary 
sensors. Mobile sinks (human, vehicular, any mobile object with a Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA)-type device) can be used to collect data from fixed sinks in a scheduled manner to reduce 
forwarding cost, balance communication load and extend the life of the network. The mobile 
sinks use wireless communication when in range to collect sensor data. The hierarchical 
organization is to conserve energy and network bandwidth.
4.1.2 Attacker Model
We assume the attacker can inject bogus bundles into the network to keep legitimate DTN nodes 
busy, drain their limited resources and introduce network latency. We assume that the computing 
power of the attacker is large (i.e. the attacker can generate a large number of bundles per unit 
time, has high transmission bandwidth and range) compared to legitimate nodes. The attacker can 
compute crypto-functions and Message Authentication Codes (MAGs) with great speed and 
efficiency. The attacker can modify bundles but does not have knowledge of network secrets 
such as keys and nonce values. The attacker can or cannot spoof source addresses of legitimate 
nodes. We also assume that the attacker is mobile and is not capable of compromising legitimate 
nodes.
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Figure 4-3 Threat Tree [80]
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All systems connected to a communication network have vulnerabilities which make them 
susceptible to threats. Identifying and providing mitigation mechanisms against such threats is 
crucial to the survivability of the network. Figure 4-3 shows a threat tree which describes the type 
of attacker, his/her capability, target of attack, the vulnerabihty being exploited and the result of 
attack. We are interested in DoS attacks where the attacker acts independently without collusion 
or coordination from other nodes. The attacker technically has the capability to receive, transmit, 
replay, modify and execute the protocol. The aim of the attacker is to cause damage in a localized 
fashion which over time will result in a network-wide damage because he is mobile. A stationary 
attacker is less effective because connectivity in a DTN is intermittent. Such an attacker waits for 
a legitimate node to be within its conununication range and can only cause damage within its 
local neighbourhood. The mobile attacker on the other hand can tailgate or move within the 
conununication range of legitimate nodes. The main targets of the attacker are the application 
layer services, the authentication service and the data forwarding service. A successful DoS attack 
on a DTN can constitute a nuisance, degrade, disrupt or even disable DTN nodes if their batteries 
are depleted.
4.1.3 Design Assumptions and Security Goals
We assume that an Offline Security Manager (GSM) exist during the initialization of the system 
to handle key generation, distribution of secret credentials and security policies. We assume that a 
large number of nodes in the DTN are resource-constrained. We assume that gateways are 
stationary while malicious nodes are mobile. Key revocation is out of scope of this work.
The security goals of the proposed DoS defence mechanism are as follows:
• Prevent otherwise authorised nodes/applications from sending bundles at a Class of 
Service which they lack permission
• Discard promptly bundles that are damaged or modified in transit
• The proposed DoS resilience mechanism should not be a target of new attacks
• Ensure that all relayed bundles are authenticated in order to filter and drop bogus traffic 
injected by the attacker i.e. promptly detect and discard unauthorised traffic
• The security mechanism should not increase network load during attack periods by 
generating additional traffic
• Our scheme should improve the performance of security service and network efficiency, 
improve bundle delivery ratio and minimize computational and communication costs in 
resource-constrained DTNs
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4.1.4 Networking and Security Requirements
In order to counter the attacks listed in section 4,1.2, our design has to fulfil a number of 
networking and security requirements;
4.1.4.1 Networking Requirements
• It is important that the DoS resihence mechanism should be able to withstand significant 
node mobility
• The mechanism should be able to run efficiently on resource-limited nodes and be 
resilient to delays in the order of minutes, hours or days
• The mechanism should support varying data rates and withstand changes in contact times.
• In the absence of an end-to-end path between source and destination, the mechanism 
should be able to operate efficiently
4.1.4.2 Security Requirements
• Restrict security processing to capable and security-aware nodes
• To ensure freshness, we use nonce and timestamps to thwart replay attacks and drop 
expired bundles
• Every bundle is checked for integrity to prevent bundle content modification during 
transit
• Every bundle is authenticated to ensure they originate from legitimate sources.
4.2 The Proposed Security Scheme
A robust and effective DoS resilience mechanism should have a Detection, Classification and 
Response component. The Detection component can be anomaly-based or signature-based or a 
hybrid of the two. For anomaly-based detection, any deviation from standard behaviour from 
clients is recognized by the system. In signature-based detection, the system attempts to identify 
the characteristics of known attacks. The Classification component classifies incoming packets 
into valid (normal) packets and invalid (attack) packets using either anomaly-based or signature- 
based techniques. The Response element protects the system by dropping attack packets promptly 
or redirects them to a trap for further evaluation and analysis [66].
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Figure 4-4 A DTN Bundle with Appended DTN-Cookie Block
Figure 4-4 shows a generic DTN bundle with additional security blocks (BAB, PIB and PCB) 
added to provide security to the bundle. To provide DoS resilience, we propose a new extension 
security block called DTN-Cookie block. This block introduces light-weight message 
authentication mechanism which reduces the computational overhead associated with digital 
signature verification.
4.2.1 Definition of Parameters
• TSithe timestamp is a concatenation of a bundle creation time and a monotonically increasing 
sequence number. The TS is unique for every new bundle for source End-point Identifier 
(EID).
• LSrthe bundle life span or expiry time of a bundle which can be in minutes, hours or days. In 
this thesis, LS and TTL (Time-To-Live) are used interchangeably.
• Src_EID: the Source End-point Identifier or Source address is the originator of the bundle, 
we assume that each EID is a singleton.
• Dst_EED: the destination EID is the entity or node for which the bundle is destined
• CoS: the sender’s Class of Service rights is used to assign priority to certain class of traffic. A 
bundle can have an expedited, normal or bulk CoS rights
• RSAwithSHA256: represents the cipher suite for the digital signature algorithm
• NTL: represents the Network Threat Level indicator which a node uses to determine which 
cipher suite to use during DTN-Cookie verification.
• BAB: the Bundle Authentication Block, assures the authenticity of the bundle in a hop-by- 
hop basis
• FIB: the Payload Integrity Block, assures the authenticity and integrity of the bundle in an 
end-to-end basis
• PCB: the Payload Integrity Block, indicates that some parts of the bundle has been encrypted 
at the source
61
Chapter 4. Intra-Region DoS Mitigation Mechanism for DTNs
ESB: Extension Security Block, indicates that there are additional blocks after the payload 
block to provide security to the bundle
M: the bundle payload
H (M): h is the hash value derived by passing the bundle payload M through the hash 
function H. H is a cryptographic hash function such as MD5, SHAl or SHA256. We will be 
using SHA256 as the underlying hash function to the signature and MAC algorithms
privK( H(M)): the bundle-specific digital signature
Cookie: the DTN-Cookie, is derived from a combination of bundle fields and a 256-bit long 
random nonce as input to a one-way hash function.
pubKxi: the public key of node Xi
privKxi: the private key of node Xi
The BSP specification [28] provides minimal protection against DoS attacks. DTN nodes simply 
drop bundles that fail the authentication and access control checks. This in itself is vulnerable to 
new security threats such as resource exhaustion attacks. An attacker simply sends a large volume 
of bundles to a target node. The victim node will be kept busy verifying bogus signatures and 
wasting its resources (CPU processing cycles and battery). Legitimate bundles will be denied 
access to the victim node or dropped due to congestion or time-to-live expiry.
4.2.2 DTN-Cookie Design
To prevent the attack described in section 4.2.1, we propose three DTN-Cookie variants for the 
intra-region scenario which can be applied based on the perceived Network Threat Level (NTL). 
One critical feature of our design is the requirement to reduce the computational cost associated 
with bundle authentication. We take advantage of the unique blocks (fields) of the DTN bundle in 
the composition of our light-weight DTN-Cookie mechanism. The present BSP specification 
provides HMAC-SHAl and RSA-SHA-256 digital signature as BAB for bundle authentication. 
HMAC-SHAl and RSA-SHA-256 use symmetric and asymmetric cryptography respectively.
Our proposed DTN-Cookies are based on cryptographic one-way hash functions with no need 
for cryptographic keys with the exception of variant 3. Fetching the symmetric key or the 
private/public key pairs from the key store during the computation and verification of the BSP 
BAB imposes energy consumption cost on security-aware nodes. The design of the first and 
second DTN-Cookie variants eliminates the key fetch operation. The DTN-Cookie is designed to 
provide resilience against modification and resource exhaustion attacks. It protects the integrity of
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the primary block fields and security blocks associated with the DoS-resilience mechanism. The 
payload block is protected against modification and eavesdropping attacks using PIB (digital 
signatures) and PCB (data encryption) in an end-to-end fashion.
DTN-Cookie = H(i({TS\SrcEiD)\LS\CoS\NTL)\p-RNG(IV)) (I)
The Initiahzation Vector (TV) is known to registered nodes of the region. The IV is used to seed 
the pseudo-random number (p-RNG) generator. The output from the p-RNG is a 256-bit random 
long integer value of type Biglnteger which is optimized for speed. This Biglnteger value is the 
random nonce. A concatenation of the timestamp (TS) and the bundle source address (SrcJEID) 
provides a unique bundle identifier. The unique bundle identifier is concatenated with the bundle 
life span (LS i.e. TTL: time-to-live), Class of Service (CoS), Network Threat Level (NTL) and the 
random nonce. The resulting output is hashed with H (the SHA-256 algorithm) to produce a fixed 
length hash h which is appended to a bundle as DTN-Cookie. The IV is changed periodically by 
the regional security gateway to ensure freshness.
DTN-Cookie = H(({TS\SrcEw)\LS\CoS\NTL) XOR p-RNG(IV)) (2)
The difference between the first and second DTN-Cookie variant is the XOR operation. The xor 
operation introduces bit flip which produces a stronger mechanism with a high degree of 
randomness and make forgery more difficult.
DTN-Cookie = HMAC(({TS\SrcEw)\LS\CoS\NTL) XOR p-RNG (IVl K r s )  (3)
The third DTN-Cookie variant uses keyed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) to provide 
DoS resilience and uses SHA-256 as the underlying hash function. The result of the operation is 
hashed with a regional secret key Krs to produce a fixed length MAC which is appended to every 
bundle. The secrecy of the key Krs and the IV makes the DTN-Cookie hard to forge. To prevent 
compromise, X/?^and the IV  are periodically changed by the security gateway.
We will test our proposed mechanisms in two case scenarios: In the first scenario, we assume that 
the attacker does not have the capability to spoof the source addresses of other nodes and does not
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hide his identity. In the second scenario, we assume that the attacker has the ability to spoof the 
source addresses of other nodes and can hide his identity.
4.2.3 Non-spoofing Scenario
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Figure 4-5 DoS Resilient Mechanism against Resource Exhaustion Attacks
Figure 4-5 is a flowchart which shows the steps a node takes to authenticate a bundle. In this first 
scenario, we assume that the attacker does not spoof the address of other nodes and does not hide 
his address. When a bundle arrives at a DTN node, the sender’s address is checked against a Node 
Isolation Log (NIL). The NIL is used to store the addresses of all blacklisted or blocked nodes. 
All bundles from a blocked node are discarded without any form of processing. All nodes serve as 
Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) and are required to enforce their own configurable security 
policies [11]. In general policies are defined as Event-Condition-Action (EGA) clauses, where on 
event(s) E, if condition (C) is (are) true, then action(s) A is (are) executed. To prevent the 
injection of bogus bundles, the receiving node proceeds to ensure that the bundle size is within the
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limits allowed by the application, the time-to-live (TTL) is not set into the future and that the 
bundle was sent using the authorised Class of Service (CoS) rights. If any of these checks fail, the 
bundle is discarded and processed no further.
The next step is to check the authenticity of the bundle by verifying the DTN-Cookie. A 
node’s address is logged in the Node Misbehaviour Log (NML) if bundle authentication fails. A 
node is blocked if it has a configurable number of failed authentication attempts recorded against 
it in the NML. Conversely, if DTN-Cookie verification is successful, and the processing node is 
an intermediate node, the bundle is stored in the buffer until a contact opportunity arises. On the 
other hand if the processing node is the bundle destination, signature verification is triggered. The 
bundle is discarded if signature verification fails otherwise the bundle is delivered to the 
application. A Failed Authentication Cache is defined which is made up of two logs: (1) the Node 
Misbehaviour Log (NML) which captures information on nodes whose bundles fail the DTN- 
Cookie verification. It also captures the time when the failure occurred. (2) The Node 
Misbehaviour Count Log (NMCL) records the number of failed authentication attempts. The 
NML is implemented as a linked list where insertions and deletions are constant time 0(1) 
complexity operations. The NMCL is implemented as a HashMap as follows:
HashMap < DTNHost, Integer > NodeMisbehaviourCountLog
DTNHost is the node address and Integer is the numeric type in which count is stored. The 
HashMap class uses a hash table to implement the Map interface in Java and uses the hash value 
of the key object (i.e. DTNHost address) to locate where the value (Failed Authentication Count) 
is stored. HashMap allows the execution of basic operations such as get () and put () to remain 
constant even for large sets. Without the NMCL, the NML must be searched every time a bundle 
is received in order to deduce the number of failed authentication attempts for the sending node. 
Such searches can yield either a zero or higher count making the failed authentication count 
calculation a linear 0(n) complexity operation.
Node Misbehaviour Log Node Misbehaviour Count Log
DTNHost Address ! Timestamp j DTNHost Address j Failed Authentication Count
al tl al 1
a2 t2 a2 3
bl t3
---------------
bl 2
b3 i (4 b3 3
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When a bundle originating from a node fails the DTN-Cookie verification, and the node address 
does not exist in the NML, a new entry is created and Failed Authentication Count is set to L If a 
node’s address already exists in NML, Failed Authentication Count is incremented by 1 and the 
existing value replaced by the new. A node’s address that exceeds a pre-defined count threshold 
has a new record appended to the Node Isolation Log (NIL). This pre-defmed count threshold is 
dependent on the type of application and available network/node resources.
Node Isolation Log
DTNHost Address > Timestamp ;
a2 t2
b3 t4
The NIL is a HashMap defined as: HashMap < DTNHost, Double > NodelsolationLog
Any node that has a record in NIL is isolated or blocked for a set period of time Tbiocked, in which 
bundles originating from such nodes are dropped by legitimate nodes. All entries in NIL that 
exceed time Ttiocked are removed from NIL. Similarly, all entries in the NML older than time Tiogged 
are purged and the NMCL updated accordingly. Ttiocked is the length of time a node address is 
blocked in NIL and Tiogged is the length of time a node address is logged in the NML respectively.
4.3 Evaluation of the Design
In this section, we evaluate the strength and resilience of our proposed scheme against attacks. 
The proposed scheme requires a single bundle exchange to achieve bundle authentication and uses 
symmetric cryptography and hash functions which are four orders of magnitude faster than 
public-key cryptography and digital signatures. The computational requirements of hash functions 
and MACs are low compared to digital signatures. In our design, every bundle has a timestamp 
embedded in it which is used to provide an accurate record of the bundle creation time and act as 
a freshness identifier. The concatenation of the timestamp and source_EID is a unique bundle 
identifier which provides a strong feature for thwarting replay attacks. Any attempt to modify the 
timestamp is detected during DTN-cookie verification. The payload is protected using a digital
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signature and can be encrypted for confidentiality. The BSP specification recommends RSA-1024 
as the de facto digital signature algorithm for DTN. Recent studies show that Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) is suitable for resource-constrained devices like sensors. The Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA-160 supports 160-bit keys and provides the same level of 
security as RSA-1024 [114]. ECDSA-160 has a smaller key and signature size which makes it 
more energy efficient and results in bandwidth, memory and computational savings than RSA- 
1024 [114], [119], [120].
The use of a cryptographically secure random number generator and secret nonce values make 
the proposed mechanisms random and hard to forge. The first and second DTN-cookie variants 
use SHA-256 as hash function. SHA-256 is a 256-bit hash function which uses 32-bit words and 
provides 128 bits of security against collision attacks [69]. The hash operation produces a fixed- 
length DTN-cookie which saves memory, CPU processing and provides integrity to bundle fields. 
As a requirement, H can be apphed to a block of data of any size, and it is relatively easy to 
compute Hfx) for any x  For any given value h it is computationally infeasible to find y x such 
that H(y) = Hfxj (weak colhsion resistance). Finally it is computationally infeasible to find any 
pair (x, y) such that H(x) = H(y) (strong colhsion resistance) [69]. The first and second DTN- 
cookie variants have all these properties in-built.
The third DTN-cookie variant uses HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication and uses 
SHA-256 and a secret key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC is dependent on the properties 
of the underlying hash function and the bit length of the key. On average an attack will require 2^'
attempts on a k-bit key. The amount of effort needed for a brute-force attack on a MAC 
algorithm can be expressed as min (2*, 2"). The key and MAC lengths should satisfy the 
relationship min (k, n)>N,  where N is in the range of 128 bits [106]. The irreversibility property 
of the one-way hash function and the secrecy of the symmetric keys (Ks, K rs) , makes the proposed 
DTN-cookie hard to forge.
4.4 Simulations and Performance Evaluation
We implement DoSRAM on the Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator [57] and 
evaluate its performance. ONE is an agent-based discrete event simulation engine and a number 
of simulation modules are updated by the simulation engine at each simulation step. The simulator 
models node movement, inter-node contacts, routing and message handling. Results are collected 
and analysed through visualization, reports and post-processing tools. Node movement is 
implemented by synthetic movement models or through existing movement traces. Connectivity 
between nodes is based on node location, communication range and bit-rate. Messages are 
generated through event generators or external events and unicast having a single source and
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destination host inside the simulation world. The Simulator is written in Java and the basic agents 
are nodes which model mobile endpoints and are capable of forwarding messages using a store- 
carry-and forward approach. Each node belongs to a group which is assigned a set of capabilities 
and a node inherits the capabilities of the gi'oup to which it belongs. Capabilities such as the node 
buffer size, message size, transmission range, transmission speed etc. are set in the Configuration 
file. More complex capabihties such as movement and routing are configured using specialized 
modules which models a particular behaviour for that capability. For energy simulations, each 
node in the simulation world is assigned a fixed amount of energy. A node’s energy profile is 
depleted when it transmits or receives messages, scans for the presence of other nodes during the 
discovery process and performs security processing. More details on the ONE simulator can be 
found in [58], [121] and appendix D. Figure 4-6 shows the internal modules of the ONE simulator 
and how they link and interact with each other. One major limitation of the ONE simulator is that 
it does not implement any form of security. We have hnked the ONE to cryptographic primitives 
using the Java Security Architecture and extended the simulator in order to implement our 
proposed security schemes.
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Figure 4-6 Overview of the ONE Simulator Environment [351
In our simulations 100 nodes are uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters by 3400 meters area. Each 
node has a transmission range of 100m and travel at a speed of between 18 to 36 km/hr to 
conform to the selected scenario of vehicular networks. We vary the number of attackers from 10 
to 50 to see what effect it has on bundle delivery ratio, average latency and energy efficiency of
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nodes. The attacker generates one bundle every 5 seconds, moves with a speed between 18 to 36 
km/hr and uses the Random Way Point (RWP) Mobility model. We implement DoSRAM using 
the Spray and Wait routing protocol [59]. This scheme can also be implemented on other DTN 
routing protocols such as Epidemic [61]. To demonstrate the efficiency of DoSRAM, we compare 
it to the Bundle Security Protocol authentication mechanism based on RSA-1024 digital 
signatures. We use the second variant of our proposed DTN-Cookies for the simulations. Details 
of the simulation parameters are shown in the Table 4.1 where the node speed represents the 
speed of a car in an urban area. The message size is set at 64kB to prevent an attacker from 
arbitrarily sending large bundles to fill available buffer space. Spray and Wait routing protocol 
supports bundle replication and to prevent flooding we limit the number of forwarding copies to 
2.
Table 4-1 Simulation Parameters
Simulation Duration 43200 s (12hrs)
Number of Nodes 100
Speed of Nodes 18-36 km/hr
Transmission Range 100m
Mobility Model Map-Based Mobility Model
Message Size 64kB
Message TTL 300 minutes
Message Generation Interval 60 ~ 120 (90) s
Routing Protocol Spray and Wait
Number of Forwarding Copies 2 Copies
Buffer Size 5MB
4.4.1 Simulation Results
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the performance of DoSRAM. One of the prime 
purposes of a DoS attack by a malicious node is to reduce the amount of bundles delivered to 
destinations.
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Figure 4-7 Effects of Increasing Number of Attackers on Delivery Ratio
In the ONE simulator, delivery ratio is defined as follows:
Delivery Ratio =
number o f  bundles delivered
number o f  bundles created by legitimate nodes
Figure 4-7 shows the effect on bundle delivery ratio when the number of attackers increases. In 
the presence of mobile attackers with no DoS defence mechanism in place, the average number of 
bundles delivered is 76 compared to 585 bundles generated by honest nodes. This represents 
15.7% of the overall bundles generated by honest nodes. The low delivery ratio is as a result of 
attack traffic using up resources such as bandwidth, buffers and memory. Legitimate traffic is 
dropped if their time-to-live expires or the buffers of nodes become full. The BSP RSA-1024 
digital signature mechanism gives an average delivery ratio of 87.3% representing 424 out of 585 
bundles delivered to destination. When we activate DoSRAM, the bundle delivery ratio rises to 
96.8% (469 bundles) which represents 81.1% increase when compared when no security 
mechanism is used and 9.5% increase when compared to when BSP RSA-1024 digital signature is 
used. DoSRAM performs better because attack traffic is filtered and discaided freeing up 
resources for legitimate traffic (flows).
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Figure 4-8 Effects of Increasing Number of Attackers on Average Latency
Delay is introduced as bundles traverse the network in a multi-hop routing scenario. There are a 
number of factors such as transmission, propagation, processing and queuing delays which affect 
latency in the network. In traditional end-to-end communications, latency is defined as follows:
Latency = transmission delay -f propagation delay -I- processing delay 
+ queuing delay
Transmission and propagation delays are influenced by the transmission medium. The capability 
of the DTN node has a direct influence on the processing and queuing delays. Each bundle has a 
time-to-hve (TTL) of 300 minutes (18000 seconds). Security processing at DTN nodes introduces 
congestion which has a major role to play in affecting the latency levels in the network. Figure
4-8 shows the average latency experienced by each bundle. Without any security mechanism, the 
average latency experienced by a bundle is 125 seconds as the number of attackers increase from 
10 to 50. This represents 0.69% of a bundle’s total TTL. When BSP RSA-1024 digital signature is 
used as the mitigation mechanism, the average latency per bundle is 2214 seconds which 
represents 12.3% of a bundle’s TTL. The high average latency is as a result of the resource - 
intensive operations associated with the computation and verification of RSA digital signatures. 
DoSRAM imposes a minimal amount of latency due to security processing at intermediate nodes. 
The average latency experienced by a bundle from source to destination is 1272 seconds which 
represents just 7.1% of the TTL of each bundle. Thus DoSRAM introduces a much lower latency 
when compared to RSA-1024 digital signature but higher latency than when no security 
mechanism is used.
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Figure 4-9 Overhead Ratio with Increasing Number of Attackers
Overhead Ratio =
(number o f  bundles relayed — number o f  bundles delivered) 
number o f  bundles delivered
Overhead ratio is dependent on the number of relayed bundles and number of bundles delivered to 
destination. In Figure 4-9 with no security mechanism, the Overhead ratio keeps increasing as 
the number of attackers increase. The average overhead ratio is 49.5 (approximately 50) because 
only a small fraction of relayed bundles are actually delivered to destination. It should be noted 
that an attacker generates one bundle every 5 seconds and none of these are filtered from the 
network. This makes it less likely for legitimate bundles to be dehvered to destination. When 
mitigations schemes are activated, overhead ratio drops drastically. Figure 4-9 shows that 
DoSRAM has a lower overhead ratio of 1.00556 when compared to BSP RSA-1024 (1.10386). 
This is because DoSRAM has a higher dehvery ratio as shown in Figure 4-7. The graph showing 
the overhead for DoSRAM and RSA-1024 appeal* to merge because the difference in overhead 
ratio is just 0.1016 as shown in Figure 4-9. When DoSRAM is activated, it reduces the overhead 
ratio by as much as 48.49% compared to the instance when no security mechanism is used.
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Figure 4-10 BufferTime Average with Increasing Number of Attackers
The BufferTime Average is a metric which shows the average time a bundle spends in the buffer 
as it traverses the network from source to destination. Buffer availability enhances the efficiency 
of the DTN carry-store-and-forward mechanism. Figure 4-10 shows that with no security 
mechanism the average buffer time of a bundle is 174 seconds. This is as a result of the network 
being saturated with fake bundles from the attacker. A DTN node drops bundles when its buffer is 
full and this affects the number of bundles from honest nodes that are stored in buffers for onward 
forwarding to next hop towards the destination. With RSA-1024, the buffertime average is 17960 
seconds which is the same as DoSRAM. DoSRAM filters and drops all attack bundles, increasing 
the buffertime average to 17960 seconds. Bundles from legitimate nodes experience extended 
buffeitime average values thus increasing their chances of being delivered to destination.
Energy consumption is a major concern for most mobile and resource-constrained nodes. The 
battery life of nodes has a direct impact on the lifespan of a DTN network. A certain amount of 
energy is expended every time a node sends or receives a message. The amount of energy 
consumed by a security function for a given microprocessor is determined by the processor, 
power consumption, the processor clock cycle frequency and the number of clocks needed by the 
processor to compute the security function. The cryptographic algorithm and the efficiency of the 
softwaie implementation determine the number of clock cycles necessary to perform the security 
function [122]. For symmetric cryptographic functions, the energy cost at both transmitter and 
receiver of a processed message are relatively equal. Asymmetric public-key cryptographic 
algorithms have different energy cost associated with a processed message at the receiver and 
transmitter. For the energy simulations 10 nodes are uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters by 3400
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meters area and all configuration parameters in Table 4-1 remain the same. To obtain the average 
energy consumed by each node, we consider transmission energy, receive energy, computational 
energy and scan energy in our simulations. Every node has an initial energy of 2 x 10^  mJ and we 
set transmit and receive energy to 0.0596 and 0.0286 mJ/s respectively. A node scans for other 
nodes once every 60 seconds and expends 0.0140mJ of energy each time. Each DTN-Cookie 
computation and verification requires 0.0059 mJ/s of energy while each RSA-1024 Sign and 
Verify operation requires 304 mJ/s and 11.9mJ/s respectively [114].
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Figure 4-11 Average Energy Consumption with Increasing Number of Attackers
The result in Figure 4-11 shows the energy consumed in the propagation and authentication of 
bundles and how the increase in number of attackers affects the energy consumption of nodes. 
The average energy consumed by honest nodes with no security mechanism is 1274mJ which 
represents 0.06% of the total battery power. When Public-Key Cryptography (BSP RSA-1024) is 
used as security mechanism, the energy consumption rate rises sharply with an increase in number 
of attackers. With 50 attackers, the average energy expended by a node is 1.990419 x 10^  mJ 
which represents 99.5% of a node’s total batteiy power. When our mechanism (DoSRAM) is 
activated, the average energy consumption per node is 16557ml which represents 0.83% of the 
total battery power. The average energy consumed by a node when DoSRAM is used is slightly 
higher than when no security mechanism is used. The energy consumption for DoSRAM is much 
lower than when Public-Key Cryptography (RSA-1024 digital signature) is used for bundle 
authentication. Table 4-4 provides a cleai' picture of the actual amount of energy consumed in all 
three instances. The result in Figure 4-11 cleaiiy demonstrates the effectiveness of DoSRAM in
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tackling resoui'ce exhaustion attacks which targets the battery power of nodes when a security 
service like authentication is applied.
4.4.2 Spoofing Scenario
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Figure 4-12 A DoS Resilient Mechanism against Resource Exhaustion and Spoofing Attacks
In the second scenaiio, we assume that the attacker can spoof source addresses. In our design as 
shown in Figure 4-12 we do not block (perform filtering) node addresses to avoid memory 
exhaustion and masquerade attacks. The only cost we will bear is in computational cost which is 
negligible as the result in Figure 4-17 shows and this is primarily due to the light-weight 
mechanisms we have proposed. In Figure 4-12, the flowchart shows that when a bundle arrives at 
a DTN node, the receiving node checks to ensure that the bundle size is within the limits allowed
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by the application, the time-to-live (TTL) is not set into the future and that the bundle was sent 
using the authorised Class of Service (CoS) rights. If any of these checks fail, the bundle is 
discarded and processed no further. This is to prevent the injection of bogus bundles into the 
network.
The next step is to check the authenticity of the bundle by verifying the DTN-Cookie. If the 
verification of DTN-Cookie fails, the bundle is dropped and processed no further. Conversely, if 
DTN-Cookie verification is successful, and the processing node is an intermediate node, the 
bundle is stored in the buffer until a contact opportunity arises. The bundle can be forwarded to 
the next hop (DTN node) or destination. On the other hand if the processing node is the bundle 
destination, signature verification is triggered. The bundle is discarded if signature verification 
fails otherwise the bundle is delivered to the application. 10 nodes are uniformly deployed in a 
4500 meters by 3400 meters area. In the simulations we vary the number attackers from 10 to 50 
to see how this affects delivery ratio, average latency, energy consumption network overhead ratio 
and to show the resilience and scalability of the proposed solution when there are more attackers 
than legitimate nodes in the network. Apart from the number of nodes, all other simulation 
parameters remain same as in Table 4-1. We use the second variant of DTN-Cookie for the 
simulations.
0.9 No-Security
DoSRAM
RSA-1024
I  0.7
a
0.5
0.4
30 5010 20 40
Nurrioer of Attackers
Figure 4-13 Increasing Number of Attackers and its Effects on Delivery Ratio
One of the prime purposes of a DoS attack is to disrupt or reduce network functionality. Network 
throughput is an important metric which we consider in our simulations. Figure 4-13 shows the 
effect of bundle injection DoS attack on delivery ratio. With an increasing number of mobile 
attackers and no DoS defence mechanism, the average number of bundles delivered is 275
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compared to 484 bundles generated by honest nodes. This represents 56.82% of the overall 
bundles generated by honest nodes. It is evident that delivery ratio declines shapely with an 
increase in number of attackers in the network. Attack traffic uses up resources such as 
bandwidth, buffers, CPU processing cycles and memory. The BSP RSA-1024 digital signature 
mechanism gives an average delivery ratio of 76.24%. This means that out of the 484 bundles 
generated, 369 bundles were dehvered to destination. Legitimate traffic is dropped when the time- 
to-live on the bundle expires as a result of processing delays and congestion. When we activate 
DoSRAM, there is a significant improvement in bundle delivery ratio to 98.3% (476 bundles) 
which represents a 41.5% increase when compared to when no security is used. DoSRAM 
performs better than RSA-1024 digital signatures with an overall improvement of 22.1% in 
bundle delivery ratio.
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Figure 4-14 Increasing Number of Attackers and its Effects on Overhead Ratio
Overhead ratio is dependent on the number of bundles relayed and number of bundles delivered. 
The more the number of bundles delivered, the lower the overhead ratio. In Figure 4-14 when no 
security mechanism is used, the overhead ratio increases almost linearly as the number of 
attackers increase. This is as a result of fewer bundles being delivered to destination. The average 
overhead ratio for BSP RSA-1024 is 4.3 which is higher than the overhead ratio for DoSRAM. 
The overhead ratio for the proposed mechanism (DoSRAM) is 3.7 which remain almost 
consistent throughout the duration of the simulation even with an increase in the number of 
attackers. DTN uses the cany-store-and forward approach to deliver bundles to destinations and 
the buffer plays a crucial role in this regai'd. In Figure 4-15, with no security mechanism, the 
Buffer Time Average declines as the number of attackers increase from 10 to 50. The buffer time 
average is 761.9 seconds which indicates a high bundle drop rate as a result buffer overflow.
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When RSA-1024 is used as security mechanism the buffer time average is 9808.9 seconds which 
is as a result of congestion and high latency. When DoSRAM is activated, the buffer time average 
per bundle is 8650.6 seconds which is slightly lower than the value for BSP RSA-1024. 
Comparing these values to a time-to-live of 300 minutes used in our simulations, the buffer time 
average is 4.23%, 48.6% or 54.5% of a bundle’s TTL in instances when no security mechanism, 
DoSRAM or RSA-1024 is used respectively.
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Figure 4-15 Increasing Number of Attackers and its Effects on BufferTime Average
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Figure 4-16 Increasing Number of Attackers and its Effects on Latency
As stated earlier, a number of factors such as transmission, processing, propagation, security 
processing and queuing delays affect the latency in a system. Figure 4-16 shows that BSP RSA-
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1024 has the highest latency value when compared to the instance where DoSRAM or no security 
mechanism is adopted. Without any security mechanism, the average latency experienced by a 
legitimate bundle is 377.6 seconds which is 2.10 % of a bundle’s TTL. The main reason we 
compare the latency value to the TTL of a bundle is because of the TTL determines how long a 
bundle can remain in the network. High average latencies reduce the chances for a bundle to be 
delivered to destination. With RSA-1024, the average latency is 1614.8 seconds which is 8.97% 
of a bundle’s TTL which can be attributed to the complex modular arithmetic associated with 
Public-Key Cryptography. The average latency when DoSRAM is adopted as security mechanism 
is 675.2 seconds which represents 3.75% of a bundle’s TTL. This result is significant in the sense 
that DoSRAM protects the network against DoS attacks and at the same time reduces the latency 
levels by more than half when compared to BSP RSA-1024.
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Figure 4-17 Energy Consumption with Increasing Number of Attackers
Figure 4-17 shows the effects of an increase in number of attackers on the energy consumption of 
nodes. The average energy consumed by honest nodes when no security mechanism is adopted is 
1258mJ which represents 0.0629% of the total battery power. Energy consumption rises sharply 
when RSA-1024 digital signature is used as security mechanism. The average energy expended is 
1.902955 X 10^  mJ which represents 95.15% of a node’s total battery power. When a node 
expends all its battery power, that node is effectively dead and cannot send or receive bundles. 
When DoSRAM is used, the average energy consumption is 17124mJ, which represents 0.8562% 
of a node’s total battery power. The amount of energy consumed by a node when DoSRAM is 
used as security mechanism is slightly higher than when no security mechanism is used. Also, the 
energy consumption for DoSRAM is much lower than RSA-1024 digital signature as shown in 
the summai'ized results in Table 4-5.
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The results shown in Figure 4-13, Figure 4-14, Figure 4-15, and Figure 4-16 are same if the 
same parameters are used for first and second scenarios. The only notable difference is in the 
energy consumption as shown in Figure 4-17. In the first scenaiio, the average energy 
consumption when DoSRAM is activated is 16569 mJ which represents 0.82845% of the total 
battery power of a node. This is 0.03% or 600 mJ lower than the average energy consumed by a 
node in the second scenario when our mechanism is activated. This difference is as a result of the 
filtering (blocking) mechanism used in the first scenaiio. In the first scenario, a node is blocked 
for 20000 seconds if it has three failed authentication counts against it in the Node Misbehaviour 
Log (NML). Figure 4-17 clearly demonstrates effectiveness and efficiency of DoSRAM in both 
scenarios to protect DTN nodes against resource exhaustion DoS attacks.
4.4.3 Comparison of the Proposed DTN-Cookie Variants
In this section, we make a comparison of the performance of the three variants of DTN-Cookie 
proposed in this thesis based on average energy consumption and delivery ratio. The simulation 
parameters are the same as that used in the section 4.4.2 (spoofing scenario). In this scenario, 
every bundle generated by both legitimate nodes and attackers are processed to verify their 
integrity and/or authenticity.
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Figure 4-18 Average Energy Consumption for DTN-Cookie Variants Vs. Number of Attackers
Figure 4-18 shows the average energy consumption of each node based on the variant of DTN- 
Cookie in use. From, the average energy consumed by a legitimate node is 16731 mJ for DTN- 
Cookiel when 10 attackers are present in the network. As the number of attackers increase to 50,
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the average energy consumption rises to 17516 ml. For DTN-Cookie 2, with 10 attackers, the 
average energy consumption by a legitimate node is 16731 mJ and rises slightly to 17516 mJ 
when 50 attackers are present. The energy requirement of DTN-Cookie 1 and DTN-Cookie2 are 
identical as the result in Figure 4-18 shows. However, DTN-Cookie2 is harder to forge because 
the XOR operation used in its generation inputs more randomness into the final output by flipping 
the bits. From the result, we can infer that the energy required for XOR operation is neghgible. 
Similarly, Figure 4-18 and Table 4-2 show that the average energy consumed by a legitimate 
node when DTN-Cookie3 is used is 55640 mJ when 10 attackers are present in the network and 
214479 ml when 50 attackers are present respectively. DTN-Cookie3 is generated using a Hash- 
based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) which involves a cryptographic hash function and a 
secret cryptographic key. DTN-Cookie3 consumes more energy than DTN-Cookie 1 and DTN- 
Cookie2 because: (1) an iterative cryptographic hash function (SHA-256) is used to compute the 
HMAC as follows:
HMACk = H{K XOR opad \H(K XOR ipad |m)) (4)
A ipad
/? bits b bits  —     ... b bits
>0 .  « •
:>f
IV
/j bitsopad
h bits pad to /j  bits
n bitsIV
n  bits
Hash
Hash
Figure 4-19 HMAC Structure [22]
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Figure 4-19 shows number of steps involved in the computation of HMAC, the two level-hash 
during the computation of HMAC makes it much more secure and hard to forge.
opad = the byte 0x36 repeated B times and ipad = the byte 0x5C repeated B times. The minimal 
length for key Kis L bytes which is the hash output length. The message m is defined in equation 
(3). From equation (4) it can be noticed that hashing is performed twice during HMAC 
(DTN-Cookie3) computation as opposed to one hashing operation during the computation of 
DTN-Cookie 1 and DTN-Cookie2. (2) HMAC requires the use of a secret shaied key which is 
fetched from the keystore every time a node creates or receives a bundle with DTN-Cookie3. This 
key fetch operation consumes some amount of energy.
Table 4-2 Average Energy Consumption for Each DTN-Cookie Variant
DTN-Cookie Variants
Metric
Number of Attackers
10 20 30 40 50
DTN-Cookie 1 Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 16731 16933 17103 17337 17516
DTN-Cookie2 Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 16731 16933 17103 17337 17516
DTN-Cookie3 Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 55<%0 96879 133723 178513 214479
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Figure 4-20 Delivery Ratio for Each DTN-Cookie Variant Vs. Number of Attackers
The purpose of each DTN-Cookie variant is to detect and classify traffic into legitimate and attack 
bundles. Figure 4-20 and Table 4-3 show the performance of each proposed DTN-Cookie vaiiant.
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The result shows the resilience of each DTN-Cookie variant in situations when the number of 
legitimate nodes to attackers and bundle generation rate of legitimate bundles to attack bundles is 
1:5 respectively. It can be observed that the delivery ratio of legitimate bundles does not fall 
below 97.31% as the number of attackers increase from 10 to 50. On the other hand, the dehvery 
ratio for attack bundles is 0% which proves the effectiveness of using that the proposed DTN- 
Cookie variants in detecting and dropping attack bundles.
Table 4-3 Delivery Ratio for Each DTN-Cookie Variant
DTN-Cookie Variants
Metric
Number o f Attackers
10 20 30 40 50
DTN-Cookiel Delivery Ratio 0.9979 0.9876 0.9814 0.9731 0.9752
DTN-Cookie2 Delivery Ratio 0.9979 0.9876 0.9814 0.9731 0.9752
DTN-Cookie3 Delivery Ratio 0.9979 0.9876 0.9814 0.9731 0.9752
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a robust and energy-efficient DoS-Resilient Authentication 
Mechanism (DoSRAM) for delay/disruption tolerant networks. Three variants of DTN-Cookies 
have been proposed for hop-by-hop bundle authentication and the results in Figure 4-11 and 
Figure 4-17 show that the proposed DTN-Cookies are light-weight and energy-efficient. All three 
variants of the proposed DTN-Cookie are highly effective in identifying attack bundles. However, 
the HMAC variant expends more energy during the computation/verification of the DTN-Cookie 
and during the key fetch operation. Two different scenarios were considered: first we assumed 
that the attacker does not have the capabihty to spoof addresses while in the second scenario, we 
assumed that the attacker has the capability to spoof addresses. In both scenarios, the results 
presented show significant improvements in delivery ratio, buffer time average, average latency 
and energy consumption of DoSRAM over BSP RSA-1024 digital signatures for bundle 
authentication. In addition, the results for the second scenario show the robustness of DoSRAM in 
maintaining a high delivery ratio even when the number of attackers is greater than the number of 
legitimate nodes. In terms of scalabihty, the results for both scenarios show that the proposed 
mechanism can support a large number of nodes. Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 provide a summary of 
the simulation results for the non-spoofing and spoofing scenarios respectively.
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Chapter 5
5 Inter-Region DoS Mitigation Mechanism 
for DTNs
It is critical to secure the inter-regional segment of DTN communications to ensure availability of 
DTN services. Any successful attack on the gateway isolates a region from the rest of the DTN. 
This is why it is particularly important to secure and make gateway communications resilient to 
DoS attacks. In DTN, disjoint regions can be connected either by bus, ship, satellite, aeroplane or 
train which act as data mules or relays. In this communication scenario we assume that gateways 
are powerful workstations with large storage and processing capabilities. To prevent the attacker 
from spoofing addresses, ingress filtering is enforced at the gateways. To properly minimize the 
risk of DoS attacks, communication is gateway-to-gateway. A node in one region is not allowed 
to contact a node in another region directly but only through its regional gateway. In this chapter 
we propose an enhanced version of DoSRAM to protect DTN gateways against resource 
exhaustion DoS attacks. The design is built upon the previous design proposed in chapter 4. The 
significant difference is that in the inter-region scenario, we assume that gateways are loosely 
time-synchronized and have a common view of time. The design is built on the use of variable 
nonce values in different timeslots in the computation and verification of the DTN-Cookies 
proposed in section 5.2. The overall objective is to protect the DTN bundle forwarding service 
and the authentication security service against resource exhaustion DoS attacks.
Protecting inter-regional communications against DoS attacks is vital to the survivabihty of a 
DTN and guarantees the availabihty of DTN services. Figure 5-1 shows three remote DTN 
regions which are isolated but bridged using data mules such as satellite, ferries, buses, trains, and 
aeroplanes which act as relays or gateways. These data mules provide connectivity and support 
inter-region communications between two or more remote or isolated regions [1] where 
communication is scheduled and predictable. For example a satelhte as data mule is subject to 
large round trip times (RTT), large bandwidth delay product, burst errors on coded satellite links 
and variable RTT have impact that affect transport layer and application performance [1], [123]. 
The high altitude of the satellite provides a large terrestrial coverage which allows security 
gateways to send and receive messages to and from the satellite. Satellites are not affected by
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limitations such as line of sight range of ground-based nodes [123]. For more details on the 
advantages of satellite communications see [123].
5.1 System Model, Attacker Model and Security Requirements
In this section we present the system model, the attacker model, design assumptions and the 
security/design goals for the inter-region scenario. As shown in Figure 5-1, communication in this 
scenario is restricted to the gateways (i.e. gateway-to-gateway). A node in region 1 can only 
communicate with other nodes in regions 2 and 3 through its regional gateway (Gateway 1). Data 
mules are mobile gateways which move between regions and provide connectivity through their 
inherent mobility. The satellite, high-speed train, aeroplane, bus and car are examples of data 
mules that can be used in this scenario. The attacker is a mobile rogue gateway (car) shown in red.
Satellite
Gateway
Aeroplane
Region 3
ateway 1
AttackerRegion
Region 1
Gateway 2
Hlgti-speed Train
Figure 5-1 Remote DTN Regions Connected via Gateways
5.2 DTN-Cookie Design
The design is the same as that proposed in Figure 4-4 of section 4.2.2. The difference is that in 
inter-regional communications, we use the third DTN-Cookie variant which is derived using 
HMAC and a secret key Ks as shown below in equation (5):
DTN-Cookie = HMAC((i{TS\SrcEiD)\LS\CoS\NTL) XOR p-RNGOV)>Xs) (5)
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5.3 The Proposed Security Scheme
The security mechanisms proposed for the inter-region scenario offers a stronger security solution 
against DoS attacks. The nonce is generated using variable seeds in different timeslots which 
inputs randomness, an important element in the generation of the proposed DTN-Cookie. Also the 
key Ks is secret and known only to legitimate gateways. In section 5.1 and in the attacker model, 
we assume that gateways are stationary and have large storage and computational capabihties to 
withstand a large number of connection requests. The design of the proposed mechanism 
(Enhanced-DoSRAM) is based on the assumption that DTN gateways are loosely time- 
synchronized where the gateways have a common synchronized view of the Coordinated 
Universal Time (UTC) [34], [51]. We propose the use of variable nonce values in different 
timeslots to seed the pseudo-Random Number Generators (p-RNGs) during the computation and 
verification of DTN-Cookies as illustrated in Table 5-1 below.
Table 5-1 Table Showing the Use of Variable Nonce Values in Different Timeslots
Timeslot
(seconds)
Nonce
Variables
Description
0 - 7200 No
The nonce Nq is a 256-bit random BIGInteger value derived when a 
reference seed SqIs input into a pseudo Random Number Generator 
(p-RNG).
7200 -14400 Ni
The nonce Ni is a 256-bit random BIGInteger value derived using 
the seed Si where Si = So + [counter] when seed Si is input into a 
pseudo Random Number Generator (p-RNG).
14400 - 21000 N2
The nonce N 2  is derived using the seed S2  where S2  = Si -t- [counter] 
and derived the same way as Ni.
21000 - 28200 Ns
The nonce N 3 is derived using the seed S 3 where S3 = S2  + [counter] 
and derived the same way as N 2 .
28200 - 36000 N4
The nonce N 4  is derived using the seed S4  where S4  = S3 + [counter] 
and derived the same way as N 3 .
36000 - 43200 Ns
The nonce N 5  is derived using the seed S5 where S5  = S4  + [counter] 
and derived the same way as N 4 .
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Time-synchronization is an important concept which was considered during the design of 
Enhanced-DoSRAM. We assume initial pre-shared symmetric keys between the gateways 
(Gateway 1, Gateway 2 and Gateway 3). The security gateways have a common view of time (say 
UTC) irrespective of their time zones and the pseudo-random number generator (p-RNG) 
functions at the security gateways have a uniform initial seed value (So). Communications among 
the gateways is initiated by the DTN owner or Administrator (say Gateway 2) by sending two 
different seed values to Gateway 1 and Gateway 3. The seed is the bundle payload and is 
encrypted using the public key of Gateway 1 and Gateway 3. Gateway 2 signs the bundles using 
its private key, calculates the DTN-cookie, appends it to the bundles and sends to gateway 1 and 
3. At the destination gateways, the timestamp and sender EID are retrieved from the bundle and 
based on the pre-shared symmetric keys (Ks) between the Gateway 1, Gateway 2 and Gateway 3, 
the DTN-cookie is computed and compared to that on the received bundle. The bundle is silently 
dropped if the DTN-cookie verification is unsuccessful.
On the other hand, if the verification is successful the gateway proceeds to test the integrity of 
the digital signature. Each gateway uses the public key of the Gateway 2 to verify the signature. If 
the signature verification fails the bundle is dropped because its content is considered modified on 
transit. In the event where the verification of signature is successful, the gateway proceeds to 
decrypt the payload and each gateway uses its private key to decrypt the payload which is the new 
reference seed for the generation of nonce values. Attackers within the data mules’ coverage are 
able to see every communication if the channel is a broadcast channel like in satellite 
communication.
To prevent eavesdropping of the seed, we encrypt the payload. A security gateway with data to 
send first chooses a random number within a pre-defined bound which it uses as seed to the p- 
RNG function. The result of this operation is a seed which it sends to a destination gateway. This 
is done following the steps described earlier above. Bundles that arrive after their creation 
timeslot can still be processed if they are not expired. When a bundle arrives at a node, the bundle 
agent retrieves the bundle timestamp and uses the timestamp to determine which seed it should 
use to generate the nonce which is one input for the generation and verification of a DTN-Cookie.
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Figure 5-2 Enhanced DoS-Resilient Authentication Mechanism for DTN Gateways
The flowchart in Figure 5-2 shows the steps taken by a gateway to ensure that only bundles from 
legitimate sources are allowed to pass through the gateway. In the inter-region scenario we 
assume that an attacker has the capability to spoof source addresses in order to deceive the 
gateways. To combat this menace, we restrict communications between regions to the security- 
aware regional gateways. The bundle size, time-to-live (TTL) and Class of Service (CoS) rights 
are checked against the gateway’s security policy. The bundle size check is to prevent rogue
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routers from sending small-sized bundles with bogus DTN-Cookies. The TTL check is to prevent 
the use of large or INFINITE TTL values to prevent bundles looping and congesting the network. 
The gateway also checks to ensure that a node sends bundles using its authorised CoS rights 
(Expedited, Normal, or Bulk) to guarantee fair access to resources for all legitimate nodes.
The gateway proceeds to check if the bundle is from a legitimate gateway within the DTN. If 
the gateway address is not within its list of legitimate gateways, the bundle is discarded. If the 
gateway address is in the Legitimate Gateway List (LGL), the address is checked against the 
Node Isolation Log (NIL). If gateway address is not in NIL, then the DTN-Cookie is checked for 
validity/authenticity. The bundle is however discarded if gateway address is not in LGL or is in 
NIL. In the next step, the gateway proceeds to verify the DTN-Cookie on the bundle. If the DTN- 
Cookie verification fails, the gateway address is logged in the Spoof Address List (SAL) and a 
counter COUNT incremented each time an entry is logged against a gateway address. If the value 
of COUNT exceeds a threshold set by the DTN administrator/owner, the gateway address is 
assumed to be spoofed and logged in NIL. Subsequent bundles emanating from that gateway 
address are discarded.
If an attacker continues to spoof the addresses of legitimate gateways and repeatedly 
fails the authentication attempts then the addresses of these legitimate and honest 
gateways will be blocked. To prevent this from happening and to guard against our 
mechanism becoming a target to this type of DoS attack, we impose a limit to the number 
of gateways that can be cached in the NIL at any point in time to 2. Subsequent bundles 
from legitimate addresses that exceed the failed authentication threshold are dropped and 
not logged in the NIL. On the other hand, if the DTN-Cookie verification is successful and the 
gateway is not the final destination, the bundle is either buffered or forwarded to next hop. If the 
gateway is the bundle destination, the signature is verified and if successful, the bundle is 
dehvered to the apphcation otherwise it is discarded. All gateways serve as Policy Enforcement 
Points (PEPs) and are required to enforce their own configurable security pohcies [28]. In general 
policies are defined as Event-Condition-Action (ECA) clauses, where on event(s) E, if condition 
(C) is (are) true, then action(s) A is (are) executed.
5.4 Simulation and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the performance of Enhanced-DoSRAM. We 
implement Enhanced-DoSRAM on the Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator 
[57] and evaluate its performance. In our simulations 5 super nodes are uniformly deployed in a 
4500 meters by 3400 meters area as gateways and have a transmission speed 54Mbps and 
transmission range of 300m. These super nodes are defined as static gateways and are visited
91
Chapter 5. Inter-Region DoS Mitigation Mechanism for DTNs
periodically by another mobile gateway travelhng at a speed of 108-115 km/hr which acts as data 
mule to provide connectivity to the 5 defined regions. The data mule is assumed to be a car or 
high-speed train which pauses for a period between 0 to 120 seconds during each visit to the 
regions. We vary the number of attackers from 5 to 20 to see how this affects bundle delivery 
ratio, average latency, buffertime average and energy consumption. An attacker generates one 
bundle of size 1MB every 5 seconds. Details of the simulation parameters are shown in the Table
5-2. We implement Enhanced-DoSRAM using the Spray and Wait routing protocol [59] for both 
the attacker and legitimate nodes and use the third variant of our proposed DTN-Cookie which 
uses HMAC for the simulations. To demonstrate the efficiency of Enhanced-DoSRAM, we 
compare it to BSP RSA-1024 digital signatures and when no security mechanism is adopted in the 
network.
Table 5-2 Simulation Parameters
Simulation Duration 21000 s (6hrs)
Number of Gateways 6
Speed of Gateway Stationary
Transmission Range 300m
Initial Energy 4xlO"mJ
Message Size 1.5MB
Message TTL 300 minutes
Message Generation Interval 60 s
Routing Protocol Spray and Wait
Number of Forwarding Copies 5 Copies
Buffer Size 50MB
We set the transmission range and buffer size to 300m and 50MB respectively because gateways 
are assumed to have long communication range and large storage capacity. Large message sizes 
of up to 1.5 MB are permissible in this scenario to maximize contact opportunity. Also, gateways 
have large storage capacity and can handle large message sizes.
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Figure 5-3 Delivery Ratio with Increasing Number of Attackers
Figure 5-3 shows the effects of a DoS attack on the bundle delivery ratio and evaluate the 
performance of Enhanced-DoSRAM. In our simulations, we change the attack intensity by 
varying the number of attackers from 5 to 20. We evaluate the first case when no security 
mechanism is adopted to combat DoS attacks with 5 attackers present in the network, the bundle 
deliveiy ratio is 61.94% and 99.28% for legitimate and attack bundles respectively. As the 
intensity of attack builds up as more attackers become present, the network gradually becomes 
congested and as buffers at the gateways become full, both legitimate and attack bundles are 
dropped. This explains the slight drop in delivery ratio for attack bundles as the number of 
attackers increase. The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles as attackers increase from 5 to 20 is 
66.39% on average.
Using BSP RSA-1024 digital signature as security mechanism, the delivery ratio for 
legitimate bundles is 33.33% with 5 attackers and gradually declines with an increase in number 
of attackers to 26.39% when the number of attackers increases to 20. All attack bundles are 
dropped when BSP RSA-1024 is used as security mechanism. However, the heavy cryptographic 
processing associated with digital signature algorithms has a negative impact on the overall 
delivery ratio. Gateways become congestion points during the process of verifying individual 
bundles as they ai'rive and legitimate bundles are dropped as a result of TTL expiry. When we 
activate our proposed mechanism (Enhanced-DoSRAM), delivery ratio improves dramatically to 
between 97.50% and 98.06% on average. This represents a 67.22% and 31.52% improvement 
when compai'ed to the performance of BSP RSA-1024 and when no security mechanism is 
implemented respectively. Enhanced-DoSRAM accurately detects and drops all attack traffic and
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frees up resources for legitimate traffic to be processed. See Tables Bl, B2 and B3 in Appendix B 
for more results.
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Figure 5-4 Latency with Increasing Number of Attackers
Average latency as stated earlier is based on transmission, propagation, processing and queuing 
delays. Transmission and propagation delays are dependent on the transmission medium while 
processing and queuing delays depends on the capacity of the DTN device in question. We want 
to analyse how average latency is affected by increasing the number of attackers in the network. 
In Figure 5-4, when there is no security mechanism to protect the system against DoS attacks, 
legitimate bundles experience an average latency of about 251 seconds with 5 attackers which 
gradually increase to 260 seconds with 20 attackers. This is as a result of congestion because 
attack traffic is allowed to traverse from source to destination using up scarce resources (buffer 
space, memory, CPU processing cycles and battery power). The slight drop in average latency 
with 15 attackers in the network is reflected in the small drop in dehvery ratio for legitimate 
bundles from 68.61% to 67.22% (see Figure 5-3) with 10 and 15 attackers present respectively. 
Interestingly, the result in Figure 5-4 shows that BSP RSA-1024 has a much lower average 
latency. The reason for this is simple, average latency is calculated based on the number of 
bundles delivered as follows:
Average Latency —
{latencyB^ -t- latencyB2 + latencyB^ H f latencyB^^)
number o f  bundles delivered
Where Bi B2 B3 and Bn represent bundle 1, bundle 2, bundle 3 and bundle N respectively.
Fewer bundles are delivered as a result of network congestion which is linked to modular 
exponentiation associated with public-key cryptography (RSA-1024). The gateways become
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congestion points which indirectly impede the free flow of legitimate traffic. Figure 5-3 shows a 
low delivery ratio for BSP RSA-1024 hence the low average latency in Figure 5-4. With 
Enhanced-DoSRAM, legitimate bundles experience an average latency of 388 seconds which is 
higher than when no security mechanism or BSP RSA-1024 is used to protect the network against 
DoS respectively. Latency is also affected by the wait time parameter of between 0 to 120 
seconds used in our simulations. See Tables Bl, B2 and B3 in Appendix B for more detailed 
results.
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Figure 5-5 BufferTime Average with Increasing Number of Attackers
As bundles traverse the network, they are stored in buffers and forwarded to the next hop node 
towards destination when a contact (link) becomes available [39]. Figure 5-5 shows the 
buffertime average for legitimate bundles when no security mechanism is adopted. The buffertime 
average of a legitimate bundle with 5 attackers in the network is 344 seconds. The buffertime 
average for legitimate bundles decreases slightly to 339 seconds as the number of attackers 
increase to 20. On the contrary, the buffertime average for attack bundles increases from 489 
seconds to 1032 seconds with 10 and 20 attackers present in the network respectively. This value 
further strengthens the results in Figure 5-3 and confirms that legitimate bundles are dropped due 
to TTL expiry or contention for resources such as memory and contact time. Using BSP RSA- 
1024 as mitigation mechanism, the buffertime average with 5 attackers in the network is 2364 
seconds and rises to 2628 seconds with the presence of 20 attackers in the network. The reason is 
that as more attackers become present in the network, the more congestion builds up in the 
network causing legitimate bundles to be buffered for longer periods of time. Also due to the 
heavy processing associated with digital signatures, gateways are unable to receive and process 
more legitimate bundles. With Enhanced-DoSRAM switched ON, every legitimate bundle
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experiences a buffertime average of 2360 seconds. This value remains fairly constant throughout 
the duration of the simulation and is an indication that legitimate bundles are buffered at DTN 
nodes as they traverse the network from source to destination. In Figure 5-5, the buffertime 
average graph for Enhanced-DoSRAM and BSP RSA-1024 appear to merge when the network 
has 5 and 10 attackers respectively. More details on the simulation results can be found in Tables 
Bl, B2, B3 and B4 of Appendix B.
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Figure 5-6 Overhead Ratio with Increasing Number of Attackers
Overhead ratio is dependent on the number of relayed and delivered bundles. The more times 
message copies are relayed, the higher the overhead ratio becomes. Figure 5-6 shows that the 
overhead ratio with no security mechanism in the network is 5.90605 on average. Using BSP 
1024-bit RSA digital signature as security mechanism, the overhead ratio rises quite significantly 
to 9.1475 because fewer bundles are delivered to destination. Enhanced-DoSRAM has an 
overhead ratio of 3.06605 which is lower than the instance with no security mechanism and BSP 
1024-bit RSA digital signature has a very high overhead ratio because less than 34% of legitimate 
bundles are delivered to destination. See Table Bl, B2 and B3 in Appendix B for more detailed 
results.
Battery power is a critical resource and one of the greatest constraints in DTN nodes and there 
are many factors which affect the energy consumption of nodes [122], [124]. The aim of our 
proposed mechanism (Enhanced-DoSRAM) is to make DTN gateways resilient to resource 
exhaustion DoS attacks. In our simulations, gateways are assumed to be energy rich super nodes 
with large memory, buffer space and processing capabilities.
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Figure 5-7 Average Energy Consumption with Increasing Number of Attackers
In Figure 5-7, the energy consumption of a gateway when no security mechanism is adopted is 
662 mJ on average as the number of attackers increase from 5 to 20. This represents 0.00016% of 
a gateway’s total battery power. When BSP 1024-bit RSA digital signature is used as the 
mitigation mechanism, the energy consumption with 5 attackers present in the network is 
1.32694095 x 10^  mJ which represents 33.17% of a gateway’s battery reserve. With 20 attackers 
in the network the average energy consumption is 3.80382344 x 10^  mJ which is equivalent to 
95.1% of a gateway’s total battery reserve. However with Enhanced-DoSRAM, the average 
energy consumption is 20471 mJ which is equivalent to 0.0051% of a gateway’s total battery 
power. From the results, the energy consumption when no security mechanism is used is lower 
than when Enhanced-DoSRAM is used. However, the energy consumption for RSA-1024 digital 
signature is higher than the energy consumption for Enhanced-DoSRAM. A summary of the 
simulation results is shown in Table 5-3. Detailed results can be found in Tables Bl, B2 and B3 of 
Appendix B.
To evaluate the effectiveness of incorporating a filter/blocking mechanism in Enhanced- 
DoSRAM we consider the presence of false positives. False positives are legitimate traffic that is 
accidentally classified as attack traffic. In Tables B2 and B4 of Appendix B, it is clear' that with or 
without a blocking mechanism our scheme is able to classify traffic correctly. Both tables show 
identical data with the exception in energy consumption. The energy consumption of nodes when 
no form of blocking is implemented is higher since every single bundle has to be processed. 
Without a blocking mechanism and with 5 attackers, the energy consumption using enhanced- 
DoSRAM is 12620360.8 mJ or 3.16% of the gateway’s total power. The energy consumption at 
the gateway increases to 44760305.38 ml or 11.2% of the gateway’s total power with 20 attackers
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present in the network. When blocking is implemented the attacking source is identified and 
subsequent bundles coming from that source are dropped without any form of processing. See 
Figure 5-7 (with blocking implemented) and Figure 5-8 (without blocking) for the difference in 
energy consumption.
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Figure 5-8 Average Energy Consumption without Blocking Mechanism
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an enhanced version of DoSRAM (Enhaneed-DoSRAM) for 
DTN gateways. Our scheme uses the FIMAC variant of our proposed DTN-Cookies to classify 
bundles as they arrive at the gateway. We exploit the assumption that DTN nodes are loosely 
time-synchronized and the fact that DTN nodes have the in-built capability to read the local 
system clock values and determine the conect time. Based on these we proposed the use of 
variable nonce values in different timeslots in the generation and verification of the HMAC 
variant of oui' proposed DTN-Cookies. In terms of the design we use HMAC as a sequence 
generator because it is cryptographically secure and polynomial-time unpredictable. HMAC also 
accepts an arbitrary value (a secret key and data input) as input paiameter. The use of variable 
seed values in different timeslots to generate a nonce for DTN-Cookie computation and 
verification makes the proposed DTN-Cookie hard to forge and more robust against DoS attacks. 
The results presented show impressive improvements in delivery ratio, buffer time average, 
average latency and energy efficiency of our scheme. In terms of scalability, the results show that 
despite an increase in the number of attackers, our proposed scheme is secure, resilient and highly 
robust against resource exhaustion attacks. A summaiy of the simulation results for the inter­
region scenario is shown in Table 5-3.
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Chapter 6
6 A De-centralised Defence Mechanism for 
Flood-based DoS Attacks
In this chapter, we will focus on direct flooding DoS attacks accomplished through high bundle 
rates known as bandwidth-consumption attacks. Network nodes such as servers, routers, firewalls 
and gateways all have constraints in input-output processing, interrupt processing, memory and 
CPU resources [110]. In DTN, a direct path to a destination may not be available to allow attack 
bundles to cause network-wide flooding but the inherent mobility of nodes allows the attacker to 
move within communication range in order to flood legitimate nodes with useless bundles. The 
attacker exploits the throughput limits of gateways by sending a high number of small bundles to 
overwhelm the gateways. The effect of this is that the link fills up and legitimate traffic slows 
down or is dropped. We have proposed a comprehensive flood defence scheme which is highly 
dynamic and de-centralised. The scheme combines our proposed solution in Chapter 5 and also 
incorporates a rate-limiting mechanism. The aim of this scheme is to ensure the availability of 
communication contact time (link) which is a vital resource in DTN.
6.1 A Basic Flood Defence Scheme for DTN
In this section, we present a basic scheme to mitigate the effects of flooding DoS attacks in 
delay/disruption tolerant networks.
6.1.1 Network Model
In our adopted scenario, we opt for a more general DTN and focus on the DoS problem for inter­
region communication. The hosts in this scenario are message custodians which we refer to as 
gateways. Regional gateways are fixed and act as inter-connection points and mobile sinks such 
as data mules [39], [125], [126] are examples of mobile gateways. Inter-region communication is 
enabled by data mules which visit the regional gateways to deliver bundles destined for a 
particular region and collect messages that are destined for other regions. Examples of data mules
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include satellite, car, bus, train, helicopter and aeroplane as shown in Figure 5-1. The gateways 
have a wide communication range and good reception capabilities and end-to-end path is not 
always guaranteed so messages are routed in a scheduled manner.
6.1.2 Attack Model
We assume that the attacker is able to perform localised flooding during a connection opportunity 
since most nodes in the DTN are unavailable most of the time. There is no direct path from a 
source to a destination. The attacker has the ability to generate a large volume of bundles to 
overwhelm the victim node. The attacker also exploits the mobility pattern to attack all nodes 
within its communication range. On the other hand, the attacker can permanently be within the 
range of one node in the network but cannot compromise a gateway.
6.1.3 Assumptions
We assume that there are no cases of flash events where large amount of expected or unexpected 
traffic from legitimate clients suddenly arrive at a gateway. We assume that an Offline Security 
Manager (OSM) exist during the initialization of the system to handle key generation, distribution 
of secret credentials and security policies. We assume that the gateways have large storage and 
computational capabilities to process bundles. We assume that malicious nodes are mobile and 
gateways are stationary except data mules. Key and credential revocation is out of scope of this 
work.
6.1.4 Design/Security Goals
• Prevent otherwise authorised nodes/applications from sending bundles at a rate and Class 
of Service which they lack permission
• Discard promptly bundles that are damaged or modified in transit
• The proposed DoS resilience mechanism should not be a target of new attacks
• The security mechanism should not increase the load during attack periods by generating 
additional traffic
6.2 The Proposed Flood-based DoS Defence Scheme
The primary goal of any flood-based DoS mitigation mechanism is to restrict the volume of 
malicious traffic during an attack. Mitigating such attacks will consume resources at security- 
aware nodes or gateways and may require a number of filters to classify attack flows. To 
guarantee the availability of connections to legitimate traffic during a flooding DoS attack, we
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combine ingress filtering, rate limiting techniques and light-weight bundle authentication in our 
proposed scheme as shown in Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1 Gateway Block Diagram with DoS Filters
Figure 6-2 shows the flow of processes and steps taken by a gateway to thwart DoS attacks 
mounted through flooding. We incorporate a rate limiting mechanism to help identify malicious 
nodes that send bundles at a rate they are not authorised to. Any node identified as exceeding its 
authorised bundle sending rate is penalised. Every bundle that arrives at a gateway has its size, 
time-to-live (TTL) and the Class of Service (CoS) rights of the user checked for validity. Bundles 
with sizes that do not meet the requirement specified in the security policy are discarded. 
Similarly, bundles with expired TTL and incorrect CoS are dropped. If the bundle size, TTL and 
CoS rights aie valid, the gateway checks the source address on the bundle against the Legitimate 
Gateway List (LGL). Bundles whose source addresses are not in the LGL are considered spoofed 
and are discarded. If the source address matches a gateway address in the LGL, that gateway 
address is checked against the Node Isolation Log (NIL). The NIL contains addresses of blocked 
gateways that are considered spoofed because they failed the DTN-Cookie verification or 
exceeded the set bundle rate threshold.
If a source address matches an address in NIL, the bundle is discarded otherwise bundle rate 
associated with the paiticular traffic flow is checked against a set bundle rate threshold. If a 
gateway exceeds the bundle rate threshold, its address is logged in the NIL and subsequent 
bundles originating from such blocked gateways are silently dropped until the configured block 
period expires. This helps to free up bandwidth for legitimate traffic and improve network 
performance. However, if the bundle rate of a particular traffic flow is within the bounds of the set 
threshold, the gateway proceeds to verify the DTN-Cookie. To verify the DTN-Cookie, the 
gateway uses the timestamp to choose the conect seed for generating the unique nonce for
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computing the DTN-Cookle. The computed DTN-Cookie must match the received DTN-Cookie, 
any mismatch will mean that the bundle is spoofed and must be dropped. The source addresses of 
bundles that fail the DTN-Cookie verification are logged in the Spoofed Address List (SAL). 
Source addresses in the SAL that exceed a COUNT threshold are automatically logged in NIL. If 
the DTN-Cookie verification is successful and the gateway is not the bundle destination, the 
bundle is either stored in the gateway’s buffer or a new DTN-Cookie is computed, appended to 
the bundle and then forwarded to the next hop. On the other hand, if the gateway is the bundle 
destination, it proceeds to verify the digital signature protecting the bundle payload. If the 
signature verification is successful, the bundle is delivered to the application otherwise it is 
discarded and processed no further.
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Figure 6-2 Flowchart Showing Flood-based DoS Attack Mitigation for DTN Gateways
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6.3 Simulations and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed flood defence 
scheme.
6.3.1 Simulation Setup
We implement our proposed flood defence scheme on the Opportunistic Network Environment 
(ONE) simulator [57] and evaluate its performance. In our simulations, 5 super nodes are 
uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters by 3400 meters area as gateways and have a transmission 
speed and range of 54Mbps and 300m respectively. These super nodes are defined as static 
gateways and are visited periodically by another mobile gateway which acts as data mule to 
provide connectivity to the 5 defined regions. The data mule is assumed to be a car or high-speed 
train which travels at a speed of 105-108 km/hr and has a wait period of between 0 to 5 seconds at 
each region. In the first scenario, we vary the number of attackers from 10 to 50 to see the effect 
on packet delivery ratio, average latency, buffertime average and energy consumption. An 
attacker generates one bundle of size 1 Megabytes every 5 seconds.
Table 6-1 Simulation Parameters
Simulation Duration 43200s
Number of Gateways 6
Speed of Gateway Stationary
Transmission Range 300m
Initial Energy 4 X 10^  mJ
Message Size 1.5MB
Message TTL 300 minutes
Message Generation Interval 60s
Routing Protocol Spray and Wait
Number of Forwarding Copies 5 Copies
Buffer Size 50MB
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In the second scenario, we vary the bundle generation rate from 1 bundle per second to 1 bundle 
every 20 seconds. The purpose is to evaluate the effect of high bundle rate used in bandwidth DoS 
attacks on delivery ratio, average latency and energy consumption. Details of the simulation 
parameters are shown in Table 6-1. We implement our mechanism using the Spray and Wait 
routing protocol [59] for legitimate gateways. This scheme can also be implemented on DTN 
routing protocols such as Epidemic [61]. The attacker uses an energy-aware variant of the 
Epidemic router. The third DTN-Cookie variant in equation (5) is used in both scenarios.
6.3.2 Threshold Configuration
To determine the correct threshold, we analyse the number of bundles sent by each gateway in an 
ideal scenario where there is no form of attack. In this scenario we have 5 gateways (a, b, c, d and 
e) and a data mule (g). Throughout the 43200 seconds duration of the simulation as shown in 
Table 6-2, gateway (a) made 205 contacts and processed 445 bundles. Gateway (b) made 157 
contacts and processed 421 bundles; gateway (c) made 90 contacts and processed 369 bundles. 
Gateway (d) and (e) made 160 and 150 contacts each and processed 374 and 405 bundles 
respectively. The data mule (g) made 632 contacts and processed 980 packets. This high number 
of bundles is due to the fact that the data mule is mobile and encounters the gateways periodically 
and more frequently. Gateway (c) sends 4 bundles per contact opportunity and in for our 
simulations we use Spray-and-Wait routing protocol and limit the number of forwarding copies to 
5 bundles. The attacker uses epidemic router in order to maximize the effect of flooding.
Table 6-2 Bundle Rate per Contact
Node Id Number of bundles No. of contacts Average bundles sent per contact
a 445 205 2.17073
b 421 157 2.68153
c 369 90 4.10000
d 374 160 2.33750
e 405 150 2.70000
g 980 632 1.55063
Based on the dataset in Table 6-2, we fix the bundle rate threshold to 600 for the stationary 
regional gateways and 1000 for the mobile data mule in order to dampen the intensity of the
105
________________________ Chapter 6. A Distributed Defence Mechanism for Flood-based DoS Attacks
attack flow and avoid legitimate bundle loss. This means that 74.2% of the data flow allowed at 
the gateways is legitimate.
6.3.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the results of the simulations for two different scenarios: (1) by 
increasing the number of attackers and (2) by varying the bundle generation rate.
6.3.3.1 Impact of Increasing the Number of Attackers on Network Performance
We first test the robustness of the proposed flood mitigation mechanism in the presence 
of increased number of attackers. We vary the number of attackers from 10 to 50 and 
examine how this affects network performance.
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Figure 6-3 Delivery Ratio with Increasing Number of Attackers
Figure 6-3 shows the effect when the number of attackers increases from 10 to 50. In a network of 
10 attackers, when rate limiting is applied to incoming traffic flows, the delivery ratio for 
legitimate bundles is 90.69% and 9.11% for attack traffic. When the number of attackers increases 
to 50, the delivery ratio for legitimate bundles declines to 68.61% while the delivery ratio for 
attack traffic increases to 16.93%. This result shows that rate-limiting as a flood mitigation 
technique performs poorly during high bandwidth DoS attacks which involve very high bundle 
rates. Combining rate limiting and RSA-1024 security achieves a delivery ratio of 31.53%. 
However when we activate our proposed flood mitigation mechanism, an average delivery ratio of 
99.25% is achieved even when 50 attackers aie present in the network. See Table C1-C3 of 
Appendix C for detailed simulation results.
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Figure 6-4 Average Latency with Increasing Number of Attackers
Figure 6-4 shows the average latency experienced by legitimate bundles as attackers increase 
from 10 to 50. Any increase in the number of attackers directly equates to an increase in attack 
intensity and volume. Using rate limiting as the only mitigation mechanism, legitimate bundles 
experience an average latency of 198 seconds with 10 attackers and 214 seconds with 50 attackers 
respectively. Average latency increases as more attackers join the network because the rate 
limiting mechanism allows a percentage of attack bundles to pass through. This causes the 
network to become congested and legitimate bundles aie dropped if buffers are full. Using RSA- 
1024 in combination with rate limiting as mitigation mechanism, the average latency per 
legitimate bundle is 104 seconds. The reason for the low average latency for RSA-1024 is because 
less than 32% of legitimate bundles are delivered as shown in Figure 6-3 and average latency is 
calculated based on number of bundles delivered. When our proposed mechanism is used, the 
average latency experienced by a legitimate bundle is 191 seconds as attackers increase from 10 
to 50. This represents 1.06% of a bundle’s TLL. See Table C1-C3 of Appendix C for simulation 
results.
The buffeitime average experienced by every legitimate bundle is shown in Figure 6-5. 
Ideally, legitimate bundles experience less time in the buffer as the number of attackers increase 
in the network. Using rate limiting as the only mitigation mechanism, the buffeitime average for 
legitimate bundles gradually declines from 2233 seconds with 10 attackers and 1626 seconds with 
50 attackers respectively. Attack bundles on the other hand experience a slight decline in 
buffertime average as the number of attackers increase. With 10 attackers, the buffeitime average 
for an attack bundle is 487 seconds and gradually reduces to 401 seconds with 50 attackers in the
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network. Using RSA-1024 in combination with rate limiting, the buffeitime average for a 
legitimate bundle is 2528 seconds with no attack bundle occupying buffer space. With our 
proposed flood mitigation mechanism, the buffertime average of legitimate bundles is 2530 
seconds. See Table C1-C3 of Appendix C for simulation results.
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Figure 6-5 BufferTime Average with Increasing Number of Attackers
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Figure 6 - 6  Average Energy Consumption with Increased Number of Attackers
In Figure 6-6, the average energy consumption is 1238 mJ when rate limiting is used as the only 
security mechanism against flooding DoS attacks. This represents 0.00003% of a gateway’s total
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energy reserve. Combining RSA-1024 with rate limiting consumes 312078 mJ of energy per 
gateway when 10 attackers aie present in the network. Energy consumption continues to rise with 
an increase in the number of attackers. A gateway expends 645674 mJ of power with 50 attackers 
in the network. The average energy consumed per gateway when our proposed flood mitigation 
mechanism is activated is 39465 mJ which represents 0.001% of a gateway’s energy reserve. The 
energy consumption of our proposed mechanism is less than the energy required for RSA-1024 
because the energy required for ingress filtering, table lookups, list searches and DTN-Cookie 
computation and verification is negligible. Detailed simulation results can be found in Table Cl- 
C3 of Appendix C.
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Figure 6-7 Overhead Ratio with Increasing Number of Attackers
Figure 6-7 shows the Overhead ratio which is dependent on the number of relayed and delivered 
bundles. The overhead ratio when rate limiting is used as the sole mechanism to mitigate flood- 
based DoS attacks is 106.1612 on average because a large number of bundles are relayed but not 
delivered as a result of network congestion. RSA -1024 with rate limiting has an overhead ratio of 
10.04318 because less than 32% of the total relayed bundles are delivered. Our proposed 
mechanism has the lowest overhead ratio of 3.18668 which is largely due to the high delivery 
ratio recorded by our mechanism as shown in Figure 6-3. Detailed simulation results can be found 
in Table C1-C3 of Appendix C.
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6.33.2 Impact of Traffic Load on Network Performance
The intensity of a DoS attack is measured based on the percentage of legitimate bundles lost due 
to excessive traffic load. An attack intensity of 70% means that only 30% of legitimate traffic will 
be delivered. We set the bundle rate threshold per flow for each gateway to 600. In this scenaiio, 
we are interested in measuring the impact of different bundle sending frequencies on the overall 
network performance. In our simulations 5 super nodes are uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters 
by 3400 meters area as gateways and have a transmission range 300m. These super nodes are 
defined as static gateways and are visited periodically by another mobile gateway which acts as 
data mule to provide connectivity to the 5 defined regions. We adjust the bundle generation rate 
for the attacker from 1 bundle per second to 1 bundle every 20 seconds. Legitimate gateways 
generate 1 bundle per minute (i.e. 1 bundle every 60 seconds). There are 5 attackers in this 
scenaiio and we measure the network performance using five metrics: delivery ratio, average 
latency, average energy consumption, overhead ratio and buffertime average.
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Figure 6-8 Impact of Network Load on Delivery Ratio
Figure 6-8 shows the effect of different bundle generation rates on delivery ratio. High bundle 
generation rates imply increased number of messages which in turn result in lower delivery ratios. 
This is evident when no form of security mechanism is adopted and the bundle generation rate is 
high. The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles when an attacker generates I bundle per second is 
14.44% and 89.19% for attack bundles. As the attack intensity reduces to 1 bundle every 5 
seconds, the delivery ratio for both legitimate and attack bundles rise to 26.53% and 99.27% 
respectively. Delivei-y ratio for legitimate bundle drops to 22.22% when the attacker generates 1
1 1 0
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bundle every 10 seconds because 99.79% of attack bundles are delivered. From the graph, it is 
clear that delivery ratio for legitimate bundles start rising gradually as the bundle generation rate 
becomes less frequent. When incoming bundles are rate limited, delivery ratio rises to an average 
of 93% because any attacker that exceeds the set bundle generation threshold of 600 per flow is 
blocked. Using RSA-1024 with rate limiting as a DoS defence mechanism against flooding 
achieves a delivery ratio of 31.53%. However when we switch ON our proposed mechanism, a 
delivery ratio of 99.31% is achieved with 1 attack bundle generated per second. The delivery ratio 
rises to 99.44% as the attack intensity eases with 1 attack bundle generated every 5, 10 or 20 
seconds. See Table C4-C7 of Appendix C for detailed results.
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Figure 6-9 Impact of Network Load on Average Latency
Latency is influenced by many factors such as congestion, node processing, and queuing delays. 
Multi-hop routing can also introduce delay as bundles move from source to destination. Figure 
6-9 shows that when no security mechanism is adopted to mitigate flooding, average latency rises 
as the intensity of the bundle generation rate reduces from 1 bundle per second to 1 bundle every 
20 seconds. Average latency is calculated as the cumulative sum of latencies experienced by 
delivered legitimate bundles divided by the number of delivered bundles. This supports the result 
shown in Figure 6-8 which shows delivei^y ratio rising with a reduction in attack intensity. When 
we rate limit the incoming traffic, average latency is 194 seconds because a large percentage of 
legitimate bundles are delivered to destination. When RSA-1024 and rate limiting are used as 
mitigation mechanism, the average latency is 99.6 seconds when 1 attack bundle is generated per 
second, and 105 seconds on average when 1 attack bundle is generated every 5, 10, 15 or 20
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seconds. The reason for the low average latency is because less than 32% of legitimate bundles 
are delivered as shown in Figure 6-8. When we apply our proposed mechanism, the average 
latency is 190 seconds which is equivalent to 1.06% of a bundle’s TLL. Detailed simulation 
results can be found in Table C4-C7 of Appendix C.
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Figure 6-10 Impact of Network Load on Energy Consumption
As stated earlier in previous chapters, energy consumption is an important consideration in DTN 
security design because most of the nodes are low-power devices. During bundle authentication, 
both computational and communication energy (transmit and receive) are consumed. Figure 6-10 
shows that the difference in energy consumption when no form of security is adopted and when 
rate limiting is used as a flood mitigating mechanism is quite negligible (1245 mJ and 1240 mJ 
respectively). This is because no cryptographic operations aie involved and the amount of energy 
required for table lookups is low. When RSA-1024 is used in combination with rate limiting, the 
energy consumption per gateway rises to 270468 mJ which represents 0.0068% of a gateway’s 
total battery power. Our proposed mechanism incurs an energy cost of 39464.4 mJ per gateway 
when activated which is equivalent to 0.00099% of a gateway’s total battery power which is less 
when compared to the energy consumption of RSA-1024 digital signatures. From Figure 6-10, it 
is cleai' that the instances when no security mechanism is used and when rate limiting is used as 
security mechanism have the lowest energy consumption. This is closely followed by Enhanced- 
DoSRAM-FRate limiting while RSA-1024+Rate limiting has the highest energy consumption of 
all four instances. A summary of the actual energy consumption in all four instances (i.e. no 
secuiity, rate limiting, Enhanced-DoSRAM+Rate limiting and RSA-1024+Rate limiting) is
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provided in Table 6-4 and Table 6-5. Table C4-C7 of Appendix C provides more details on the 
simulation results.
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Figure 6-11 Impact of Network Load on Overhead Ratio
Bandwidth is one of the scarce resources in DTN which we attempt to protect using our proposed 
scheme. Overhead ratio is an assessment of bandwidth efficiency and an important metric used in 
the evaluation of oui* proposed scheme. In Figure 6-11 with no security mechanism activated, 
overhead ratio when 1 attack bundle is generated per second is 14.6437 and rises sharply with 1 
attack bundle generated every 5, 10, 15 or 20 seconds. This is because a large number of both 
legitimate and attack bundles aie relayed but few legitimate bundles are delivered to destination 
due to congestion. When the rate limiting mechanism activated, the overhead ratio remains high 
but less than with no security mechanism in place. Using RSA-1024 with rate-limiting, the 
overhead ratio is 10.037 on average and is fairly constant throughout the duration of the 
simulation because illegitimate bundles are dropped at the first hop. However since RSA digital 
signatures are used, the gateways are computationally occupied with the verification of bogus 
signatures from the attacker and legitimate bundles are dropped if their TTL expires. It is cleai' 
that our proposed flood mitigation mechanism has the lowest overhead ratio of 3.1827 on average 
and hence more bandwidth efficient. This is evident in the high performance of our proposed 
scheme in terms of delivery ratio as shown in Figure 6-8. Despite the variation in bundle 
generation rate, overhead ratio remains fairly constant when our mechanism is activated. Due to 
the hop-by-hop authentication based on our proposed DTN-Cookies, an attack bundle is dropped 
close to the source of attack. This is in contrast to end-to-end authentication which allows an
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attack bundle to traverse the network wasting scarce network resources before it is dropped at the 
destination. See Table C4-C7 of Appendix C for more details on simulation results.
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Figure 6-12 Impact of Network Load on BufferTime Average
Figure 6-12 shows the effect of bundle generation rate on buffertime average. When no security 
mechanism is used, the buffertime average for a legitimate bundle rises gradually from 60 seconds 
when 1 bundle is generated per second to 82 seconds when 1 bundle is generated every 5 seconds. 
When 1 bundle is generated every 20 seconds the buffertime average is 112 seconds. The 
buffertime average improves to 2266 seconds on average when rate limiting is apphed. When the 
bundle generation rate varies from 1 attack bundle per second to 1 attack bundle every 20 
seconds, the buffertime average for legitimate bundles gradually decreases while that for attack 
bundles gradually increases. The buffeitime average is 2535.5 seconds when RSA-1024 is used 
and 2535 seconds when our proposed DoS defence scheme is used. The buffertime average 
experienced by a bundle in each instance (i.e. no security, rate limiting, Enhanced- 
DoSRAM-FRate limiting and RSA-1024-FRate limiting) is shown in Table 6-4 and Table 6-5. 
Detailed results can also be found in Table C4-C7 of Appendix C.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a DoS defence scheme which provides DoS resilience against 
flood-based and resource exhaustion DoS attacks. The scheme uses Enhanced-DoSRAM in 
combination with ingress filtering and rate limiting mechanisms. The proposed scheme is
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dynamic and de-centralised because each gateway runs the algorithm and independently decides 
when to impose the rate limiting filter. Different gateways are assigned different threshold values 
based on their capability and role in the network. We adopted the use of standard spray-and-wait 
routing to boost performance while controlling the amount of traffic. The aim of this scheme is to 
identify and stop authorised nodes (with cryptographic credentials) and unauthorised nodes from 
sending bundles at a rate which they are not authorised to. The results in both case scenarios show 
significant improvements in delivery ratio, buffertime average, overhead ratio and energy 
consumption. We have also shown through the results that the scheme is resilient and scales as the 
number of attackers increase or as the bundle rate intensity increases. The solution proposed in 
this chapter can work for both the intra-region and inter-region scenarios with very little 
modification. Implementing the proposed scheme in the intra-region scenario will require 
omitting the ingress filtering component which is exclusively a functionality of a border 
router/gateway. Table 6-3 provides a summary of simulation results showing the impact of 
number of attackers during a flooding attack. Similarly, Table 6-4 and Table 6-5 provide a 
summary of simulation results showing the impact of bundle generation rate (attack bundles) on 
the network performance.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis presented a research on “Mitigating Denial of Service Attacks in Delay/Disruption 
Tolerant Networks (DTNs)”. Conventional networks are designed based on a continuous end-to- 
end path between a source and a destination for the delivery of packets. However end-end paths 
do not exist in some networks such as sparse ad hoc networks, satellite networks, vehicular 
networks and deep space networks. This is the reason why DTN was conceptualized to provide 
data services to these constrained networks using the store-and-forward strategy and an overlay 
called the bundle layer, DTN research has many promising practical applications in deep space 
and terrestrial environments and has stimulated a lot of interest in recent years. However, DTNs 
are susceptible to a wide variety of attacks such as resource exhaustion and flooding DoS attacks. 
For DTN to gain wide-scale acceptance and deployment, security must be taken as a priority. 
DoS attack mitigation is challenging and is still an open research issue in DTN. To provide 
solutions to the problem, the objectives of this research were: (1) to study the features and 
characteristics of DTN and obtain a sound background on how nodes communicate with each 
other. (2) Understand the different types of attacks which DTN is prone to especially resource 
exhaustion and flooding-based DoS attacks and study how these attacks are mitigated in other 
networks. (3) Propose light-weight mechanisms for bundle authentication in the intra-region and 
inter-region scenarios. The proposed mechanisms should be scalable, support different network 
technologies and mobility and should not be susceptible to new threats such as resource 
exhaustion attacks. (4) The proposed mechanisms should have a high probability to identify and 
discard attack traffic promptly while keeping false positives to a minimum. (5) The proposed 
mechanisms should improve network performance using metrics such as delivery ratio, average 
latency, buffertime average, overhead ratio and energy consumption. (6) Finally, the proposed 
mechanisms should minimize computational and communication costs.
7.1 Conclusions
In summary, the main achievements of this research are as follows:
Modification of the ONE Simulator: a number of packages in the ONE simulator have been 
extended. In Core package, classes such as Message .Java and MessageCreateEvent.java were
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extended with additional fields such as ntl, cos, msgPayload, signature and dtnCookie to suit the 
design requirements of the proposed DTN-Cookie variants. In the Routing package, the 
EnergyAwareRouter class and the SprayAndWaitRouter class have been extended to create new 
router classes such as AttackerEnergyawareRouter class, AttackerSprayAndWaitRouter class, 
EloodResistantSprayAndWaitRouter class, and GatewaySprayAndWaitRouter class. The ONE 
simulator does not have any in-built security functionality, for this reason a new Security package 
has been defined with classes such as Keystore for the storage of public/private keypairs and the 
HMAC secret key, dtnCookieOenerationAndVerification, signatureGenerationAndVerification, 
BundleRateCache and FailedAuthenticationCache. Finally, the DTNCookieEnergyLevelReport is 
an extension of the EnergyLevelReport defined in Report package of the ONE simulator and two 
new classes: MessageStatsReportPerApplication and MessageTransferCountPerConnectionReport 
have been defined to capture vital statistics relating to the simulations. All the classes end with the 
Java extension.
Light-weight Bundle Authenticator: a comprehensive survey of DoS attacks and mitigation 
techniques in DTN and other networks was provided. Three variants of light-weight DTN- 
Cookies were proposed for use considering the fact that most DTN nodes have limited battery 
power and CPU processing capability. Based on the prevailing Network Threat Level (NTL), any 
of the proposed DTN-Cookie variants can be used as a light-weight bundle authenticator. The 
DTN-Cookies are based on cryptographic hash functions (SHA-256), HMAC, the secret 
symmetric keys (Ks, Krs) and nonce values which make them hard to forge. The proposed DTN- 
Cookies provide 128 bits of security against collision attacks and protect the primary block and 
security blocks defined in our proposed schemes against modification, replay and resource 
exhaustion attacks. The per-bundle addition of using RSA-1024 digital signature as a bundle 
authenticator is more when compared to the proposed DTN-Cookie variants. Each RSA-1024 
digital signature is 128 bytes long while each variant of the proposed DTN-Cookie is 32 bytes 
long. This means that less energy is required to transmit bundles which use the proposed DTN- 
Cookies as bundle authenticator which results in lower communication cost.
Intra-region DoS Mitigation: from the literature, resource exhaustion is one form of DoS attack 
which DTNs are vulnerable. To protect the hop-by-hop bundle authentication service against this 
attack, a DoS-Resilient Authentication Mechanism (DoSRAM) has been proposed. Two different 
scenarios were considered: In the first scenario, we assumed that the attacker cannot spoof source 
addresses. A threshold is set for the number of failed authentication attempts which we assume is 
distributed as part of the security policy. The traffic flow for each node is monitored, failed 
authentication attempts are logged in the Node Misbehaviour Log (NML) and nodes which 
exceed the set failed authentication threshold are logged in the Node Isolation Log (NIL) for a set
120
Chapter 7. Conclusions and Future Work
period of time. In the second scenario we assumed that the attacker can spoof addresses and we 
simply discard bundles that do not authenticate.
In the first scenario (non-spoofing scenario), when DoSRAM is used as mitigation mechanism 
delivery ratio improves by 81.1% or 9.5% compared to when no security mechanism or BSP 
RSA-1024 is used respectively. The average latency of bundles when DoSRAM is used to combat 
DoS attacks is 1272 seconds which is 7.1% of a bundle’s TTL compared to 2214 seconds or 
12.3% of a bundle’s TLL when BSP RSA-1024 is used. In terms of overhead ratio, DoSRAM 
reduces the overhead ratio by 48.49% compared to when no security mechanism is adopted. 
Bundles experience a buffertime average of 17960 seconds with DoSRAM as mitigation 
mechanism compared to 174 seconds when no security mechanism is implemented. A node 
expends 16557 mJ of power or 0.83% of the node’s total energy with DoSRAM as defence 
mechanism. This is 0.77% higher than when no security mechanism is adopted and 98.76% lower 
than the energy expended when BSP RSA-1024 is used as defence mechanism.
Similarly in the second scenario (spoofing scenario), delivery ratio is 98.3% using DoSRAM 
as defence mechanism which is a 41.5% improvement in delivery ratio compared to when no 
security is adopted and 22.1% improvement when BSP RSA-1024 is used. Similarly, the average 
latency of a bundle when our proposed mechanism is used is 675.2 seconds or 3.75% of a 
bundle’s TTL which is less than 1614.8 seconds or 8.97% of a bundle’s TTL when BSP RSA- 
1024 is used. For energy efficiency, a node expends 17124 mJ or 0.8562% of a node’s total power 
using DoSRAM which is less than 1.902955 x 10^  mJ or 95.15% of a node’s total power using 
BSP RSA-1024 but is higher than 1258 mJ or 0.0629% of a node’s total power when no security 
is implemented. In both scenarios, the results presented show significant improvements in 
delivery ratio, buffer time average, average latency and energy consumption of DoSRAM over 
schemes which use RSA-1024 digital signatures for bundle authentication. In addition, the results 
for the second scenario show the robustness of DoSRAM in maintaining a high delivery ratio 
even when the number of attackers is more than the number of legitimate nodes. In terms of 
scalability, the results from both scenarios show that the proposed mechanism can support a large 
number of nodes. The results show a degradation of performance for schemes that use RSA 
digital signature as the network size increases.
Inter-region DoS Mitigation: for super nodes such as the regional gateways and data mules 
which have a large amount of memory, CPU processing cycle and battery power, an enhanced 
version of DoSRAM was proposed. Enhanced-DoSRAM is based on the HMAC variant of the 
proposed DTN-Cookie. It exploits the assumption that DTN nodes have the in-built capability to 
read system clock to determine the correct time and are loosely-time synchronized. The proposed 
mechanism act as a lightweight classifier function to filter incoming bundles using variable nonce 
values in different timeslots in computing and verifying DTN-Cookies. The proposed mechanism
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uses ingress filtering at the gateways to ensure that received bundles originate only from 
legitimate gateways using a Legitimate Gateway List (LGL). A failed authentication threshold is 
set and traffic flow for each gateway is monitored. A gateway with a failed authentication attempt 
is logged in the Spoof Address List (SAL) and gateways which exceed the set failed 
authentication threshold are logged in the Node Isolation Log (NIL). The bundle size is checked 
to prevent memory exhaustion; the TTL is checked to prevent looping and network congestion by 
expired bundles. Finally the Class of Service (CoS) is checked to guarantee that all legitimate 
gateways have fair access to resources.
The results show a 64.73%, 64.98%, 67.78% and 71.11% improvement in delivery ratio for 
Enhanced-DoSRAM over RSA-1024 when the ratio of legitimate gateways to attackers is 1:1, 
1:2, 1:3 and 1:4 respectively. For Enhanced-DoSRAM, the average latency per bundle is 388 
seconds which is 2.15% of a bundle’s TLL and is slightly higher than the average latency of 201 
seconds when no security mechanism is implemented in the network. The average latency for 
Enhanced-DoSRAM is also higher than BSP RSA-1024 because less than 34% of legitimate 
bundles created are delivered when BSP RSA-1024 is used as defence mechanism. In terms of 
overall energy consumption, a gateway running the proposed mechanism with 20 attackers in the 
network consumes 20677 mJ of power which represents 0.0052% of the gateway’s total power. 
This is lower than 3.80382344 x 10^  mJ required or 95.1% of the gateway’s total power if BSP 
RSA-1024 is used as the defence mechanism. From the results, the comparative advantage of the 
proposed scheme in terms of resilience, robustness and scalability over the use of BSP RSA-1024 
digital signature scheme is established.
Flooding-based DoS Attack Mitigation: one of the objectives of DTN security is the protection 
of DTN resources from misuse by authorised and unauthorised entities. To achieve this objective, 
we proposed a dynamic and fully distributed flood mitigation mechanism for DTN gateways. The 
proposed mechanism combines enhanced-DoSRAM, ingress filtering and rate limiting techniques. 
Each node or gateway runs the algorithm and independently decides when to impose the rate 
limiting filter. The gateways are assigned different threshold values based on their capability and 
role in the network. The proposed flood mitigation mechanism has the capability to filter out 
attack traffic which use randomly spoofed source addresses or source addresses belonging to 
legitimate gateways. We adopted the use of standard spray-and-wait routing to boost performance 
while controlling the amount of traffic. The aim of this scheme is to identify and stop authorised 
nodes (with cryptographic credentials) and unauthorised nodes from sending bundles at a rate 
which they are not authorised to.
Two case scenarios were defined: (1) to test the impact of increasing the number of attackers 
and (2) to test the impact of traffic load on network performance. In the first scenario we test the 
impact of increasing the number of attackers on network performance. Delivery ratio is 99.17%
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with 50 attackers present in the network when the proposed mechanism is used. This is 67.64% or 
30.56% higher than when BSP RSA-1024 or rate-limiting are used as the flood defence 
mechanism respectively. Also the average latency per legitimate bundle when the proposed 
mechanism is used is 191 seconds which is 18 seconds lower than when rate-limiting is used as 
the defence against flooding. Most significantly, the energy consumption at the gateway with 5o 
attacker present in the network when the proposed mechanism is implemented is 39466 mJ or 
0.00097% of the gateway’s total energy reserve. This is lower than the 345674 mJ or 0.016% of 
the total gateway energy consumed when BSP RSA-1024 is used.
In the second scenario, we test the effects of traffic load (i.e. bundle generation rate) on 
network performance. The delivery ratio when the proposed flood defence mechanism is used is 
99.44% with 1 attack bundle generated every 20 seconds. This is 68.61%, 8.19% or 67.91% more 
than when no security mechanism, a rate-limiting mechanism or BSP RSA-1024 is implemented 
respectively. The average latency per bundle when the proposed mechanism is used is 190 
seconds which is lower than the 193 seconds when rate-limiting is used. The average latency for 
the proposed mechanism is slightly higher than when no security mechanism is implemented or 
when BSP RSA-1024 is used because the delivery ratios for the latter are below 32% of the total 
legitimate bundles generated. The energy consumption at a gateway when the proposed 
mechanism is implemented is 39464 mJ or 0.0001% of the gateway total power. This is lower 
than the 270468 mJ or 0.0068% of the gateway total power consumed when BSP RSA-1024 is 
used. The energy consumption of the proposed mechanism is however higher than the 1245 mJ or 
1240 mJ of energy consumed when no security mechanism or rate-limiting is implemented 
respectively. This is as a result of the cryptographic security processing at the gateways. In both 
case scenarios, the proposed flood defence mechanism performs better and is more energy- 
efficient than BSP RSA-1024. From the results, the proposed mechanism performs better than 
when no security mechanism is implemented or when rate limiting is adopted as security 
mechanism to protect DTN against flooding attacks.
The proposed schemes use one single message to achieve bundle or entity authentication 
thereby minimising the number of rounds trips which translates to less communication overheads. 
The results presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6 show that our proposed mechanisms accurately 
detects DoS attacks and outperforms the BSP RSA-1024 digital signature scheme in terms of 
delivery ratio, energy consumption and bandwidth efficiency.
7.2 Future W ork
In this thesis, we have proposed secure and resilient mechanisms against resource exhaustion and 
flooding-based DoS attacks in DTN. Mitigating DoS attacks in DTN is a challenging task which
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requires practical solutions. The work presented in this thesis can be continued and we list some 
directions for future work:
Improved Flexibility: We have proposed 3 variants of DTN-Cookies which can be used for 
bundle authentication. One area of future research is the possibility of making the proposed 
mechanisms flexible so that nodes within a neighbourhood or region can adaptively choose the 
strength of DTN-Cookie based on their perception of the DoS threat. Also individual nodes 
should be able to independently lower or increase the threshold value of the rate limiter based on 
the perceived Network Threat Level (NTL).
Compromised Node Problem: In our proposed mechanisms we assume that the attacker cannot 
compromise a node. The compromised node problem is an orthogonal problem which involves 
insider nodes. This research can be continued by implementing a cooperative version of the 
proposed mechanisms based on alert-approach, where DTN nodes will have the ability to report 
abnormal activity in a controlled manner. We will like to see how the use of control bundles 
(alerts) affect the metrics used in this thesis.
Investigating other Malicious Behaviours in DTN: In decentralised environments, because 
nodes are autonomous entities which try to maximize their interests they sometimes collude to 
disrupt the network. During the course of this work, we have thoroughly studied the types of DoS 
attacks which DTNs are vulnerable to. As a continuation of this work malicious behaviour such as 
packet dropping and falsification of routing table information in DTN can be investigated. The 
research should be geared towards how to identify and classify nodes that exhibit these different 
forms of misbehaviour and to apply different forms of punishment.
Many-to-One DoS Attacks: The focus of this work has been on DoS attacks in DTN, where the 
attacker acts independently without colluding with other attackers or compromising legitimate 
nodes to achieve his goal. Further research can be carried out to investigate Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks in DTN, where an attacker first compromises a number of nodes and then 
orders them to attack a target node or a set of nodes. It will be interesting to see the effects of 
DDoS attacks in a disconnected environment like DTN.
Further Optimization: Energy efficiency has been one of the main goals in the design of the 
proposed DTN-Cookies. In our work, end-to-end authentication was achieved using RSA-1024 
digital signatures. Further optimization of our mechanism can be achieved by replacing RSA- 
1024 digital signatures with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) i.e. Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-160 digital signatures. ECC is more appropriate for use on 
wireless devices with constrained memory resources and computational power and capability. It 
will be interesting to see what effect this change will have on the signature and key size, code 
size, memory requirements, power consumption etc.
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Appendix A
A Intra-Region DoS Attack Mitigation
A-1 Non-spoofing Scenario
In our simulations 100 nodes are uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters by 3400 meters area. Each 
node has a transmission range of 100m and travel at a speed of between 18 to 36 km/hr. Each 
legitimate node is assigned an initial energy of 2 x 10^  mJ and use the map-based mobility model. 
We vary the number of attackers from 10 to 50 to see what effect it has on bundle delivery ratio, 
average latency and energy efficiency of nodes. The attacker generates one bundle every 5 
seconds, moves with a speed between 18 to 36 km/hr and uses the Random Way Point (RWP) 
Mobility model. The second variant of our proposed DTN-Cookies is used for the simulations and 
details of the simulation parameters are shown in Table 4-1 of section 4.4.
Table A-1 Metrics Table: No Security Mechanism in Network
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio
0.0308
0.2330
0.0340
0.1897
0.0384
0.1155
0.0392
0.1464
0.0401
0.0990
Overhead Ratio
31.2892
4.0172
40.7362
4.8478
44.4029
7.7857
48.0869
6.0000
51.9198
8.8542
Average Latency (s)
276.5839
185.4805
223.6691
138.3576
187.4867
117.3196
169.8305
94.0028
168.0919
89.9792
Buffer Time Average (s)
94.3131
314.5724
84.7566
223.7134
81.1131
171.0862
82.3601
155.5398
82.8866
131.9058
Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 1268 1269 1269 1294 1272
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes in Blue and Attacker Nodes in Black
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In this scenario, no security mechanism is used to protect the network against DoS attacks. Table 
A-1 shows the performance of the network as the number of attackers increase from 10 to 50. The 
results for legitimate nodes are shown in blue and that for attackers are shown in black. With 10 
attackers in the network, the delivery ratio for legitimate bundles is 23.30% and 3.08% for attack 
bundles. However, as the number of attackers increase to 50, the delivery ratio for legitimate 
bundles drops to 9.90% and 4.01% for attack bundles. Average latency is based on the delay 
experienced by delivered bundles. From Table A-1, average latency decreases for both attack and 
legitimate bundles as the number of attackers increase. The reason for this is that a large number 
of bundles are dropped due to congestion and therefore not accounted for in these values. Latency 
is a combination of propagation delay, transmission delay, queuing delay and processing delay 
and is hnked to successful dehvery. Similarly, average buffertime decreases as the number of 
attackers increase due to high bundle drop rate. For the energy simulations, 10 nodes are 
uniformly deployed and all other simulation parameters on Table 4-1 remain the same. From 
Table A-1, the average energy consumed by a legitimate node is 1274mJ which represents 0.06% 
of its total battery reserve.
Table A-2 Metrics Table: DoSRAM Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio 0.9711 0.9608 0.9773 0.9588 0.9711
Overhead Ratio 1.0021 0.9979 1.0000 1.0172 1.0106
Average Latency (s) 1312.6019 1198.9258 1317.3200 1359.3363 1172.6110
Buffer Time Average (s) 17960.0065 17959.9832 17960.5213 17959.6719 17960.6792
Average Energy 
Consumption (mJ)
16585 16577 16571 16545 16565
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table A-2 shows the values of the evaluation metrics with the activation of the proposed DoS- 
Resilient Authentication Mechanism (DoSRAM). The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles is 
97.11% when 10 attackers are present in the network and does not drop below 95% despite the 
increase of attackers from 10 to 50. Similarly, the overhead ratio for legitimate bundles is 1.006 
while average latency rises from 1313 seconds to 1359 seconds with 10 and 40 attackers in the 
network respectively. However with 20 and 50 attackers present, average latency drops to 1198 
seconds and 1173 seconds respectively. This fall is due to the low overhead ratio which means
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that fewer bundles were relayed resulting in fewer processing overhead. Legitimate bundles 
experience a buffertime average of 17960 seconds which remains fairly constant throughout the 
duration of the simulation despite the increased presence of malicious nodes. For the energy 
simulations, 10 nodes are uniformly deployed and all other simulation parameters on Table 4-1 
remain the same. From Table A-2, the average energy consumed by a legitimate node is 16569mJ 
which represents 0.83% of its total battery reserve. The increase in energy consumption is as a 
result of security processing but still quite negligible.
Table A-3 Metrics Table: RSA-1024 Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio 0.9340 0.9216 0.9443 0.8639 0.7608
Overhead Ratio 1.0419 1.0694 1.0349 1.1169 1.2087
Average Latency (s) 2286.7190 2293.1026 2068.7365 2293.1026 2130.0469
Buffer Time Average (s) 17959.9049 17959.7280 17960.5231 17959.6719 17960.6691
Average Energy 
Consumption (mJ)
1092360 1177556 1573021 1884183 1990419
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table A-3 shows the value of different performance metrics when RSA-1024 digital signature is 
used as the security mechanism to combat DoS attacks. The delivery ratio when 10 attackers are 
present in the network is 93.4% and drops to 76.08% with 50 attackers present. This is an 
indication that the intensity of the DoS attack has an effect on the number of bundles delivered. 
Legitimate bundles are dropped as a result of congestion caused by the intensive verification 
operations associated with RSA signature verification which involves modular arithmetic. The 
average latency experienced by legitimate bundles is 22145 seconds and this is linked to the 
congestion as a result of security processing. Legitimate bundles experience a buffertime average 
of 17960 seconds indicating that bundles are being queued at intermediate nodes and forwarded as 
contact opportunities become available. The average energy consumed by a legitimate node is 
154350 mJ which is 77.18% of a node’s total battery power reserve. This is 76.36% more than 
energy consumed when DoSRAM is used as the mitigation mechanism.
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A-2 Spoofing Scenario
In this scenario, we assume that the attacker has the ability to hide his address, spoof a random 
address or spoof the address of any legitimate node. Based on this assumption, we avoid blocking 
addresses of nodes to prevent memory exhaustion and masquerade attacks. 10 nodes are deployed 
uniformly in a 4500m x 3400m area and the have a transmission range of 100m. The attacker 
generates one bundle every 5 seconds, moves with a speed between 18 to 36 km/hr and uses the 
Random Way Point Mobihty model. Each bundle generated by the attacker is 2M in size and we 
vary the number of attackers from 10 to 50 to see its impact on bundle delivery ratio, average 
latency and energy efficiency of nodes. The second variant of our proposed DTN-Cookies is used 
for the simulations and details of the simulation parameters are shown in Table 4-1. Apart from 
the assumption that the attacker can spoof addresses, the number of attackers is more than the 
number of legitimate nodes. The aim is to test the robustness of the proposed security mechanism 
to withstand DoS attacks of varying intensity and power.
Table A-4 Metrics Table: No Security Mechanism in Network
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio
0.0075
0.8099
0.0126
0.6364
0.0153
0.5517
0.0184
0.4587
0.0203
0.3802
Overhead Ratio
2.5569
3.6199
3.1031
3.6948
3.6555
3.8090
3.9874
4.1577
4.4183
4.3913
Average Latency (seconds)
297.2022
674.0658
162.3536
415.2494
158.2266
328.7903
135.7999
241.5770
137.1794
228.1679
Buffer Time Average (seconds)
29.7680
1638.0271
50.1731
808.6496
68.9865
582.5761
86.5316
424.5302
103.9782
355.7056
Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 1253 1258 1259 1258 1261
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes in Blue and Attacker Nodes in Black
Table A-4 shows the delivery ratio, overhead ratio, average latency, buffertime average and 
energy consumption of nodes. No security mechanism is adopted to protect the network against 
DoS attacks. The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles declines from 80.99% to 38.02% with 10 
and 50 attackers present in the network respectively. The overhead ratio of legitimate nodes keeps
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increasing as the number of attackers increase indicating the relay of more attack bundles. The 
average latency for legitimate bundles is 674 seconds with 10 attackers and falls to 228 seconds 
with 50 attackers in the network. This is consistent with the fact that there was a decline in 
delivery ratio as the number of attackers increased and less processing at the nodes. The 
buffertime average for legitimate bundles falls from 1638 seconds to 355 seconds as the number 
of attackers increase from 10 to 50. This shows that fewer bundles are buffered at intermediate 
nodes which are an indication of a high bundle drop rate. From Table A-4, the energy consumed 
by legitimate nodes is neghgible. On average, the energy expended by a legitimate node is 1258 
mJ which is 0.0629% of a node’s total battery power.
Table A-5 Metrics Table: DoSRAM Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio 0.9979 0.9876 0.9814 0.9731 0.9752
Overhead Ratio 3.7101 3.7406 3.7263 3.7113 3.6843
Average Latency (s) 701.4114 674.1726 631.4463 643.7072 725.4633
Buffer Time Average (s) 8995.6257 8595.5206 8574.4085 8597.3884 8489.9494
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
16731 16933 17103 17337 17516
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table A-5 shows the results when DoSRAM is used as the mitigation mechanism, delivery ratio 
remains fairly constant at 98.3% on average. With 10 attackers the dehvery ratio is 99.79% and 
dechnes to 97.52% with 50 attackers in the network. Overhead ratio is 3.71452 on average despite 
an increase in attack intensity with more attacking nodes in the network. Security processing is 
one factor that contributes to the latency in the network. From the results shown in Table A-5, 
DoSRAM adds little to the average latency during the computation and verification of DTN- 
Cookies. The average latency experienced by legitimate bundles is 675 seconds on average. The 
buffertime average of each legitimate bundle delivered to destination is 8651 seconds. This is an 
indication that network resources such as memory and buffers are available because attack 
bundles are dropped during bundle verification. As stated earlier, security processing comes with 
a cost. From the table, the average energy expended by a legitimate node is 17124 mJ 
representing 0.8562% of a node’s total battery power.
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Table A-6 Metrics Table: RSA-1024 Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Dehvery Ratio 0.8140 0.8533 0.7893 0.6839 0.6736
Overhead Ratio 4.1853 4.0702 4.2173 4.4139 4.3865
Average Latency (s) 1342.8815 1800.5189 1544.8610 1792.6734 1592.9411
Buffer Time Average (s) 9785.2008 9040.2360 9212.9911 10704.2422 10301.8128
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
1603849 1923612 1987314 2000000 2000000
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Using RSA-1024 as security mechanism, Table A-6 shows the dehvery ratio for legitimate 
bundles. The dehvery ratio is 81.4%, 85.33% with 10 and 20 attackers respectively. Dehvery ratio 
dechnes to 67.36% when there are 50 attacking nodes in the network. The overhead ratio is 
4.25464 on average. The RSA algorithm is based on modular exponentiation which is resource­
intensive. This security processing contributes quite significantly to the overall latency in the 
system. On average, a legitimate bundle experiences 1615 seconds delay from source to 
destination. For buffer time average, a legitimate bundle spends 9809 seconds while energy 
consumption per node increases as the attack intensity increases. It can be observed from the table 
that with 40 or 50 attackers in the network, total battery of a node is completely depleted. This 
means that such nodes cannot send or receive bundles which explain the reason behind low 
dehvery ratio.
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Appendix B
B Inter-Region DoS Attack Mitigation
In our simulations 5 super nodes are uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters by 3400 meters area as 
gateways. These super nodes are defined as static gateways and are visited periodically by another 
mobile gateway which acts as data mule to provide connectivity to the 5 defined regions. The 
gateways have a transmission speed of 54Mbps and transmission range of 300m which gives it a 
wider coverage than other nodes in the network. The gateways and the data mule have an initial 
energy of 4 x 10^  mJ. To evaluate the impact of attack power on bundle delivery ratio, average 
latency, buffertime average and energy consumption, we vary the number of attackers from 5 to 
20. A legitimate node generates one bundle every 60 seconds while an attacker generates one 
bundle every 5 seconds. Details of the simulation parameters are shown in the Table 5-2 of 
section 4.4 and detailed simulation results are shown in Table B-1, Table B-2, Table B-3 and 
Table B-4.
Table B-1 Metrics Table: No Security Mechanism in Network
Number of Attackers 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio
0.9928
0.6194
0.9928
0.6861
0.9907
0.6722
0.9910
0.6778
Overhead Ratio
4.3579
1.6143
4.3476
1.4939
4.3650
1.5289
4.3691
1.5205
Average Latency (s)
167.0154
251.4484
166.1817
265.3883
158.0229
247.2860
164.9937
259.8750
Buffer Time Average (s)
489.1826
344.0008
695.6572
342.7551
877.3184
327.3665
1032.7656
339.1664
Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 622.53 622.35 622.80 622.25
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes in Blue and Attacker Nodes in Black
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Table B-1 shows the performance metrics when no security mechanism is applied in the network. 
The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles is affected as the number of attackers increase in the 
network. The dehvery ratio of legitimate bundles with 5 attackers in the network is 61.94% and 
67.78% when there are 20 attackers in the network. Attack bundles have a dehvery ratio of 
99.18% on average as the number of attackers increase from 5 to 20. The overhead ratio with 5 
attackers in the network is 5.9722 and rises to 5.8896 with 20 attackers in the network. For 
legitimate bundles, the latency average is 251 seconds with 5 attackers in the network and 265 
seconds with 10 attackers. The latency average falls sharply to 247 seconds as a result of a fall in 
dehvery ratio from 68.61 % to 67.22%. The average latency for attack bundles is 167 seconds 
with 5 attackers and gradually faUs to 165 seconds with 20 attackers present in the network. This 
is less than the value for legitimate bundles. Buffertime average is the average time a bundle 
stayed in the buffer of each node. The buffertime average for attack bundles increases from 489 
seconds with 5 attackers in the network to 1033 seconds with 20 attackers in the network. The 
reverse is the case for legitimate bundles with the buffertime average decreasing from 344 
seconds with 5 attackers to 339 seconds with 20 attackers in the network. Energy consumption is 
low at the gateways because no security mechanism is used. Each gateway consumes 662 mJ of 
energy during the processing and transmission of bundles. This represents 0.00016% of the 
gateway’s total battery power.
Table B-2 Metrics Table: Enbanced-DoSRAM Activated
Number of Attackers 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio 0.9806 0.9750 0.9861 0.9750
Overhead Ratio 3.0652 3.0769 3.0423 3.0798
Average Latency (s) 395.5635 385.5843 389.4228 381.6154
Buffer Time Average (s) 2362.6552 2376.7612 2346.9583 2356.6058
Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 20263.017 20393.20 20550.65 20677.317
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table B-2 shows metrics when Enhanced-DoSRAM is used as the security mechanism to thwart 
DoS attacks. No attack bundle is delivered to destination, instead attack bundles are dropped at 
the first hop due to bundle authentication failure. The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles is 
98.06% with 5 attackers and drops to 97.50% with 10 attackers. The delivery ratio fluctuates 
slightly due to the attack intensity. Another factor which affects the delivery ratio is data mule
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wait time. A data mule pauses for a period between 0 to 120 seconds during each visit to a region 
and some legitimate bundles may expire on transit. However, the average the delivery ratio does 
not fall below 97.91% even as the number of attackers increases from 5 to 20. Overhead ratio 
remains fairly constant on 3.06605 notwithstanding an increase in the number of attackers. 
Average latency with 5 attackers present in the network is 396 seconds, 386 seconds with 10 
attackers present and 382 seconds when there are 20 attackers. As stated earlier, the wait time at 
each region by the data mule also influences the average latency for each legitimate bundle that is 
delivered to destination. It is worthy of note that the average latency experienced by a legitimate 
bundle is 2.16% of a bundle’s TLL. With Enhanced-DoSRAM activated, the buffertime average 
for legitimate bundles is about 2361 seconds which is an indication that the legitimate bundles are 
being buffered at intermediate nodes. This is an improvement when compared to the result in 
Table B-1. Security processing requires additional CPU cycles, memory and power. Average 
energy consumption increases slightly to 20471 mJ on average using Enhanced-DoSRAM as 
security mechanism. This represents 0.00512% of a gateway’s total battery power.
Table B-3 Metrics Table: RSA-1024 Activated
Number of Attackers 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio 0.3333 0.3222 0.3083 0.2639
Overhead Ratio 9.0167 9.3103 9.0631 9.2000
Average Latency (s) 206.0275 195.0698 188.0306 215.2253
Buffer Time Average (s) 2364.3388 2375.9484 2410.5078 2628.3002
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
132694095.40 246097799.20 345222055.40 380382344.40
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table B-3 shows the performance metrics when RSA-1024 is used as security mechanism against 
DoS attacks. Delivery ratio is 33.33% when 5 attackers are present and as the intensity of attack 
increases with 20 attackers, the delivery ratio falls to 26.39%. RSA-1024 is known to be resource­
intensive which causes a large number of legitimate bundles to be dropped due to bundle expiry 
and congestion. The overhead ratio is 9.1475 and is higher when compared to the overhead ratio 
for Enhanced-DoSRAM in Table B-2. The reason is that a large number of relayed bundles are 
not delivered to destination. The average latency experienced by a legitimate bundle is 206 
seconds with 5 attackers, falls to 188 seconds with 15 attackers in the network and rises to 215
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seconds with 20 attackers. Average latency is the cumulative sum of latencies experienced by 
each delivered bundle divided by the number of delivered bundles. The lower the delivery ratio, 
the lower the average latency and from the results shown in Table B-3, delivery ratio falls as the 
number of attackers increase. The few bundles delivered to destination experience a high 
buffertime average which increases from 2364 seconds to 2628 seconds with 5 and 20 attackers 
respectively. This is an indication that the resource-intensive operations of RSA digital signatures 
affect the propagation of legitimate bundles. The gateways will be busy processing attack bundles 
with bogus signatures and legitimate bundles may be dropped due to bundle expiry. The energy 
consumption at a gateway when there are 5 attackers in the network is 1.32694095 x 10^  mJ 
which represents 33.17% of the total battery power of a gateway. However with 20 attackers, the 
energy consumption is 3.80382344 x 10^  mJ which is equivalent to 95.1% of a gateway’s total 
battery power.
Table B-4 Metrics Table: Enhanced-DoSRAM Activated (Without Filtering/Blocking)
Number of Attackers 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio 0.9806 0.9750 0.9861 0.9750
Overhead Ratio 3.0652 3.0769 3.0423 3.0798
Average Latency (s) 395.5635 385.5843 389.4228 381.6154
Buffer Time Average (s) 2362.6552 2376.7612 2346.9583 2356.6058
Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 12620360.8 - 23667986.7 35420383 44760305.38
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table B-4 shows the performance of Enhanced-DoSRAM without a blocking mechanism. It is 
clear that Enhanced-DoSRAM with a blocking mechanism (Table B-2) and Enhanced-DoSRAM 
without a blocking mechanism (Table B-4) deliver the same performance. The only difference is 
in the average energy consumption. Without the blocking mechanism, the average energy 
consumption increases because every single bundle from the attacker has to be verified. Energy 
consumed by the gateway with 5 attackers present in the network is 1.2620360 x 10^  mJ which 
represents 3.16% of the gateway’s total battery power. With 10 attackers, energy consumption is 
2.3667986 x 10^  mJ which is 5.92% of the total battery power of a gateway. Energy consumption 
rises with 20 attackers to 4.4760305 x 10^  mJ which represents 11.19% of a gateway’s total power 
reserve. It therefore means that source identification, ingress filtering and blocking the attack 
source are critical in making the proposed mechanism more energy efficient.
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Appendix C
C Flood-based DoS Attack Mitigation
In our simulations 5 super nodes are uniformly deployed in a 4500 meters by 3400 meters area as 
gateways and are defined as static. The gateways have transmission speed and range of 54 Mbps 
and 300m respectively and are visited periodically by a data mule. Each gateway including the 
gateway is assigned an initial energy of 4 x 10^  mJ. The data mule pauses for 0 to 5 seconds in 
each region before proceeding to the next region. An attacker generates one bundle every 5 
seconds. In the first scenario, we evaluate the effect of increasing the number of attackers from 10 
to 50 on delivery ratio, average latency, buffertime average and energy consumption. In the 
second scenario, we vary the bundle generation rate from 1 bundle per second to 1 bundle every 
20 seconds. The purpose is to evaluate the effect of high bundle rate used in bandwidth DoS 
attacks on network performance. Details of the simulation parameters are shown in Table 6-1 of 
section 6.3.1 and detailed results in Table C-1-Table C-7.
C-1 Impact of Number of Attackers on Network Performance
Table C-1 shows the performance metrics when no security mechanism apart from rate-limiting is 
adopted during a flooding DoS attack. In this scenario we intend to see the effect of increasing the 
number of attackers from 10 to 50 on delivery ratio, overhead ratio, average latency, buffertime 
average and energy consumption. It is clear from Table C-1 that the delivery ratio for legitimate 
bundles declines while that for attack bundles increases with an increase in the number of 
attackers. For legitimate bundles, delivery ratio is 90.69% with 10 attackers present in the network 
but declines to 85.69% with 20 attackers present. As the number of attackers increase to 50, 
delivery ratio drops to 68.61%. On the contrary, the delivery ratio for attack bundles with 10 
attackers in the network is 9.11%, 10.02% with 20 attackers and 16.93% when there 50 attackers. 
It is clear that rate-limiting cannot really prevent high bandwidth DoS attacks from causing 
damage as the result on Table C-1 shows. The Overhead ratio is rises from 53.0319 with 10 
attackers to 139.3511 with 50 attackers. This is because with the presence of more attackers, more 
attack bundles are generated and relayed. The average latency experienced by legitimate bundles
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with 10 attackers present in the network is 199 seconds and increases to 214 seconds with 50 
attackers. Both attack bundles and legitimate bundles experience less buffertime average as the 
number of attackers increase. A gateway only accepts a bundle if there is available space in its 
buffer to store that bundle and also drops bundles whenever its buffer is full to ease congestion. 
This explains the dechne in buffertime average for both attack and legitimate bundles. The 
buffertime average for legitimate bundles when there are 10 attackers is 2233 seconds and drops 
to 1626 seconds with 50 attackers. As bundles are relayed from hop to hop, more energy is 
expended in their processing and transmission. The average energy consumption by a gateway is 
1238 mJ which represents 0.000031% of a gateway’s battery power. It can be observed that the 
energy consumption remains fairly constant as the number of attackers increase because only a 
small faction of attack bundles are relayed or delivered. This small faction of attack bundles are 
allowed to pass through to avoid false positives.
Table C-1 Metrics Table: No Security + Rate-limiting Mechanism Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio
0.0911
0.9069
0.1002
0.8569
0.1235
0.7944
0.1463
0.7222
0.1693
0.6861
Overhead Ratio
49.8221
3.2098
91.3776
3.2853
111.2381
3.4895
125.4517
3.5808
135.7013
3.6498
Average Latency (s)
193.7910
198.8245
123.8398
198.3849
332.1653
217.1264
294.3880
214.4335
364.5283
214.8773
Buffer Time Average (s)
487.8942
2233.2956
477.3232
2162.2832
455.1705
1994.3796
429.8117
1857.0262
401.0763
1626.4498
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
1238.75 1237.25 1239.25 1238.75 1237.5
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes in Blue and Attacker Nodes in Black
Table C-2 shows the results when we activate our flood mitigation mechanism which uses 
Enhanced-DoSRAM and incorporates ingress filtering and rate-limiting. Delivery ratio is largely 
unaffected by the presence of attackers in the network. Delivery ratio for legitimate bundles is 
99.31% with 10 attackers, 99.44% with 20 attackers in the network and 99.17% despite the 
increase in the number of attackers from 30 to 50. No attack bundle is delivered instead they are
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dropped by either the ingress filtering mechanism, rate-limiting mechanism or the light-weight 
authentication mechanism (Enhanced-DoSRAM). The overhead ratio is 3.18668 on average 
which is low compared to the result in Table C-1. The proposed mechanism ensures that at attack 
bundles are dropped at the first hop and relayed no further. The average latency experienced by a 
legitimate bundle is 191 seconds on average while the buffertime average remains fairly constant 
at 2530 seconds on average. The average energy consumption at the gateways is not affected by 
the increase in the number of attackers. Most attack bundles are dropped during ingress filtering 
and rate-limiting stages before bundle authentication which involves light-weight symmetric 
cryptographic operations. The average energy consumption is 39465 mJ which is equivalent to 
0.00099% of a gateway’s total battery power.
Table C-2 Metrics Table: Enhanced-DoSRAM + Rate-limiting Mechanism Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio 0.9931 0.9944 0.9917 0.9917 0.9917
Overhead Ratio 3.1650 3.1899 3.1849 3.1961 3.1975
Average Latency (s) 189.9229 192.5080 191.0371 190.9542 191.4120
Buffer Time Average (s) 2538.7394 2528.7680 2531.8267 2527.7176 2526.2670
Average Energy 
Consumption (mJ)
39462.50 39464 39464.5 39466.5 39466.5
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table C-3 Metrics Table: RSA-1024 + Rate-limiting Mechanism Activated
Number of Attackers 10 20 30 40 50
Delivery Ratio 0.3153 0.3153 0.3153 0.3153 0.3153
Overhead Ratio 10.0352 10.0485 10.0176 10.0573 10.0573
Average Latency (s) 95.9344 106.0678 107.2965 106.5211 104.5330
Buffer Time Average (s) 2525.8412 2530.9327 2531.8096 2527.3619 2526.2505
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
312077.75 395537.25 478402.75 562255.50 645674.25
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
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Table C-3 shows the results of using RSA-1024 in combination with rate limiting to mitigate 
flooding DoS attacks. The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles as the number of attackers increase 
from 10 to 50 is 31.53% with no attack bundles is delivered. On average the overhead ratio is 
10.04318 because 68.47% of legitimate bundles are not dehvered to destination. The average 
latency for legitimate bundles is 96 seconds when 10 attackers are in the network and gradually 
increases to an average of 106 seconds with 20, 30, 40 and 50 attackers present respectively 
which is low compared to the result Table C-2. Since average latency is the cumulative sum of 
latencies experienced by each delivered bundle divided by the number of delivered bundles. From
Table C-3, dehvery ratio is less than 32% which explains why the average latency is low. Each 
legitimate bundle experiences a buffertime average of 2528 seconds on average. Two factors are 
responsible for this: (1) no attack bundle is stored in the buffers (2) the strong security processing 
associated with RSA impedes the free flow of legitimate traffic causing bundles to remain longer 
in buffers. Average energy consumed by a gateway rises as the number of attackers increase. 
Average energy consumed with 10 attackers present is 312077 mJ and increases to 645674 mJ 
with 50 attackers in the network. This represents 0.008% and 0.016% of the gateway’s total 
battery power respectively.
C-2 Impact of Traffic Load on Network Performance
In this section we evaluate the impact of bundle generation rate on network performance.
Table C-4 Metrics Table: No Security Mechanism Activated
Bundle Generation Rate (1 bdl/s) 1 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio
0.8919
0.1444
0.9927
0.2653
0.9979
0.2222
0.9965
0.2833
0.9958
0.3083
Overhead Ratio
12.2302
2.4135
45.4666
2.2513
97.1986
2.4625
138.4836
1.9804
165.3491
2.0946
Average Latency (s)
83.8262
73.8538
105.3812
96.9958
109.0228
111.4231
118.5432
120.0770
124.1988
111.1284
Buffer Time Average (s)
45.6368
60.1903
58.0700
81.9430
53.8800
80.0540
55.9547
106.3484
61.6111
111.6620
Average Energy Consumption (mJ) 1245.25 1245.5 1245.5 1245.25 1244.75
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Table C-4 shows the performance of a gateway with no security mechanism implemented. The 
dehvery ratio of attack bundles increases as the attack intensity reduces to an optimum level. 
From the results in Table C-1, generating 1 bundle per second affects the dehvery ratio of 
legitimate bundles with 14.44% of legitimate bundles dehvered and the dehvery ratio for attack 
bundles is 89.19%. The attack is most effective when the attacker generates 1 bundle every 10 
seconds. The dehvery ratio for attack bundles rises to 99.79% while that for legitimate bundles 
decreases to 22.22%. Overhead ratio rises as the attack intensity reduces. The overhead ratio is 
14.6437 when the attacker generates 1 bundle per second and rises to 167.4437 when the attacker 
generates 1 bundle every 20 seconds. The average latency for a legitimate bundle is 74 seconds 
when an attacker generates 1 bundle per second while average latency is 111 seconds if the 
attacker generates 1 bundle every 20 seconds. Table C-4 also shows that the buffertime average 
for legitimate bundles increase from 60 seconds when 1 attack bundle is generated per second to 
112 seconds when 1 attack bundle is generated every 20 seconds. Energy consumption at the 
gateways is relatively low since no form of security processing is involved. The energy consumed 
by a gateway is 1245 mJ which is the energy cost in transmitting/receiving bundles and scan 
energy cost associated with node discovery.
Table C-5 Metrics Table: No Security + Rate-limiting Mechanism Activated
Bundle Generation Rate 
(1 Bdl/s)
1 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio
0.0528
0.9458
0.0881
0.9306
0.1139
0.9278
0.1240
0.9333
0.1509
0.9125
Overhead Ratio
7.7629
3.1542
25.2812
3.1776
39.6463
3.1452
55.0224
3.0595
60.3466
3.1065
Average Latency (s)
92.3302
196.7094
148.3781
194.5240
150.4687
193.6157
169.6255
192.3315
183.6500
191.0205
Buffer Time Average (s)
211.6302
2356.5251
467.9585
2296.4881
543.1347
2261.5475
573.6904
2222.9335
583.7562
2192.8828
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
1239.75 1240.75 1239.50 1239.75 1240.75
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes in Blue and Attacker Nodes in Black
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Table C-5 shows the effect of using rate hmiting as the only form of mitigation during a flooding 
DoS attack. It is evident that the rate hmiting mechanism reduces the effect of the attack resulting 
in improvement in delivery ratio. With 1 attack bundle is generated per second, the delivery ratio 
for legitimate bundles is 94.58%. When the attacker generates 1 bundle every 20 seconds, the 
delivery ratio for legitimate bundles is 91.25%. Conversely, the delivery ratio of attack bundles 
rises from 5.28% with 1 attack bundle generated per second to 15.09% with 1 attack bundle 
generated every 20 seconds. Overhead ratio is dependent on the number of relayed and delivered 
bundles. Overhead ratio is higher (63.4531) when 1 attack bundle is generated every 20 seconds 
than when 1 attack bundle is generated per second (10.9171). The average latency per legitimate 
bundle is 197 seconds when a bundle is generated per second while the average latency when a 
bundle is generated every 20 seconds is 191 seconds. The buffertime average for a legitimate 
bundle is 2357 seconds with 1 attack bundle generated every second and declines to 2193 seconds 
when the attacker generates 1 bundle every 20 seconds. The average energy consumption of a 
gateway with varying bundle generation rates is 1240 mJ as shown in Table C-5.
Table C-6 Metrics Table: Enhanced-DoSRAM + Rate-limiting Mechanism Activated
Bundle Generation Rate 
(1 Bdl/s)
1 5 10 15 20
Delivery Ratio 0.9931 0.9944 0.9944 0.9944 0.9944
Overhead Ratio 3.1902 3.1732 3.1913 3.1830 3.1760
Average Latency (s) 191.7245 191.3295 190.6068 187.8927 188.4966
Buffer Time Average (s) 2520.7915 2542.8100 2529.8680 2542.0501 2540.3615
Average Energy 
Consumption (mJ)
39463 39465.50 39465 39464.25 39464.25
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table C-6 shows the effect of using the proposed mechanism to mitigate flooding DoS attacks. By 
varying the bundle generation rate, the average dehvery ratio for legitimate bundles when 1 attack 
bundle is generated per second is 99.31%. As the attack intensity eases, delivery ratio for 
legitimate bundles rises to 94.44%. Overhead ratio is 3.18274 and the average latency reduces 
from 192 seconds to 188 seconds with the bundle generation rate varying from 1 attack bundle per 
second to 1 attack bundle every 20 seconds respectively. The buffertime average for a legitimate
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bundle is 2535 seconds and the energy consumed by a gateway is 39464 mJ on average which 
represents 0.00099% of gateway’s total battery power.
Table C-7 Metrics Table: RSA-1024 + Rate-limiting Mechanism Activated
Bundle Generation Rate(l Bdl/s) 1 5 10 15 20
Dehvery Ratio 0.3153 0.3153 0.3153 0.3153 0.3153
Overhead Ratio 10.0485 10.0088 10.0661 10.0396 10.0220
Average Latency (s) 99.5744 108.4132 105.9542 105.5264 106.0789
Buffer Time Average (s) 2530.5006 2541.8336 2528.8653 2538.6944 2538.3788
Average Energy Consumption 
(mJ)
270665.75 269995.00 271059.25 270507.50 270112.75
* Metrics for Legitimate Nodes
Table C-7 shows the performance of using RSA-1024 in combination with rate-limiting as the 
security mechanism against flooding DoS attacks. The delivery ratio for legitimate bundles 
stagnates at 31.53% despite the fact that no attack bundle is dehvered to destination. The overhead 
ratio is 10.037 on average and is higher than that of the proposed flood defence mechanism 
because 68.47% of legitimate bundles could not be dehvered due to congestion and expiry of 
TTL. Since average latency is calculated based on the number of dehvered bundles, the low 
average latency as shown in Table C-7 is reflective of the low dehvery ratio for legitimate bundles 
using RSA-1024. Each legitimate bundle dehvered to destination experiences a buffertime 
average of 2538 seconds which indicates that the availability of buffer space. The average energy 
consumption remains fairly constant at an average of 270468 mJ which is 6.85 times higher than 
the energy required by the proposed mechanism in Table C-6.
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Appendix D
D The Opportunistic Network Environment 
(ONE) Simulator
One of the challenges in DTN research according to the author in [58] is the dearth of good 
simulators for protocol evaluation. In MANET research for example, there are a number of good 
simulators such as ns-2 [127] and OMNeT++ [128] which have been used extensively for a 
number of years. The two existing DTN simulators are dtnSim [56] which does not have good 
DTN support and dtnSim2 [129] which is specifically built for DTN routing simulations. Based 
on the stated limitations there was need for a more robust simulator for DTN research. The 
Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator is particularly suitable for performing 
simulations for terrestrial DTNs. The ONE simulator has in-built capabilities for mobility 
modelhng, integrated support for DTN routing and incorporates a number of tools to support 
visualization and report generation.
The core of the ONE is an agent-based discrete event simulator which uses time slicing 
approach to efficiently support simultaneous movement and routing simulation. The simulation 
time advances in fixed steps and the simulator supports any number of different types of wireless 
nodes which can be grouped in node groups which share common parameters such as buffer size 
radio range and mobility model. The simulator has GUI support to allow the interaction between 
the movement modelling and routing simulation to be visualized. The simulator supports report 
modules which capture data during the simulation for further analysis. ONE can be run on Linux, 
Windows or any other platform which supports Java.
Simulations in the ONE can be run in the GUI or Batch modes. The GUI mode is best suited 
for testing, debugging and for demonstration purposes. The GUI mode allows the simulation to be 
visualized in real-time as shown in Figure D-1. The GUI mode also allows for node inspection 
and the retrieval of routing specific information. On the other hand, the Batch mode is best for 
running large amount of simulation involving different sets of parameters. The Batch mode is 
well-suited when real-time visualization is not a need and all processing power is channelled for 
the simulation. Both modes support the generation of reports for further analysis.
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Figure D-1 Screen Shot Showing the Graphical User Interface of the ONE Simulator
D-1 Extending the ONE Simulator
The ONE simulator is a simulation environment that can be easily extended because the program 
is released under the open-source General Public License (GPL) [130]. It is possible to modify the 
behaviour of the simulator using the several extension hooks without altering the original source 
code. Thi'ough the use of the Java Reflection API, the routing modules, report modules, event 
generators and movement models are loaded dynamically when the simulator is started. The 
dynamic loading allows a user to create new classes and define its name in the configuration file 
which is loaded automatically when a defined scenario is started. For example all routing modules 
must extend the MessageRouter class. New movement models can be created by extending the 
MovementModel class which support the configuration and generation of uniform speeds and 
wait-time distributions. Event generators are created in the input interface package and must 
implement the EventQueue interface.
Report modules can be found in the Report package which supports the generation of 
customized statistics and reports for the simulation. A custom report module must extend the 
Report class and implement one of the listening interfaces. Modules which implement the 
ConnectionListener interface will be notified whenever a connection between two nodes is UP or 
DOWN. The MessageListener is used to capture message related events such as creation and 
transfers of a new message from one node to another. The MovementListener interface is used for
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tracking new destinations of a moving node while the UpdateListener gets notification every time 
the nodes are updated (every time step as defined in the configuration file). To implement our 
proposed mechanisms, we extended the following classes of the ONE simulator version 1.4,1: 
SprayAndWaitRouter class in the routing package, Message class in core package and 
MessageCreateEvent class in input package. We defined a new Security package which contains 
the source code for (1) DTN-Cookie generation and verification (2) Signature generation and 
verification (3) BundleRateCache (4) FailedAuthenticationCache. The BundleRateCache is used 
to log the number of bundles processed per flow. Data stored in this cache helps a node identify 
nodes that have exceeded the bundle rate threshold. The FailedAuthenticationCache is useful to 
log failed authentication attempts per flow and the blocking of the attacker.
To capture the required data and statistics for generating results, three new classes were defined 
and implemented in the Report package which includes:
• MessageStatsReportPerApplication: is modified from the inbuilt MessageStatReport to 
capture message delivery statistics, average latency, overhead ratio and buffertime 
average based on the defined number of event generators
• MessageTransferCountPerConnection: captures the average number of messages 
delivered per connection
• DTNCookieEnergyLevelReport: captures the amount of energy expended during 
transmit/receive operations, node discovery, table lookups, key fetch operations and 
cryptographic operations.
D-2 Limitations of the Simulator
The ONE is a good and capable simulator for DTN environments but has a number of limitations. 
The first limitation is that the simulation time is increased in finite steps, where all node 
movement and message transfers are progressed at the same time during simulations. From the 
simulator’s viewpoint, an event (e.g. completed transfer, connection broken or node mobility) 
happens before or after a full time step. The time step is configured depending on the required 
update frequency. The smaller the time step the slower the simulation, simulations are based on 
the use of discrete events the approximate real-world behaviour. The second limitation is that the 
ONE simulator does not support lower layers functionality such as the physical and MAC layers. 
Two nodes in communication range can exchange messages irrespective of the configured speed 
for connections. In the real world, the achievable transmission speeds are affected by distance, 
interference and obstacles which are not taken into account by the simulator at the moment. A 
third limitation is that nodes in the simulation are constantly turned ON but in the real-world radio 
devices implement occasional sleep cycles, switch to idle mode or are probed at specific intervals
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in order to save battery. The mobility models though complex and realistic compared to the 
simple models like the Random Waypoint Model (RWP), still lack many details relating to the 
real world. Finally, the ONE simulator has no in-built support for security. To provide security to 
apphcations, we developed our algorithms in Java using NetBeans 6.0.1 Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE). The IDE supports the Security Application Programming Interface (API) 
built around the java.secuiity package which allows the generation of cryptographic hashes and 
digital signatures in the Java Architecture.
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